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Background and motivation 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
”The history of any one part of the Earth, like the life of a soldier, consists 
of long periods of boredom and short periods of terror.” 
-Derek Victor Ager 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The Finnish system of higher education is in turmoil. Universities are facing 
growing pressures of global competition for the best talent, of national 
private sector –driven demand for well-educated workforce with diverse 
problem solving skills, and of decaying public funding. The very 
foundations of the Nordic well-fare state itself are at risk. As an answer to 
the challenges, a major national university reform is taking place, including 
changes in legislation, funding and goals concerning the universities. All 
universities have been given more economic freedom through transforming 
their legal persons from government agencies to autonomous entities. 
Furthermore, a number of new universities have been formed through 
mergers. 
Spearheading the entire reform is the forming of the new Aalto 
University, a project officially started in 2007 under the label ―Innovation 
University‖. Aalto is an ambitious endeavor of national scale, striving to be 
recognized globally as a top-class university in 10 years and being created 
through the merger of three national number one universities in their own 
fields: Helsinki University of Technology (TKK), Helsinki School of 
Economics (HSE) and University of Industrial Art and Design Helsinki 
(TaiK).  
To make the Aalto-project possible, the Finnish government has made 
the new university major contributions both in funding and in customizing 
legislation for the needs of Aalto. In addition, Finnish industries have 
played a major part in lobbying for and funding the university. This ―special 
treatment‖ has ensured Aalto a place at the heart of Finnish public debate 
concerning the university reform and geographic distribution of 
government funding across the country, contributing to high political stakes 
and ensuring continued media attention with the project.     
Aalto University formally started its operations 1.1.2010, forcing a 
number of fundamental changes to the old organizations it is based on. 
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These include, but are not limited to, a new top management, new 
management system and complete reorganization of central 
administration, new private foundation -based organizational form with 
increased financial responsibilities, moving the whole personnel from 
public civil service positions to private contracts, major organizational 
restructuring, and a stated goal of the new top management to change the 
culture of the university.  
Indeed, such a profound transformation would be challenging for any 
organization. An important further flavor here, however, is that we are 
considering a public university transformation. Several writers have 
described the general characteristics of university organizations. For 
instance Hannan and Freeman (1989: 113) described modern universities 
as ―holding companies‖ with limited central authority causing several 
problems such as strategic focus shifts based on popular trends and PR-
value, difficulties in setting up and closing down subunits, and resource 
reallocation from good-performing units to bad ones. Mintzberg (2009: 
241-273) gives universities as an example of organizations with a diversity 
of internal political games. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that 
universities, R&D units and government agencies maintain a façade of 
standardized, legitimated, formal structures while actually allowing 
variation in internal processes because of practical considerations. 
Furthermore, Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) introduced universities as a 
prime example of their ―garbage can model‖ where decision making is 
accidental and is the product of problems and solutions that get associated 
randomly. Scott (2003) describes the problems of overconformity and goal 
displacement typical in large bureaucratic organizations. All in all, it should 
be safe to claim that most common features of universities do not make 
organizational changes easier, but rather more difficult.  
Obviously, this highly volatile combination of extraordinary ambition, 
exceptional possibilities and great challenges makes Aalto University both 
an organization in demand of outstanding leadership, and a test platform 
providing a most interesting setting for scientific study. This study makes 
an effort to contribute both, management and science. 
From a managerial point of view, the challenge is how to simultaneously 
affect a turnaround and a merger in a set of traditional academic 
institutions with strong and diverse cultures and long histories. Here the 
key contribution of organization science is a reality check. Therefore, my 
purpose is not to tell the management how to make good decisions, or, even 
less, what decisions to make. My purpose is to point out and explain 
organizational phenomena, affecting and limiting the consequences of 
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managerial decisions. I try to provide insight to the question, why 
organizations often are difficult to change. In particular, I seek to find out 
why there is observable inertia also in this merger of three universities, and 
what could be done about it. Moreover, I believe that during the course of 
creating this study, I have had the chance to ask a number of difficult 
questions from the correct people, sparking new ideas and focusing 
managerial attention to relevant areas, even if these issues are outside the 
scope of this work and thus not documented here. 
The starting point of my scientific perspective is the fundamental thesis 
of organizational ecologists who claim that organizations have trouble 
changing because of structural or organizational inertia (see e.g. Hannan 
and Freeman (1977, 1984, 1989), Barnett and Carroll (1995), Aldrich 
(1999), Scott (2003), Hannan, Pólos and Carroll (2003), and Pólos and van 
Witteloostuijn (2004)). Even though organizational ecology as a whole may 
lie quite far from the mainstream of strategic research (Mintzberg 2009: 
367, 384), I embrace this school of thought as a starting point for three 
main reasons.  
First, I expect many of the challenges involved in Aalto project to revolve 
around organizational inertia. Because the whole concept of inertia has 
been developed by the ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984) and it 
remains at the core of their research, I believe the organizational ecology 
perspective to be the most refined in advancing understanding of inertia.  
Second, despite the efforts to explain organizational inertia and the fact 
that basically all organizational research has taken inertia into account at 
least to some degree since its introduction, the theoretical concept of inertia 
remains somewhat ambiguous. The question ―What is organizational 
inertia?‖ remains largely unanswered, and there is room and need for 
further research.  
Third, I believe that by choosing a less charted path my chances are 
increased to contribute fresh approaches not yet covered in the theoretical 
background of the Aalto planners. 
Finally, a great motivation for this work is the very fact that Aalto 
University is the spearhead of the Finnish higher education reform. It is 
much more likely that Aalto will be the beginning, not the end of the 
reform. Thus any understanding of Aalto will contribute to the future of the 
entire Finnish system of higher education. 
1.2 Objectives and Research Approach 
From the setting of making a study of organizational inertia in an ongoing 
public university merger, and the need to both contribute scientific 
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understanding of inertia and to provide tools for the management in their 
challenging task, we arrive to the following research question I seek to 
answer: 
How has organizational inertia affected the forming of the Aalto 
University? 
 Which are the most significant causes of inertia in the 
forming of Aalto University? 
 What features of universities make them more 
susceptible to inertia? 
 What are the characteristic features of Aalto University 
and how do they contribute to inertia? 
 How have the management‘s plan and actions to control 
the merger contributed to inertia? 
By answering these questions, I construct a set of data that can be grouped 
into theoretical categories. Once formed, these categories represent 
different root causes of inertia. Answering the questions provides insight to 
the Aalto project, but also contributes to the knowledge of organization 
theory about university mergers.   
1.3 Structure 
The contents of this study are organized as follows. The structure is 
visualized in Figure 1 on the following page. 
This subchapter concerning structure is followed by a brief overview of 
general organizational theory that binds the perspective of this work to 
wider context of organizational studies. The Introductory part is followed 
by Part I: Background, the two chapters of which chart the physical and 
theoretical premises of the thesis. First, the starting point of Aalto 
University is explained through an overview of the three old universities it 
is based on, and a brief history of the merger itself. Then a literature review 
follows, discussing organizational inertia as a whole as well as its most 
essential component parts as identified by this study.  
After setting the scene for this research, we proceed to Part II: Empirical 
Examination, which comprises the empirical contribution of this work. The 
research methods are explained in Chapter 4, after which the empirical data 
is presented and analyzed in Chapter 5. 
Finally, the study is concluded in Part III: Contribution, discussing the 
theoretical and practical findings of the work in Chapter 6. 
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1.4 A Perspective on Organizations 
Organizations are the dominating force responsible for most of the 
activities that take place in our world. In the social sciences, organizations 
are the object of analysis for a number of disciplines, such as sociology, 
economics, political science, psychology, management, and organizational 
communication. The variety of disciplines interested in organizations 
illustrates both their significance and the diversity of different possible 
perspectives that can be chosen for their research. 
Because it is difficult to cover the different sides of organizations from a 
single point of view, three perspectives are used for the purposes of this 
thesis. As we are studying here a planned organizational change, and the 
effects of inertia on it, it is natural to choose the perspective of 
organizational planning as our first point of view. After discussing the 
organizational planning view we are left with the ―reality‖ of the 
organization. Obviously one fundamental aspect is the social reality of the 
organization, that is, the organization as a social system. This ‗social system 
view‘ is our second perspective. Finally, it is also necessary to consider the 
interactions of the organization with its environment, namely to consider 
the organization as an open system. Therefore we end up with three lenses 
through which to review the literature for general properties of 
organizations.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce these lenses and the general 
perspective of this thesis on organizations, to make it easier to see what lies 
beyond the focus of this work and where we stand. 
1.4.1  Organizational Planning View 
The name of this chapter could as well be for instance ‗strategy making‘, 
‗rational control‘, ‗prescriptive school‘ or ‗managerial‘ view. The point is to 
elaborate the side of organizations literature providing managers tools and 
approaches for rationally controlling and shaping their organizations. 
The organization science itself has its origins in the work of the 
numerous founding fathers of this field. Frederick Taylor (1911) with his 
followers started the era of scientific management with mechanistic 
optimization of routines. Philip Selznick (1957) and Henri Fayol (1949 
trans.) emphasized the role of the top management in rationalizing the 
organization from top down. Weber (1968 trans.) defined different forms of 
authority, each associated with a distinctive administrative structure, and 
introduced the modern bureaucracy with specialized administrative staff as 
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the most highly developed form of formalization. Chandler‘s (1962) maxim 
that organizational structure must follow strategy is influential even today.  
Writers like Igor Ansoff (1965) and Kenneth Andrews (1971) have 
provided tools and instructions for analysis and strategy making process 
while Michael Porter followed the footsteps of military strategists like Sun 
Tzu (1971 trans.) and Carl von Clausewitz (1968 trans.) when he provided 
the management his famous tool box of ―Competitive Strategy‖ in (1980) 
which he later supplemented with ―Competitive Advantage‖ (1985).  To 
support understanding of change management, Danny Miller (1976) 
introduced different archetypes of strategy formation that were either 
successful (like ―The Dominant Firm‖) or unsuccessful (like ―The 
Aftermath‖, where a new team is trying to affect a turnaround with scarce 
resources and inadequate experience). The idea was later further developed 
by Mintzberg (1989) into organizational configurations that define the fit 
between different dimensions of organization during its life course. Miller 
and Friesen (1980) also introduced the concept of ―quantum change‖ 
between stable periods during the life cycle of organizations, a theme 
advanced further by Pettigrew (1987). 
 
Considering change management, one of the central debates is the one 
between top-down and bottom-up change. The former has been 
traditionally the dominant view – that it is the job of top management to 
envision, initiate and see through major transformations of the 
organization (see e.g. Beatty and Ulrich (1991), Baden-Fuller and Stopford 
(1992) and Kotter (1995)).  However, the latter view emphasizing long-term 
impact of change through involvement and commitment of participants has 
been gaining more ground since the 1990s (see e.g. Beer, Eisenstat and 
Spector (1990), and Dickhout, Denham and Blackwell (1995)). Instructions 
for managers to enforce top-down or enable bottom-up transformation are 
illustrated in the following ―checklists‖. 
 
Top-Down: ―Eight steps to Transforming Your Corporation‖ by Kotter 
(1995: 61) 
1. Establishing a sense of urgency 
2. Forming a powerful guiding coalition 
3. Creating a vision 
4. Communicating the vision 
5. Empowering others to act on the vision 
6. Planning for and creating short-term wins 
9 Introduction 
 
7. Consolidating improvements and producing still 
more changes 
8. Institutionalizing new approaches  
 
Bottom-Up: ―Six Steps to Effective Change‖ by Beer, Eisenstat and Spector 
(1990: 161-164) 
1. Mobilize commitment to change through joint 
diagnosis of business problems. 
2. Develop a shared vision of how to organize and 
manage for competitiveness. 
3. Foster consensus for the new vision, competence 
to enact it, and cohesion to move it along. 
4. Spread revitalization to all departments without 
pushing it from the top. 
5. Institutionalize revitalization through formal 
policies, systems, and structures. 
6. Monitor and adjust strategies in response to 
problems in the revitalization process. 
 
These ―checklists‖ illustrate well the two sides of the coin that I have called 
here the ―organizational planning view‖. 
On one hand, they illustrate the need for management science to come 
up with concrete hands-on tools that can readily be utilized by decision 
makers in the hectic pace of real life challenges faced by organizations. At 
their best, such recipes can bring some order in the often chaotic reality by 
introducing frameworks and structured approaches for solving difficult 
problems. This field of organizations theory also provides ammunition for 
the consultants of the strategy industry and professionals of the planning 
departments, defining the discourse and language of management. As such, 
the impact of such practical approaches may be great indeed. 
On the other hand, however, such ―no-nonsense approaches‖ are 
severely limited in their power to explain and control complex phenomena 
inherently present in real organizations. These limitations are discussed in 
following chapters. 
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1.4.2  Social System View 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate the approaches of sociology and 
psychology to consider organizations as complex social systems. 
Things always start to get messy, when the dreaded human factor is 
involved. For instance Scott (2003: 28) defines organizations as follows: 
 
Organizations are collectives whose participants are 
pursuing multiple interests, both disparate and common, but 
who recognize the value of perpetuating the organization as 
an important resource. The informal structure of relations 
that develops among participants is more influential in 
guiding the behavior of participants than is the formal 
structure. 
 
Therefore an organization is not just formal structure plus the idiosyncratic 
beliefs and behaviors of individual participants, but rather both a formal 
structure and an informal structure: informal life itself is structured and 
orderly. There is also a disparity between the stated and the ‖real‖ goals 
pursued by organizations, and even the real goals are not the only goals 
pursued, but organization has to expend energy to ―support‖ or 
―maintenance‖ goals to maintain itself. Yet there is one even more 
important goal, survival, which governs formal organizations like all other 
social groups (ibid.: 57). Also Hannan and Freeman (1989: 6) note that 
organizations have the tendency to live a life of their own, and that they are 
an expensive means for accomplishing their goals. Furthermore, Selznick 
(1948: 29) emphasizes the primitive reactions of the collective system:  
   
A given empirical system is deemed to have basic needs, 
essentially related to self-maintenance; the system develops 
repetitive means of self-defense and day-to-day activity is 
interpreted in terms of the function served by that activity for 
the maintenance and defense of the system. 
 
Michels (1949 trans.: 390) continues that if the interests of the rank-and-
file members diverge from those of the leaders, the former are likely to be 
sacrificed.  
From the social point of view, it becomes more reasonable to examine 
what is really done rather than what is decided and planned. In such case 
commitment and motivation also become more relevant variables than 
search and choice, if action rather than ―talk‖ is the focus (Scott 2003: 59). 
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McGregor (1960) notes that highly centralized and formalized structures 
are doomed to be ineffective and irrational in that they waste the 
organization‘s most precious resource, namely the intelligence and 
initiative of its participants. 
Another early theory development is the concept of authority in social 
systems. For instance Pelz (1952) suggested that a supervisor‘s relation to 
his or her own superior, and specifically his or her influence upward, is a 
powerful determinant of the supervisor‘s influence over his or her own 
subordinates. Barnard (1938: 163) stated that the decision as whether an 
order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, 
and does not reside in ‗persons of authority‘ or those who issue these 
orders. Because of these limitations to authority, he continued that the most 
critical ingredient to successful organization is the formation of a collective 
purpose that becomes morally binding to participants. The developing and 
imparting of such mission and the creation of moral codes for others is the 
distinctive function of the executives (ibid.: 279). 
What makes the situation for executives here difficult, however, is that to 
survive the organizations may change their reasons for existence and thus 
their unifying purposes (ibid.: 89). Furthermore, as Scott (2003: 70) notes, 
the very process of making critical decisions to change the structure or 
purpose of the organization alters the character of the organization. 
This perspective forms much of the foundation on which the 
examination of internal causes of inertia in later chapters is based. 
 
1.4.3  Open System View 
The previous two chapters have introduced two perspectives for considering 
the internal activities of a well-defined entity called organization. The 
purpose of this chapter is to introduce a third view that places the 
organization into the context of its environment and considers it as a 
systemic part of a larger system. 
For instance Aldrich (1999) defines organizations as ―goal directed, 
boundary maintaining, activity systems‖. The organizations face four main 
challenges, which are (ibid.: 113) 
i. mobilizing knowledge and resources 
ii. using them effectively 
iii. reproducing organizational knowledge 
iv. maintaining organizational boundaries 
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Here the concept of organizational boundaries is essential. What 
happens within organizational boundaries must matter to enough members 
so that organizational routines and competencies are replicated from one 
day to the next, and organizational boundaries are maintained. However, 
except for ‗total institutions‘ such as prisons or armies (see e.g. Goffman, 
1961) members have control over their entry or exit to/from the 
organization, and most people are members of multiple organizations, 
resisting the idea of being resources of any particular organization 
(McPherson, 1983). This creates an intricate network of memberships and 
loyalties blurring the organizational boundaries. 
Furthermore, this is in line with Scott‘s (2003: 29) definition that 
―organizations are congeries of interdependent flows and activities linking 
shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resources 
and institutional environments‖. This is also a process view of 
organizations, focusing not on the static structure but on the dynamic 
action keeping the organization alive. Or, as Scott puts it (ibid.: 100): 
 
If structures exist it is because they are continuously being 
created and recreated, and if the world has meaning, it is 
because actors are constructing and reconstructing 
intentions and accounts and, thereby, their own and others 
identities. 
 
The process perspective allows for a multitude of nonconventional 
interpretations for organizations. For instance Nohria and Eccles (1992) 
describe organizations as networks, Cyert and March (1963) as shifting 
coalitions, Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a nexus of contracts and 
Czarniawska (1997) as ongoing narratives and conversations among 
participants.  
Environments influence organizations in numerous fundamental ways. 
One example is what Pondy and Mitroff (1979: 7) called the ―law of limited 
variety‖, meaning that a complex system cannot maintain its complexity in 
a simple environment, and that a system will not exhibit more variety than 
the variety to which it has been exposed in its environment. The flipside of 
this interpretation is that an organization has to develop a complex form to 
successfully interact with a complex environment.  
Another example is the contingency theory coined by Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) and Galbraith (1973), who lists the basic assumptions of the 
theory as 
1) There is no one best way to organize; however 
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2) Any way of organizing is not equally effective. 
3) The best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment 
to which the organization relates. 
 
Here the contingency theorists challenge those administrative theorists who 
have sought to offer general recipes applicable for any organization. Instead 
they claim that a successful organization forms a fit between its internal 
capabilities and the demands of its environment. 
Third example of profound interaction between an organization and its 
environment is that the environment is the context in which the process of 
selection in ecological sense takes place. The concept of organizational 
change through processes of selection and adaptation is discussed in the 
next chapter.  
 
1.4.4  Organizational Change 
By definition, ―organizational change‖ involves a transformation of an 
organization between two points in time, distinguishing the organization 
―before‖ and ―after‖ the change. The change itself can be analyzed from two 
main perspectives, namely from the process or content point of view 
(Barnett and Carroll, 1995). 
The process view concentrates on the transformation itself, examining 
for instance the speed of change, the sequence of activities, the decision-
making and communication system and the resistance encountered (ibid.). 
Another possibility is to compare what actually differs in the organization 
after the change, which is the approach of the content based view (ibid.). 
It is typical that many theories of organizational change discuss only one 
of these perspectives. However, in practice they can seldom be analyzed 
independently, as portrayed for instance by Johnson (1987): 
 
It is likely that the change process that occurs will be, 
relatively speaking, ill-defined and general. Members of the 
organization will know that change is occurring but may not 
be that clear about where it is leading or what it signifies. 
However, it may be that this process of change is a necessary 
precursor to the introduction of specific strategies. 
 
What is it then that changes in an organization during a transformation? 
For instance Hannan and Freeman (1984) classify changes to core and 
peripheral changes. Peripheral changes are easier and not as risky as core 
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changes, which are rare and costly and seem to subject an organization to 
greatly increased risks of death. According to Hannan and Freeman these 
core features are in hierarchical order organization‘s mission, its authority 
structure, its technology and its marketing strategy. Here a change of 
mission represents the most fundamental possible change for an 
organization, requiring also a change in all the other core features lower in 
the hierarchy. 
Another important aspect of organizational change is the idea of 
organization‘s development through time. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) 
identify four different approaches to change: 
 
1) Life cycle theories embrace a metaphor of organic growth and 
attempt to identify stages in the development of the organization 
from its initiation to its termination. Change is viewed as immanent: 
the organization is thought to contain an underlying logic or 
program that regulates the process of change. Here the idea is that 
as an organization grows, also certain structural transformations 
should occur. A typical example would be that a successful and 
growing start-up company cannot retain its system of direct and 
informal control by owner-managers after some point in its 
evolution. 
2) Teleological theories posit that the organization is purposeful 
and adaptive and goal-directed. Development is viewed as an 
iterative process of goal setting, implementation, evaluation and 
goal modification. 
3) Dialectical theories assume that the organization exists in a 
pluralistic world of conflicting forces that compete with one another 
for domination. Stability and change are explained by alterations in 
the balance of power among opposing entities. 
4) Evolutionary theories assume that change occurs through a 
continuous cycle of variation, selection and retention. New elements 
such as rules or routines arise through random change and selection 
occurs primarily through the competition for scarce resources, and 
retention preserves them through some type of copying or 
reproduction process. 
 
These perspectives underline the fact that the selection of a relevant 
perspective is of great importance when trying make relevant observations 
about complex organizations. The chosen perspective dictates what can be 
seen and what escapes attention.  
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1.4.5  Adaptation or Selection? 
For decades, the field of organizational research has been much divided in 
two separate camps, whose main debate revolves around the question how 
flexible and thus how able to change organizations are considered to be. 
The followers of the adaptive camp assume that change in the world of 
organizations occurs mainly through the adaptive responses of existing 
organizations to prior changes in their environment (Barnett and Carroll 
1995). The camp is supported for instance by such influential proponents of 
generic strategies like Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow (1978), and the 
proponents of configuration theory like Mintzberg (1989) advocating that 
the main concern of organizations is to find an optimal configuration of key 
organizational attributes. A switch to a more advantageous configuration is 
defined as adaptive, while a switch to a less advantageous configuration is 
defined as deleterious (Amburgey et al 1993). Other theories that can be 
placed in the adaptational camp include contingency theory (Lawrence and 
Lorch 1967), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), 
institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975). 
On the contrary, the selection camp assumes that individual 
organizations cannot change easily, and even if they do they still cannot 
change as fast as their environments. Change is both difficult and 
hazardous. Therefore when the environment changes, some existing 
organizations fail, making room for new ones with a better fit with the new 
environment. According to the selection camp, most fiercely defended by 
the organizational ecologists, this cycle of selective replacement is the main 
source of change and diversity in organizations (Barnett and Carroll 1995).  
Some advocates of the selection camp emphasize internal factors of the 
organization inhibiting adaptation, such as how change is often opposed by 
organizational members (Coch and French 1948). Even when change is 
supported by some members, established roles and formal organizational 
rules are difficult to alter quickly (Tsouderos 1955, Stinchcombe 1965, 
McNeil and Thompson 1971, Hannan and Freeman 1977 and 1984). Other 
writers focus on the external linkages between the organization and its 
environment and suggest that resistance to change occurs because 
organizations are embedded in the institutional and technical structures of 
their environment (Granovetter 1985, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Scott 
1987). Zajac and Kraatz (1993) claim this kind of behavior to be particularly 
common in non-profit industries. The key concept of the selection camp is 
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that of organizational inertia, i.e. lack of ability to change, which will be 
discussed in depth in chapter 3. 
For the purposes of examining organizational inertia, the work of the 
selection camp will have a more prominent role in the following pages. 
Naturally, this is very much a matter of choosing a relevant perspective, 
meaning that it is not necessarily the only possible perspective.  
Even though the division in the field of organizational theory seems 
sometimes impregnable, in practice the camps have successfully influenced 
each other during the past decades. Selection theorists admit that 
individual organizations do sometimes successfully change, and adaptation 
theorists recognize that some organizations fail because they do not change 
when and how they should (Barnett and Carroll 1995). For instance 
Amburgey et al (1993) suggest that organizational change can be both 
disruptive and adaptive, and organizational inertia can actually increase the 
likelihood of organizational change. 
Zajac and Kraatz (1993) note, that the nature of the disagreement 
between the camps is rooted partly in the fact that different researchers 
often emphasize different aspects of environmental or organizational 
forces. The selection theorists emphasize those forces that inhibit the ability 
of organizations to change, while the adaptationists focus on the forces that 
initiate change. Furthermore, the researchers focusing on the same forces 
may fail to consider that certain forces can act simultaneously to initiate 
and inhibit strategic change by increasing the need while decreasing the 
ability to change (ibid.). 
Finally, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that a subtle relationship 
exists between adaptation and selection: Adaptive learning for individuals 
usually consists of selection among behavioral responses, and adaptation 
for a population involves selection among types of members. Aldrich (1999: 
194) sums this by concluding, that an organization that is unable to change 
is always at risk in a changing environment. Then if most of the members in 
a population are unable to change, the population can survive only through 
two methods, namely through new organizations being born into the 
population, or through copying the methods of such members that have 
successfully lived through the inevitable change. If both of these methods 
fail, the population itself can be overrun by another more successful 
population.  
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2. Research Site: Aalto University 
2.1 General 
Aalto University is a new Finnish foundation based university that started 
its operations January 1st 2010. Aalto was created through the merger of 
Helsinki University of Technology (TKK), Helsinki School of Economics 
(HSE) and University of Art and Design Helsinki (TaiK), all being the oldest 
and largest institutions in Finland within their own field. Private 
foundation based universities have been extinct in Finland since 1970s, and 
therefore Aalto also incorporates a new organizational form with the sole 
other foundation university in Finland, Tampere University of Technology, 
which was created at the same time but without a merger. 
As of May 2011, Aalto University operates on three main campuses 
around the Helsinki metropolitan area representing the three preceding 
universities, and has additional specialized smaller units in Mikkeli, Lahti, 
Pori and Vaasa, and internationally in Singapore and Shanghai. The 
organization of Aalto University is based on central administration with 
support services, and six academically independent schools, four of which 
specialize in technology, one in business and one in art and design. 
To make the Aalto-project possible, the Finnish government has made 
the new university major contributions both in funding and in customizing 
legislation for the needs of Aalto. In addition, Finnish industries have 
played a major part in lobbying for and funding the university. This ―special 
treatment‖ has ensured Aalto a place at the heart of Finnish public debate 
concerning a wider university reform spearheaded by Aalto, and geographic 
distribution of government funding across the country. The limelight of 
publicity has contributed to high political stakes and ensured continued 
media attention with the project.     
The goals of the new university have been set high, as it aims to be 
globally recognized as a top-class university by 2020 (Aalto University 
Strategy 2010). 
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2.2 History  
2.2.1  Predecessors 
2.2.1.1 TKK - Helsinki University of Technology 
Engineering education in Finland began at the Technical School of Helsinki 
in 1849. Later the school was renamed Polytechnic School in 1872 and 
Polytechnic Institute 1879, which received university rights and was 
renamed the Technological University of Finland 1908. The university 
moved from its old premises at Hietalahti Market in Helsinki to Otaniemi, 
Espoo in 1950s, creating the first American-style integrated university 
campus in Finland (Nykänen 2008). During its last operating year 2009 
TKK employed 3979 people, of which 215 were professors, and had 15 000 
under- and postgraduate students. The total funding from state and other 
sources of the university was 313 million euros (TKK annual report 2009). 
Basically all fields of engineering were researched and taught at TKK.  
Several TKK key strengths are listed in Aalto University project plan 
analysis (Aalto University 2008). These include high industry relevance 
with good and multiple relations with industry, and several world-class 
research groups with competitiveness in EU and industrial programs. The 
international reputation of TKK is considered ―satisfactory‖, but nationally 
the majority of the best students are believed to prefer TKK, it being the 
largest, oldest and most popular place to study technology in Finland. Also 
the foundations of most high technology businesses and especially the 
traditional key areas of Finnish industry, such as pulp and paper and 
telecommunications, are believed to be based on TKK expertise. 
Furthermore, the Finnish economy is dominated by top management 
educated at TKK. 
Aalto planners (ibid.) have also recognized several internal challenges 
preventing TKK from harnessing its full potential. Focusing resources was 
difficult contributing to heterogenic research culture and results. 
Bureaucracy loaded the academic staff, and rigid governance model, control 
culture and inefficient and costly processes burned-out people. 
Infrastructure needed enhancement, and there were far too many students 
per teacher contributing to long studying times. Most teaching and research 
was chronically underfunded, and the gathering of research funding was 
further hindered by lack of long-term partnerships. It had also proven 
difficult to create startup spin-offs that would grow and operate 
internationally.  
19 Research Site: Aalto University 
 
2.2.1.2 HSE - Helsinki School of Economics 
Helsinki School of Economics was established by the business community 
in 1904 and got its university standing 1911. New law guaranteed the private 
university 70% state support 1950, when its current main building was also 
inaugurated in Töölö, Central Helsinki. In 1970s HSE became a state 
university, and started its Executive Education program, which has since 
produced a sizeable portion of the total funding of the university through a 
separate HSE-owned company (Aalto University 2008). During its last 
operating year 2009 HSE employed 546 people, 46 of which were 
professors, and had 4000 students. The total funding of the university from 
the state and other sources was 42 million euros (HSE annual report 2009). 
Aalto planners (Aalto University 2008) characterize the strengths of 
HSE as follows. HSE was small and agile with a strong community feeling. 
It was the leader in management education in Finland, and had extensive 
MBA and eMBA programs abroad. The university distinguished itself 
internationally with several high-profile accreditations. Cooperation with 
companies was successful, contributing to practice-oriented teaching and 
professors active in boards and consulting. Also language training was of 
high quality and the international exchange program was extensive. 
However, also HSE faced many internal challenges (ibid.). Little time 
was committed to research, and there was a lack of researcher exchange 
programs, career paths and focus areas, and salaries and compensations 
were not perceived as competitive. As in TKK, the student/teacher –ratio 
was perceived as too high, and studies were often characterized by lack of 
commitment on both sides, which was emphasized by a wide variation in 
the performance of students. The pedagogical skills of faculty were limited, 
and there were little incentives to improve teaching. Furthermore, the 
Aalto-merger was partly seen as a threat to the identity and independence 
of HSE. 
2.2.1.3 TaiK - University of Art and Design Helsinki 
―Pro Arte Utili – for useful art‖ had been the motto of the University of Art 
and Design Helsinki and its predecessors for the past 139 years. Originally 
founded as the School of Arts and Crafts in 1871, TaiK got its university 
status in 1973. In 1990s TaiK started consistent efforts to focus on new 
media, and has since internationalized rapidly with applications from 54 
countries and growing to be the largest university on its own field in 
Scandinavia (Aalto University 2008). During its last operating year 2009 
TaiK employed 430 people, of which 39 were professors, and had 2000 
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students. The total funding of the university from the state and other 
sources was 38 million euros (TaiK annual report 2009). 
TaiK had many positive features characteristic for a successful top-class 
university. It boasted a small fraction of accepted students from all 
applicants (7,6% in 2009) and excellent student/teacher –ratio (11,4 in 
2009) (ibid.). TaiK had a strong identity and its culture was considered 
open and discussing with active international contacts with the best 
universities such as MIT, Harvard and Stanford, and with global 
corporations such as Nokia, Toyota, Hyundai, Canon, ABB and Panasonic 
(TaiK annual report 2009). TaiK was also an active participant in Finnish 
cultural life, and a strong tradition of entrepreneurship existed among 
alumni (Aalto University 2008). The teaching culture in TaiK was 
considered student based with integration of practice and theory in 
teaching and a tradition of problem based collaborative learning. TaiK was 
also a worldwide pioneer in research in its own field (ibid.). 
However, also TaiK had a number of challenges (ibid.). Tradition of 
interdisciplinary collaboration within the university was weak, and the 
culture was very individualistic. There was little interaction between 
teaching and research, and not much ability to rethink and reform teaching 
traditions and conventions. The career management for researchers and 
doctoral candidates was insufficient, and the numerous start-up companies 
rarely grew or even less operated internationally. TaiK also needed yet to 
become a strategic asset in Aalto, and had to develop its abilities to fully 
benefit from the Aalto-platform. Furthermore, there had been much 
skepticism toward Aalto especially in the more art-oriented departments of 
TaiK. 
2.2.2  The Purpose and Goals of Aalto 
University 
“The University‟s role is to advance independent research 
and scientific and artistic education. In the University, there 
is a freedom of science and education. The University 
operates in fields of technology, economics, and industrial 
arts. The responsibility for research and teaching in these 
fields are in the respective autonomous schools, which are 
based on the founding schools‟ entities and brands. 
The national task of the University is to support Finland‟s 
success by means of high level research and teaching. The 
University supports in a positive way the Finnish society, its 
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technology, economy, culture and international interest 
toward it.“  
 -Translated from the Sailas Report (2007) 
 
The Finnish system of higher education as a whole is facing new demands 
and challenges (Aalto University 2008). There is an increasing competition 
from top universities in the West and new successes in the East. The 
increased competition contributes to increased resource requirements to 
remain competitive. The world is becoming multi-disciplinary, with 
research problems more complex and multi-faceted, and new skills 
required from students, but current research and teaching mostly focused 
around single disciplines. The old university model still in use during the 
planning of Aalto University also considered universities to be a part of the 
government bureaucracy, contributing to a lack of dynamism.  
Aalto University was meant to be a national level response to these 
demands with a task of supporting Finland‘s success. The university would 
contribute by ―coaching skillful and responsible experts, leaders, 
entrepreneurs and artists to renew and lead the society, doing research that 
aims for breakthroughs on chosen fields of science and art, and being in 
active international interaction with the society and producing with the 
means of science and art proactive perspectives and solutions to social 
challenges‖ (ibid.). 
The early Aalto planners set their goals accordingly. Aalto should focus 
on selected spear heads in research on a world class level, encourage risk 
taking in potential breakthrough initiatives, and provide better framework 
and infrastructure in addition to long term funding for research. The focus 
of recruiting and evaluations was set to be in quality of research and 
teaching, and the university should provide better opportunities for 
innovation through cross-disciplinary research. Culturally a major goal was 
the creation of an inspiring learning centric culture with an increased 
commitment to teaching and learning from both staff and students (ibid.). 
The Aalto planners believed that the university could reach its goals by 
providing clear career paths, providing mentoring and support on career 
development to all faculty and staff, offering competitive salary and 
incentive systems, encouraging open communication and involvement, 
increasing international co-operation, supporting and rewarding excellence, 
and providing increased resources (ibid.).   
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2.2.3  Timespan 
An important context of the Aalto transformation is the timespan of the 
project, consisting of strongly distinctive phases between which there have 
been significant discontinuities as the makers, owners and nature of the 
project have abruptly changed. The timespan is illustrated in Figure 2 
below, with three major phases: 1) Preparation -> 9/2007, 2) Planning 
9/2007-3/2009, and 3) Implementation 3/2009 ->.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preparation. It is impossible to announce any certain point of time when 
the Aalto University project could be said to have begun. The possibilities of 
a private university for gathering private funding were discussed by TKK 
and HSE top management already in the 1990s. The President of TaiK Yrjö 
Sotamaa introduced the idea of a merger of TaiK with TKK and HSE in his 
opening speech of academic year 2005, and the Ministry of Education had 
ordered several reports to investigate possibilities for reforming the higher 
education system, the most significant of which were the reports by 
Jääskinen and Rantanen (2007) and Sailas et al (2007). The 137-page Sailas 
report that was released in February 2007 became the backbone for all 
successive planning of the Aalto project. The Sailas report was important 
not only because of the contents of the actual paper, but also because of the 
composition of the so called Sailas group that produced the report. All 
members were high-profile individuals, and the group included the 
presidents of TKK, HSE and TaiK. 
1/2010 4/2009 8/2008 9/2007 
Project Director and 
Steering Committee 
appointed by Ministry 
of Education 
Board appointed, 
Aalto Transformation 
Team assembled 
New President starts TKK, HSE and TaiK 
merge into Aalto 
University 
Sailas report 
Intense lobbying 
Political go-ahead 
Negotiations and 
planning efforts 
between TKK, HSE 
and TaiK 
Fund rising starts 
New Universities Act 
Intense planning of 
basic organizational 
structure and 
processes 
Strategy preparation 
Theme groups 
Search and 
appointment of first 
President 
Aalto Transformation 
Team disbanded 
Recruitment of vice-
presidents and 
directors 
Strategy process 
Restructuring of 
administration 
Restructuring of TKK 
into 4 schools 
Appointment of new 
deans 
New career system 
Central 
administration in 
place 
PREPARATION PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION 
Figure 2: Timespan of Aalto Project 
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Planning. Soon after the Sailas report was released, the government 
announced that the new university would be realized before the next 
general parliamentary elections in spring 2011 and that the Ministry of 
Education would coordinate the project. The Ministry of Education 
announced that the project would be based on the Sailas report, and 
appointed a project leader and a steering committee in September 2007. 
The project had essentially a shared ownership between the Ministry of 
Education, the Federation of Finnish Industries and the merging 
universities. Also the leadership structure was complex with the steering 
committee, a project management team consisting of the project director 
appointed by the ministry and project managers from the three universities, 
and a troika of three standing presidents, all making their own decisions. A 
major issue was the renewal of Universities Act in Finland, and the 
legislation process was closely coordinated with the progress of Aalto.  
The planning phase entered a much more focused and effective era in 
August 2008 when the new Board of the Aalto University was appointed, 
and the Aalto Transformation Team (A8) was formed to take control of the 
practical preparations under the supervision of the Board. The A8 then 
created ―theme groups‖ consisting of hundreds of volunteers across the 
academic community (including students) to take part in the planning 
effort and, perhaps most importantly, to facilitate communication and 
commitment. As the Board was a clear legitimate owner for the project, the 
Ministry of Education and the Federation of Finnish Industries retreated 
much to the background, and the Board and the A8 claimed the strategic 
leadership of the project. However, the Federation of Finnish Industries 
retained responsibility for gathering the private funding required by the 
university. 
 
Implementation. Because the Board and A8 had avoided making 
strategic decisions that would bind the hands of the operative management 
of the university, most importantly the President, the actual 
implementation phase of the project can be considered to have begun in 
April 2009 when the first President started at her post. The first focus of the 
implementation phase was recruitment of key leaders and budget and 
strategy preparation issues, with the new management eventually reaching 
limited operational capability in late 2009, just before the responsibilities 
of the old universities were transferred to Aalto that started as a university 
1.1.2010. It took until summer 2010 that the Aalto central management had 
completely emerged and reached full operational capacity.  
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2.3 Aalto University in Numbers 
Some key figures of Aalto University as of year 2010 can be found in Table 
1. For consistency the abbreviations TKK, HSE and TaiK are used to refer to 
the schools, even though the formal 2010 names would be Aalto School of 
Science and Technology for TKK, Aalto School of Economics for HSE and 
Aalto School of Art and Design for TaiK. Furthermore, since 2011 TKK has 
been split into four separate schools. 
 
 
 TKK HSE TaiK Aalto 
Bachelors‘ theses 688 357 101 1146 
Masters‘ theses 1887 246 179 2312 
Doctoral dissertations  153 19 12 184 
Bachelor- and Master 
students 
10792 3443 1822 16057 
Doctoral students 2933 280 246 3459 
Total staff 3187 524 402 4685 
Professors  234 58 46 338 
Space used on campus 
(m2) 
250 000 30 000 40 000 320 000 
Source: Aalto University     
 
Table 1: Key figures of Aalto University (2010)  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Overview 
The central theme of this thesis is describing the effects of organizational 
inertia in a strategic public university merger. That said, we obviously have 
to know something about universities. But above all, we have to know about 
inertia. Despite a wide range of research about inertia and change, and the 
at least partial integration of inertia to practically all relevant organizational 
theories, the whole concept of inertia remains somewhat ambiguous.  
Nevertheless, an effort must be made here to answer the question ―what 
is organizational inertia‖. The concept of inertia is opened up by using the 
framework of organizational ecologists as a starting point, but not limiting 
the analysis to their ideas. In practice this is done by splitting the concept of 
inertia to its component parts, as originally defined by Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) and supplemented by the work of Hannan, Pólos and 
Carroll (2003). The division of chapter 3.2 to subchapters is based on this 
framework. Relevant organizational and sociological theories and concepts  
are then discussed under the subchapter that draws most from the 
particular theory, such as institutional theory under chapter 3.2.4 ‗Internal 
Institutional constraints‘ and the concept of power under chapter 3.2.3 
‗Internal political constraints‘.  
The idea here is not to claim that this would be the only suitable division 
of the topic, or that it would cover all aspects of inertia. However, my belief 
is that the division is illustrative enough for approaching a complex subject 
and that at least all the most important aspects of inertia are covered. It also 
makes it possible to gather together the maximum number of aspects of 
inertia without using the limited space and time available for describing in 
detail such aspects of extensive theories that are not relevant for the scope 
of this work. 
Even though the theoretical framework is presented here in the 
beginning of the thesis, the construction of the emergent theoretical 
framework has in practice advanced iteratively on par with the developing 
empirical evidence as a grounded theory approach.   
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Change and Universities 
Returning to the main research question, the role of organizational inertia 
during the formation of a university, it becomes relevant to consider how 
applicable the reviewed theory is to universities. Actually it turns out that if 
any of my references have commented on the applicability of their research 
to either private or non-profit organizations, they have claimed that if their 
research is applicable anywhere, then in non-profit organizations. 
University is clearly the most commonly cited example of organizational 
type that faces the problems of inertia. Therefore it should be safe to 
assume that if the theoretical framework presented here is feasible 
anywhere, then it is feasible for analyzing universities. Some examples 
follow. 
Mintzberg expresses the matter quite bluntly (2009: 387) and suggests 
that no great turnarounds should be expected in professional organizations 
such as hospitals or universities, but instead continuous and incremental 
learning-based renewal of actual operations takes place all over the 
organization. 
Aldrich gives universities as an example of loosely coupled organizations 
that maintain a façade of pretending to follow institutionalized rules (1999: 
51), an example repeated also by Scott (2003: 303), who continues (ibid: 
285) that universities adopt to conflicting demands by creating appropriate 
programs and offices at the administrative level that create the required 
reports, but then decoupling these offices from the operational level. 
Acknowledging the concept of organized anarchy by Cohen and March and 
Olsen (1972), Scott also suggests that the task of university presidents is 
especially problematic, and offers solutions for academic leaders to 
―maintain their sanity and, sometimes, make a difference in the decisions 
made‖ by (Scott 2003: 306): 
 
 Carefully timing issue creation 
 Being sensitive to shifting interests and involvement of participants 
 Recognizing the status and power implications of choice situations 
 Abandoning initiatives that have become hopelessly entangled with 
other, originally unrelated problems 
 Realizing that the planning function is largely symbolic and chiefly 
provides excuses for interaction 
 
Also Hannan and Freeman (1984: 78, 113) underline the interdependencies 
of power, internal politics and resource distribution, particularly in 
university context. They describe the modern university as a ―holding 
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company‖ of different disciplines and departments. The resourcing of the 
disciplines fluctuates along trends and fashions, and the political costs for 
creating or disbanding organizational units is extremely high. This requires 
long time resourcing and recruitment planning, which creates continuous 
income transfers from successful to unsuccessful units. Therefore the best 
units are under-resourced and understaffed, while the poor-performing 
units are over-resourced and overstaffed. 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972: 11-13) claim that ―if [their garbage can] 
model [of organized anarchy] is applicable anywhere, then in universities‖. 
They find that university decision making frequently does not solve 
problems and any choices are often made through flight (moving the 
decision somewhere else to be made) or through oversight (making a 
decision because it is possible with little knowledge about the decision‘s 
implications). University decision makers often move around the 
organization offering their standard solutions to any problems they 
encounter, and also problems circulate around the organization through a 
series of decision making opportunities, where the same decision makers 
often meet the same problems over and over again. Also the most important 
choices, such as board meetings generally or strategy decisions particularly 
are the least likely to solve problems in a university. 
Cohen, March and Olsen continue (ibid.) that a university organization is 
likely to become very bureaucratic for a number of main reasons. First, 
there is little slack of resources and much heterogeneity, which create a 
need for strict controls. Slack would be a substitute for technical and value 
homogeneity by providing resource buffers between parts of organization. 
Second, high administrative power or high interrelation of problems will 
lead to a hierarchical decision structure. Furthermore, a key issue is the 
energy distribution of participants within vs. outside the organization. The 
decision makers have alternative opportunities for investing their time, and 
the stronger the relative outside demand on important people in the 
organization is, the less time they will spend within the organization and 
the more exit opportunities they have.  
The examples suggest that organizational inertia has real explaining 
power as a concept when considering a university transformation. 
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3.2 Organizational Inertia 
Perhaps the most influential description of organizational inertia has been 
given by Michael Hannan and John Freeman (1977, 1984). 
They argue that even though organizations can change their structure 
and strategy, such a change is a rare event that cannot be well coordinated 
and timed with environmental changes favoring a particular model of 
behavior (1984: 66). This difficulty in changing core characteristics of 
organizations is a result of ecological selection among organizations (ibid: 
67). 
According to Hannan and Freeman, creating an organization is an 
expensive way for accomplishing a specific task, because the maintenance 
of the organization itself consumes excessive resources. Organizations also 
have a tendency to develop into ends in themself as well as gather such 
resources and create a complex structure that are not necessary for fulfilling 
the purposes the organization exists for (ibid: 73). 
However, Hannan and Freeman claim (ibid: 74-77) that organizations 
are still necessary for their two most important positive characteristics, 
which are 
1) Reliability of performance 
2) Accountability 
 
Inability to fulfill these universal stakeholder expectations hinders an 
organization‘s chances for gathering resources during its emergence, and 
later for attracting additional resources and encouraging participant 
commitment. The expectations can be met through elaborate 
institutionalized and standardized routines which can be reproduced 
without error from one day to the next. But the institutionalization is a two-
edged sword: Even though it makes the reproduction of the unquestioned 
structure easy, at the same time the institutionalization makes the structure 
difficult to change. Any attempted change becomes a political question of 
principles instead of being simply a technical problem. 
Thus, according to Hannan and Freeman, the social selection processes 
favor organizations with high levels of reliability of performance and 
accountability, and reliability and accountability in turn depend on a 
capacity to reproduce a structure of high fidelity (ibid: 245), which 
contributes to inertia. Therefore most successful (large, old) organizations 
are likely to have high inertia. 
A number of internal and external factors contributing to inertia can be 
identified (Hannan and Freeman 1977, Hannan, Pólós and Carroll 2003). 
29 Theoretical Framework 
 
One possible illustrative list for structuring the concept of inertia is as 
follows: 
1. Sunk costs 
2. Information constraints 
3. Internal political constraints 
4. Internal institutional constraints 
5. Barriers of entry/exit 
6. External legitimacy constraints 
7. Limitations of collective rationality 
8. Limitations of learning 
 
These factors will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
3.2.1  Sunk Costs 
Sunk costs are retrospective (past) costs that have already been incurred 
and cannot be recovered. For instance organization‘s investment in plant, 
equipment and specialized personnel constitute assets that are not easily 
transferable to other tasks or functions, thus constraining adaptation 
options. For instance Aldrich (1999: 30) writes that organization‘s 
documentation, buildings and systems guide the organizational memory. 
Scott (2003: 317) continues that ―elaborate and almost invisible controls 
are embedded in the organizational structure itself‖, namely in the layout of 
offices, functions, rules and policies.  
Also early recruitment decisions concerning which people to hire, how 
their jobs are structured, and how new members interact, may have a long-
lasting effect on organization (Aldrich 1999: 119). DiTomaso et al. (2007) 
found that characteristics individuals hold as salient components of their 
self-identities become favorable bases for the evaluation of others, whereas 
dissimilar characteristics are viewed less favorably. Founders and managers 
tend to recruit people similar to themselves, and organizations tend to 
attract people who believe that the organizational members are similar to 
themself. When the reality of work is revealed, those are the most likely to 
leave who have misinterpreted the work environment (and who in reality 
are not similar to people around them). Over time these processes create 
psychologically homogenous workgroups, even though in emerging 
organizations with members totally engrossed in their tasks, they may be 
willing to tolerate dissimilar others thus sustaining a potential source of 
organizational variability (Aldrich 1999: 122-125). Furthermore, initial 
junior idiosyncratic jobs created in emerging organizations can have 
significant effect on the future organization (ibid: 130). A position and work 
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description customized for and by a particular individual can survive in the 
organization long after it has lost its original purpose. 
Colombo and Delmastro (2002) have analyzed a large sample of 
manufacturing plants observed from 1975 to 1996 and found evidence that 
the presence of sunk costs figures prominently in explaining structural 
inertia of business organizations. Rauch (1993) argues that the sunk costs 
resulting from the operation of many firms at a particular site creates a 
first-mover disadvantage that can prevent relocation. Ichniowski and Shaw 
(1995) expand the traditional concept of sunk costs further into individual 
level. They show that in addition to inertia caused by company level sunk 
costs resulting from adaptation of advanced human resource practices, also 
individual level sunk costs of workers‘ personal investment in task-specific 
and firm-specific skills to master work routines creates a major inertial 
force opposing change. 
 
3.2.2  Information Constraints 
The situational awareness of decision makers is seldom perfect. On the 
contrary, the information available for decision making is normally severely 
limited, which creates delays and often limits the scope of decision making 
to issues which are believed to be understood with reasonable accuracy. 
Some common information related issues in organizations are 
misunderstandings and communication failures, selective gathering of 
information, selective use of information, selective activation of 
organizational members, and information as power.  
One example of consequences of information constraints is the ―liability 
of newness‖ of emerging organizations described by Hannan and Freeman 
(1984). New organizations are vulnerable because their members are 
strangers and withhold crucial information from one another. Efficient 
operations become possible only after the trust has been established 
between members. Aldrich (1999: 96) continues that fatigue, which is 
common among key decision makers during critical times, contributes to 
the use of cognitive shortcuts such as optimism, overconfidence and 
selective use of information. 
Another example is the goal displacement and sub-goal formation 
introduced by March and Simon (1958: 150-158). Groups within 
organizations can become the primary groups for their members, and since 
goals are divided and factored among individuals and groups, goal 
displacement is encouraged by selective perception and attention processes 
among individuals, the selective content of in-group communication, and 
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the selective exposure to information occasioned by the division of labor 
within the larger organization. Goals assigned to individuals and groups as 
means easily come to be viewed as ends in themself. 
Cohen, March and Simon investigate in their infamous ―garbage can 
model of organizational choice‖ (1972) how organizations can make choices 
without consistent, shared goals, and how members are activated, i.e. how 
attention is directed toward, or away from, a decision. Understanding 
attention patterns is important, since not everyone is attending everything 
all of the time. They claim that variations in behavior in organized 
anarchies (the model of which describes a portion of almost any 
organization‘s activities) are largely due who is attending to what.  
In many cases the processes how an organization assesses its 
environment may have even greater influence on change than the 
environment itself. The problem of bounded rationality surfaces when the 
amount of information available for decision making grows so large, that 
the mechanisms of focusing attention and refining information become 
more important than the concept of choice (Scott 2003). Some information 
will turn influential only because it is collected and thus readily available to 
support decision making. Importantly the strategies in use (Daft and Weick, 
1984) and organizational structures in place, especially information-
processing structures (Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu, 1994), play 
significant roles in guiding interpretation. According to Thomas and 
McDaniel (1990), the organization‘s strategy amounts to a statement of 
intention that influences top management‘s perceptions of key issues, and 
tightens top management‘s interpretive focus (Daft and Weick, 1984). 
Another human limitation for organizations making sense of their 
environments is the process of enactment.  The organizational actors, 
particularly top management, interpret their environment subjectively and 
create a collective ―rational‖ explanation for challenges and phenomena 
they face and thus enact the environment around them. They can also 
actively alter anything they focus their attention to, thus producing e.g. self-
fulfilling prophecies (Scott 2003)). Also here the strategy in use is an 
important element in the institution‘s enacted environment (Weick 1979). 
Furthermore, there is the common fallacy of retrospective sense-
making. People are apt to give logical explanation for their actions after the 
act, although in reality the action often precedes interpretation and the 
interpretation creates a context for action (Aldrich 1999). It should be noted 
here as well, that the retrospective sense-making also creates significant 
challenges for research trying to figure out, why did people act as they did. 
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Most information biases apply both internally and externally in 
organizations. As Hannan and Freeman (1977) note, gathering information 
from critical external environments is especially expensive during turbulent 
times, when the information would be most valuable. Also the type of 
professionals the organization uses influences what kind of information 
1) the organization is likely to gather 
2) the organization is capable of processing 
3) the organization is capable of using 
Scott (2003: 56) concludes the discussion about limitations in 
processing information stating that an individual is incapable to anything 
even close to rational decision making, because the enormity of possibilities 
is incomprehensible. Therefore the choice is made among ―given‖ 
alternatives. 
 In addition to the numerous intrinsic difficulties organizations have in 
information gathering, processing and distributing, also a more blunt force 
often hinders the flow of information. Because information is power, 
deliberate distortions of meanings and withholding of information are also 
strategies to gain power (Aldrich 1999: 153). Scott puts it nicely (2003: 
291): 
Effective participation is not closely related to rank in the 
formal hierarchy of the organization. Power is assumed to 
pass down from the pinnacle. This happens, but only in very 
simple organizations – the peacetime drill of the National 
Guard or a troop of Boy Scouts moving out on Saturday 
maneuvers. Elsewhere the decision will require information. 
Some power will then pass on to the person or persons who 
have this information. If this knowledge is highly particular 
to themself then their power becomes very great. 
  
The effect of power games and politics on inertia is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.2.3  Internal Political Constraints 
Variations are generated within organizations as people cope with problems 
involving the reproduction of their organizations from one day to the next 
(Aldrich 1999: 54). This reproduction depends on participants continually 
negotiating a shared understanding of what they are doing. However, 
dominant groups and coalitions may constrain opportunities for variation 
to prevent challenges to their power and privilege. 
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A dominant coalition includes all the groups, whose interests have to be 
taken into account while making decisions (Scott: 2003). The groups may 
agree to compensate each other to make others support their cause, and 
thus advance causes that are irrelevant or even harmful for themselves for 
tactical reasons. The more complex the environment and the more 
uncertainty there is, the larger the dominant coalition is likely to become.  
Tilly (1998) writes that different status-based groups within the 
organization dynamically attempt to preserve and expand their advantages 
by limiting access to others outside their status group. Groups excluded 
from participation will then tend to devise means to usurp status 
monopolies, either by directly challenging a superordinate‘s advantages or 
by monopolizing other resources (Parkin 1979).  
Scott (2003) emphasizes the significance of resource distribution as an 
indicator of power and ―true‖ goals of management. He suggests that in 
differentiated and loosely coupled systems such as universities the balance 
of power between units is not reflected as much in direct attempts to 
influence the goals of the organization as a whole, but instead in attempts to 
gain access to disproportionate share of resources. The more powerful units 
are also better able to influence the resource allocation principles for their 
own favor. Thus the ―golden rule of power‖ applies: ―He, who has the gold, 
makes the rules.‖ 
The labor process school in the sociology of work has emphasized the 
relative power of actors—owners, managers, and different groups of 
workers—to influence the technical and social organization of work (e.g., 
Edwards 1979, Hodson 2001, Vallas 1993). Another approach advocated 
e.g. by Scott (2003: 133) is to consider two possible conflicting roles 
available for organizational participants. The users need to learn only the 
organizational knowledge serving their own interests, and for them the 
organization has value mostly as a resource. However, the supporters need 
to learn their part of the organizational knowledge that fully reproduces the 
organization‘s form, and for them the organization itself and its cause are 
valuable. Especially in new organizations growth by adding members may 
increase the tension between user and supporter orientations, as the 
supporters that have likely created the organization are suddenly 
overwhelmed by the normally more abundant user types. 
Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs (2010) see inertia as built 
around cognitive, interactional, and institutional processes that create and 
reinforce power and status distinctions and expectations. The relative 
power of internal workplace constituencies (e.g. dominant managerial 
coalition opposed by professional staff) also influences change in divisions 
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of labor, human resource practice, and the allocation of organizational 
resources. 
Adler and Borys (1996) consider the effect of politics on implementation 
of new technology (methodology or processes) in organizations. In worst 
case the introduction of a new technology can have no determinate effects 
on organization, because the change is primarily an opportunity for various 
social forces to play out another round in their rivalry. 
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977), bring together the key political issues causing 
inertia. Any alteration of organizational structure disturbs the political 
equilibrium and causes a redistribution of the limited resources. 
Furthermore, even if the reorganization is considered as beneficial as a 
whole, most benefits will be shared and are realized only in the long run. On 
the contrary, most disadvantages of the reorganization normally affect only 
a part of the organization, and are realized immediately. Thus it should not 
be surprising that political resistance to change exists. 
Mintzberg (2009: 273) concludes that ―it hardly makes sense to describe 
strategy formation as a process devoid of power and politics.‖ He continues 
that the significance of politics is especially great 
a) during periods of major change, when significant shifts in power 
relationships inevitably occur and so conflicts arise 
b) in large, mature organizations 
c) in complex, highly decentralized organizations of experts (such 
as e.g. universities), where many actors have the power and 
inclination to further their own interests 
d) during periods of blockade, when strategic change is stopped 
e) during periods of flux, when organizations are unable to 
establish any clear direction and so decision making tends to 
become a free-for-all 
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As examples of different possible political games played in organizations, 
Mintzberg (2009: 245-246) gives the following: 
Insurgency game: Usually played to resist authority, or else to effect change in the 
organization; is usually played by ‘lower participants’, those who feel the 
greatest weight of formal authority. 
Counterinsurgency game: Played by those in authority who fight back with 
political means, perhaps legitimate ones as well (such as excommunication in 
the church) 
Sponsorship game: Played to build power base, in this case by using superiors; 
individual attaches self to someone with more status, professing loyalty in 
return for power. 
Alliance-building game: Played among peers – often line managers, sometimes 
experts – who negotiate implicit contracts of support for each other in order to 
build power bases to advance selves in the organization. 
Empire-building game: Played by line managers, in particular, to build power 
bases, not cooperatively with peers but individually with subordinates. 
Budgeting game: Played overtly and with rather clearly defined rules to build 
power base; similar to the last game, but less divisive, since prize is resources, 
not positions or units per se, at least not those of rivals. 
Expertise game: Non-sanctioned use of expertise to build power base, either by 
flaunting it or by feigning it; true experts play by exploiting technical skills and 
knowledge, emphasizing the uniqueness, criticality, and irreplaceability of the 
expertise, also by keeping knowledge to selves; non-experts play by 
attempting to have their work viewed as expert, ideally to have it declared 
professional so that they alone can control it. 
Lording game: Played to build power base by ‘lording’ legitimate power over 
those without it or with less of it (i.e., using legitimate power in illegitimate 
ways); manager can lord formal authority over subordinate or public servant 
over citizen, etc. 
Line versus staff game: A game of sibling-type rivalry, played not just to enhance 
personal power but to defeat a rival; pits line managers with formal decision-
making authority against staff advisers with specialized expertise; each side 
tends to exploit legitimate power in illegitimate ways. 
Rival camps game: Again played to defeat a rival; typically occurs when alliance or 
empire-building games result in two major power blocks; can be most divisive 
game of all; conflict can be between units (e.g. between marketing and 
production in manufacturing firm), between rival personalities, or between 
two competing missions (as in prisons split by conflict between some people 
who favor custody and others who favor rehabilitation of the prisoners). 
Strategic candidates game: Played to effect change in an organization; individuals 
or groups seek to promote through political means their own favored changes 
of a strategic nature. 
Whistle-blowing game: A typically brief and simple game, also played to effect 
organizational change; privileged information is used by an insider, usually a 
lower participant, to ‘blow the whistle’ to an influential outsider on 
questionable or illegal behavior by the organization. 
Young Turks game: Played for the highest stakes of all; a small group of ‘young 
Turks,’ close to but not at the center of power, seeks to reorient organization’s 
basic strategy, displace a major body of its expertise, replace its culture or rid it 
of its leadership. 
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3.2.4  Internal Institutional Constraints 
Opportunities to construct new worlds are limited because of 
the historical accumulation represented by existing 
organizations, populations, and social structures. When the 
social world becomes a taken for granted reality, people 
often decline to challenge it. Evolutionary theory thus posits 
a world where people are intendedly rational, can‟t always 
get what they want, and certainly don‟t always get what they 
need. 
Howard Aldrich (1999: 41) 
 
History, established culture, routines and structures are strong 
determinants for an organization‘s ability to cope with change. In many 
cases a strong heritage works to anchor organization to its recognized and 
respected past. 
A distinctive culture is something that an organization has, but it is also 
something that an organization is. On one hand the culture can be 
manipulated, on the other hand the culture affects everything that takes 
place in an organization. A strong culture has also its downsides, because as 
it attracts the like-minded, at the same time it also repels those who think 
differently. Homogeneity improves an organization‘s controllability but 
simultaneously impairs its problem solving capabilities. Aldrich (1999) 
writes that the selective refining of information emphasizes the views 
supported by the majority, and gradually the heterogeneity of organization 
is likely to diminish. The social reality created by early generations limits 
the ability of later actors to interpret their environment.   
As a starting point, Hannan and Freeman (1977) suggest two main 
causalities how normatively agreed routines and tasks contribute to inertia: 
 
1) Normative approval grants justification and organizing principle to 
forces that wish to oppose change by providing a common cause 
above mere self-interest. 
2) Normatively agreed processes and behavior limit a serious 
consideration of different options to only a few alternatives.  
 
Concerning normativity, a unique and important phase in an organization‘s 
development is the period of founding. Scott (2003: 70) writes that even 
the processes of decision making themselves, through which the structure 
of the organization is altered, shape the character of the organization. 
Aldrich (1999: 91-92) continues that much of the improvisation in shaping 
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an organization is limited to the period of founding, and even then the 
choice possibilities are perceived as limited because most managers simply 
try to reproduce normatively recognized structures.  
Any routines dating back to the period of founding are especially 
resilient to change because they are associated with the strong emotions of 
organization‘s early development. The excitement and intensity of the 
period of founding also drive the key personnel to carry a tremendous 
burden of work creating heroic stories difficult to match later. The 
idiosyncracy of actors to existing routines occurs not only for organizational 
reasons but also because the routines ease the lives of participants (ibid.). 
After the routines have been in place long enough to be institutionalized, 
people no longer do something because it is the normatively ―correct‖ or 
rationally ―the best‖ thing to do, but because it is the only thing to do (ibid: 
51). 
Barnett and Burgelman (1996) emphasize the significance of the period 
of founding for the organization‘s strategy making process. In the beginning 
the top management sets a structural framework for all activities, the most 
significant of which are the resource allocation principles. Resource 
allocation is a strong indicator of the true goals and motives of an 
organization, regardless of strategic rhetoric. And when the resource 
allocation principles have once been set, they are very difficult to change. 
Another interesting dimension of institutional limitations is the 
legitimacy of leadership. During a major organizational crisis or turnaround 
the significance of charismatic leadership may be great. However, as time 
goes by even charisma can be routinized and institutionalized, i.e. encoded 
into organizational structures (Barley and Kunda 1992, Aldrich 1999). 
When power is legitimate, it is also normatively constrained – the rules of 
authority limit as well how the power cannot be used (Scott 2003: 314). 
Furthermore, legitimate power is normally endorsed power, meaning that 
subordinates collectively enforce limitations to the use of power. Thus any 
change proposed by management can be challenged, delayed and even 
stopped by powerful subgroups within the organization, should it be viewed 
as illegitimate. According to Clemens and Cook (1999: 19) this means that 
when political entrepreneurs seek to transform the overarching institutions, 
they face high demands to keep their calls for change within accepted 
models, and the most ambitious innovators may well cloak their efforts for 
change in appeals to restore tradition. Consequently, as written by Riker 
(1995: 121), ―no institution is created de novo‖.  
On the other hand, the power of a legitimate order is great indeed. When 
a person is presented with a demand in a situation that has all the earmarks 
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of legitimacy, he does not usually ask himself what he would like to do. 
Instead, the central question he confronts is what he must do or should do 
– it becomes all about his obligations rather than his preferences (Scott 
2003: 314). Because of this great power of legitimacy, the most intense 
struggles within organizations develop over who will have the power to 
shape rules and norms (Aldrich 1999: 51). 
Scott (2003: 181) notes also that a particular problem of leadership 
exists as an organization moves from one stage to another during its life 
cycle. According to Scott, each stage requires different type of leadership, 
and the solutions for each stage become the problems of the next. Each 
stage ends in a crisis that the organization has to survive to enter the next 
stage, but normally the solutions the management has to offer for solving 
the crisis are the solutions of the past. 
Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs (2010) emphasize the 
cognitive foundations of institutions and have reviewed extensively 
organizational theory to explain processes causing inequality in 
organizations. They find a key feature of formal organizations to be that 
they are designed to outlive their participants. Organizational routines, 
status distinctions, and divisions of labor become the taken-for-granted 
framework for habitual action, and the formalization of the rights and 
privileges attached to the hierarchy of jobs contribute to maintaining the 
status quo. The division of labor typically codifies workplace inequality 
because it determines the scope and possibility for upward mobility, 
structures the form and content of social interaction, and defines 
compensation structures. Stainback et al. (ibid.) conclude that in the 
presence of status or class inequalities, all these factors are likely to 
reinforce the cognitive foundations of organizational inertia. 
Another interesting recent study by Willer, Kuwabara and Macy (2009) 
focuses on the enforcement of norms, and more exactly on the false 
enforcement of unpopular norms. Many such unpopular norms exist, that 
people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. Peer 
sanctioning is a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular 
norms, but the question why people enforce unpopular norms is more 
interesting. Willer et al. (ibid.) suggest that people enforce unpopular 
norms to show that they comply out of genuine conviction and not because 
of social pressure. The results demonstrate the potential for a vicious cycle 
in which perceived pressures to conform to and falsely enforce an 
unpopular norm reinforce one another.   
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3.2.5  Barriers of Entry/Exit 
In addition to internal factors contributing to inertia, organizations are also 
susceptible to inertial pressures from their environment. 
An obvious example are the barriers of entry and exit limiting an 
organization‘s chances for diversification into new markets or areas of 
operation, or its possibilities for abandoning established activities. The 
significance of entry barriers has been covered extensively in the 
organizational literature (see for example Porter 1980, Bain 1968 or 
Ferguson 1974). A readily available university related example would be a 
state licensed monopoly position for providing certain types of education. 
However, in the context of inertia the exit barriers are perhaps even more 
interesting (Hannan and Freeman 1977), as there are numerous instances 
of political and legal limitations that prevent organizations from 
abandoning certain operations. For a university, for instance, the political 
and fiscal barrier for exiting bachelor level education might be very high. All 
such constraints on entry and exit limit the breadth of adaptation 
possibilities. 
Research discussing directly the impact of mobility barriers on inertia is 
not very excessive. One example are the findings of Barnett and Sorenson 
(2002), who suggest that competition triggers organizational learning, 
which in turn intensifies competition and this cycle (the so called ―red 
queen model‖) leads some organizations to grow and evolve quickly and 
establish strong barriers to entry while limiting the choice available for the 
organizations involved. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993) report a low level 
of mobility between different strategic groups in conditions of high inertia 
and mobility barriers. Furthermore, Munene (1995) has studied innovation 
in private sector and found that there were significantly less entrepreneurial 
innovations because the institutional environment was characterized by 
entry as well as exit barriers. These included dependency and isolation from 
foreign technology, political patronage and a high level of moral hazard. 
These barriers made innovations a costly and expensive venture into which 
organizations entered reluctantly so that the bulk of innovations were of the 
type that consolidated existing ventures or prevented their demise.  
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3.2.6  External Legitimacy Constraints 
The concepts of legitimacy and institutionalized rules play a major part not 
only in the internal but also in the external constraints to organizational 
change. All the legitimacy that an organization has been able to gather 
constitutes an important resource that the organization can utilize to 
manipulate its environment. Thus any change diminishing the 
organization‘s legitimacy causes significant costs (Hannan and Freeman 
1977). The key success factor for private sector organizations is efficiency, 
but on the public sector the success is largely based on isomorphism to 
institutionally accepted behavior (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Therefore 
any change in the institutionalized rules may be even fatal for public sector 
organizations that cannot credibly show that they are conforming to the 
new rules.  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) discuss the character of legitimacy constraints 
in depth in their report ―Institutionalized Organization – Formal Structure 
as Myth and Ceremony‖.  
Meyer and Rowan suggest that modern societies are filled with 
rationalized bureaucracies for two main reasons (ibid: 345): 
 
1) Rational networks become increasingly complex as societies 
modernize. 
2) Modern societies are filled with institutional rules which function as 
myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to the 
attainment of desirable ends. 
 
Perhaps the most influential of these myths in our society is the myth of 
rationality that has a vast organizing potential after the myth has become 
institutionalized (ibid: 346). The pressure to establish certain structures 
and practices may arise from such sources as the state, public opinion, or 
professional organizations (Stainback et al. 2010). 
Isomorphic changes may also arise from mimetic processes in which 
organizations facing uncertainty alter or adopt behaviors and structural 
forms that are similar to existing organizations within their field (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Organizations tend to model themselves after other 
similar organizations they perceive as legitimate, but the change can be 
incremental or even unintentional if following environmental shifts such as 
variation in labor force supply and demand (Stainback et al. 2010). 
An organization can demonstrate its social fitness by incorporating 
structures with high ceremonial value, such as those reflecting the latest 
expert thinking or those with the most prestige. Also units within the 
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organization often use ceremonial assessments as accounts of their 
productive value to the organization, which makes the ceremonially fittest 
units also the most powerful internally (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 351). 
However, organizations are not merely at the mercy of the externally 
imposed institutional contexts, but they can play active roles in shaping 
those contexts. Many organizations actively seek charters from authorities 
and manage to institutionalize their goals and structures in the rules 
enforced by the authorities (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This external 
influence can take place in different scenes (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 348): 
 
1) Powerful organizations force their immediate relational networks to 
adapt to their structures and relations. 
2) Powerful organizations attempt to build their goals directly into 
society as institutionalized rules. 
 
A problem for organizations trying to follow the rules arises because the 
myths are generated in different parts of the environment, and thus may 
conflict with one another. Furthermore, a conflict is likely to arise between 
categorical rules and efficiency, because institutional rules are very general. 
Therefore organizations are faced with four ―partial‖ solutions for handling 
the inconsistencies between institutionalized myths and efficiency (ibid: 
355): 
 
1) Neglecting myths: However, organization that neglects 
ceremonial requirements and portrays itself as efficient may be 
unsuccessful in documenting its efficiency. 
2) Conforming to institutional requirements by cutting out 
external relations: However, institutional organizations must not 
only conform to myths but must also maintain the appearance that 
the myths actually work. 
3) Cynically acknowledging the inconsistence between 
structure and work requirements: However, this denies the 
myths and illegitimates the organization. 
4) Promising reform: However, defining the valid structure lying in 
the future makes the current structure illegitimate. 
 
Because all these solutions have significant disadvantages, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977: 357) offer two mechanisms to attempt a complete solution, 
namely loose coupling of formal structures and actual work activities, 
and the logic of confidence and good faith. 
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To achieve a loosely coupled state institutionalized organizations protect 
their formal structures from evaluation on the basis of technical 
performance by emphasizing the ―professionalism‖ of organization, such as 
the ―academic freedom‖ in a university. Inspection, evaluation and control 
of activities are minimized, and coordination, interdependence and mutual 
adjustments among structural units are handled informally. Ambiguous 
goals and categorical ends are substituted for technical ends, for instance 
schools produce students, not learning. Integration is avoided, 
implementation is neglected and inspection and evaluation are 
ceremonialized. This effort is supported by making human relations very 
important. The ability to get along with other people is highly valued, which 
contributes to ability to coordinate things in violation of the rules (ibid., 
Hannan and Freeman 1984, Scott 2003). 
The key concept of the logic of confidence and good faith is the 
maintenance of face. Assuring that individual participants maintain face 
sustains confidence in the organization, and ultimately reinforces 
confidence in the myths that rationalize the organization‘s existence. This 
can be accomplished through avoidance, discretion and overlooking (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977: 358). 
March and Simon (1958) wrote that delegation, professionalization, goal 
ambiguity, the elimination of output data and maintenance of face are all 
mechanisms for absorbing uncertainty while preserving the formal 
structure. Effectively absorbing uncertainty and maintaining confidence 
requires people to assume that everyone is acting in good faith (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977: 358). This assumption that everything is as it seems, allows an 
organization to perform its daily routines with a decoupled structure. 
Professionalization is not merely a way of avoiding inspection, but it also 
binds both supervisors and subordinates to act in good faith. The same is 
required in the public displays of morale and satisfaction, and the more an 
organization is derived from external legitimacy requirements, the more it 
maintains elaborate displays of confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, 
both internally and externally (ibid.). The participants do not only commit 
themselves to supporting an organization‘s ceremonial façade, but also 
commit themselves to making things work out in the backstage. The 
committed participants engage in informal coordination that keeps 
technical activities running smoothly and avoids public embarrassments, 
even if the methods may be formally inappropriate (ibid.). 
However, not everything that goes on in the backstage is necessarily for 
the overall good. Adler and Borys (1996) note that even though most 
organizations emphasize enabling and empowerment rhetoric in their 
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public communication, behind the façade many activities are still based on 
coercion. Enabling and empowerment are considered more legitimate, and 
so if any issues of coercion are brought into limelight, they are often 
justified as the ―necessary evil‖. 
Institutionalized organizations also seek to minimize inspection and 
evaluation by both internal managers and external authorities. Evaluation 
is harmful, because it can uncover events and deviations that undermine 
legitimacy, and because it is an assertion of social control which violates the 
assumption that everyone is acting with competence and in good faith. This 
violation lowers morale and confidence, and therefore undermines the 
ceremonial aspects of organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 359). 
 
3.2.7  Limitations of Collective Rationality: 
The Garbage Can Model 
Organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, 
issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they 
might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work. 
-Cohen, March and Olsen 1972 
 
As noted in last chapter from the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), one of 
the most powerful myths of modern world, especially forceful in the 
Western societies, is the myth of rationality. Ever since this myth has been 
institutionalized, and thus been taken for granted in our society, it has set 
the standards for most formal decision making (as opposed to for instance 
medieval decision making, heavily influenced by the institutionalized myth 
of divine intervention by God). In the context of examining inertia, the 
picture will be left incomplete if this standard of rational decision making is 
left unquestioned. Therefore I introduce here the ―Garbage can model of 
organizational choice‖ introduced by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). 
Cohen, March and Olsen first define a type of organization called 
‗organized anarchy‘. Such organizations have three general properties: 
 
1) Problematic preferences: Organization discovers preferences 
through action more than acts on the basis of preferences. 
2) Unclear technology: Organization‘s own processes are not 
understood by its members. 
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3) Fluid participation: Participants vary in the amount of time and 
effort they devote to different domains, and involvement varies from 
one time to another. 
 
Cohen, March and Olsen claim that these properties are characteristic for 
any organization in part, but only part of the time. Therefore the theory of 
organized anarchy will describe a portion of almost any organization‘s 
activities, but will not describe all of them.  
Where goals and technology are hazy and participation is fluid, many of 
the axioms and standard procedures of management collapse. One of the 
key concepts of Cohen and his co-writers is that a decision is actually an 
outcome or interpretation of several relatively independent streams within 
organization: 
 
1) Problems: Concerns of people inside and outside organization 
requiring attention. 
2) Solution: Somebody‘s product. An answer actively looking for a 
question. 
3) Participants come and go. 
4) Choice opportunities: Occasions when the organization is 
expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision. 
 
Cohen, March and Olsen introduce also three available decision styles for 
organized anarchies (ibid: 8): 
 
1) Decision by resolution: Normal problem solving; some choices 
resolve problems after some period of working on them. The length 
of time required varies by the number and difficulty of problems. 
The outcome is often a less-than-perfect solution. 
2) Decision by oversight: If a choice becomes available when there 
are problems attached to other choices, and there is energy available 
to make the new choice quickly, it will be made without any 
attention to existing problems and with a minimum of time and 
energy. Essentially making a decision with little knowledge about its 
implications. 
3) Decision by flight: In some cases choice opportunities are 
associated with problems (unsuccessfully) for some time until a 
choice more attractive to the problems comes along. The problems 
leave the choice, and therefore it now becomes possible to make the 
decision. The decision resolves no problems, however, because they 
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have attached themselves to a new choice. Essentially moving a 
decision somewhere else to be made. 
 
In their empirical research concerning adversity in university decision 
making, Cohen, March and Olsen found that actually almost all decisions 
were made through flight or oversight. They also observed that both 
decision makers and problems tend to move together from choice to choice. 
This means that many decision makers have the feeling that they are always 
working on the same problems in somewhat different context and mostly 
without results, while the problems meet the same people wherever they go 
with the same result. Furthermore, they found out that the segmentation of 
problems reduces the number of unresolved problems, but slows down the 
solution (ibid: 10). Important choices are less likely to resolve problems 
than unimportant choices. Important choices are made through oversight 
and flight while unimportant choices are made through resolution. 
Cohen, March and Olsen conclude it to be clear that the garbage can 
process doesn‘t resolve problems well. However, it does enable choices to 
be made and problems resolved, even when the organization is plagued 
with goal ambiguity and conflict, with poorly understood problems that 
wander in and out of the system, with a variable environment, and with 
decision makers who may have other things on their minds. 
 
3.2.8  Limitations of Learning 
Organizational learning obviously has many virtues. It could be argued that 
a successful ―learning organization‖ could live its life effortlessly adapting to 
its environment and overcoming the obstacles of inertia. However, it should 
be noted that processes of organizational learning are subject to some 
important limitations. 
Levinthal and March (1993) remind that learning has to cope with 
confusing experience and the complicated problem of balancing the 
competing goals of developing (exploring) new knowledge and exploiting 
current competencies in the face of dynamic tendencies to emphasize one 
or the other. They identify three forms of ―learning myopia‖, namely the 
tendency to overlook distant times, distant places, and failures. 
Furthermore, they find that learning processes contribute to organizational 
tendency to overinvest in exploitation at the expense of exploration. 
Salaman (2001) writes in his critique of the learning organization that 
the learning processes are limited by conventional organizational structures 
and hierarchy, by organizational cultures that frequently encourage anti-
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learning values and routines, and by shared structures of organizational 
cognition. Salaman also claims that the learning organization overlooks the 
extent to which standards of rationality within organizations arise from 
dominant external discourses of government and other authorities. Contu, 
Grey and Ortenblad (2003) concentrate on the political character of 
learning discourse which, they argue, ―works as the surface of intelligibility 
pro-posing the reality of work, self-hood, citizenship and society‖, but has 
little real value. 
The strategic drift introduced by Johnson (1987: 244-247) is an extreme 
example of uncontrolled learning: an overemphasis on learning may lead an 
organization to learn away from what works. Staw (1976) reminds of the 
possibility of negative learning in his notion of ‗escalating commitment‘: As 
you fail, you keep investing more in the hope of recouping your losses, not 
recognizing that the situation may be hopeless.  
Even Mintzberg, recognizing himself as ―an enthusiastic adherent‖ of 
‗learning school‘, uses six pages (2009: 233-238) for discussing the 
limitations of learning organization, highlighting the risks associated with 
too much focus on organizational learning, which can lead to an 
organization with ‗no strategy‘, ‗lost strategy‘ or ‗wrong strategy‘. Mintzberg 
(ibid: 238) also notes that learning can be very expensive and it takes a lot 
of time. Learning can go off in unexpected directions, resources must be 
invested in false starts, people have to be convinced of the benefits of one 
initiative over another, and the organization may be forced to bounce 
around indefinitely, thus paying the price of not settling down quickly 
enough to concentrate its resources. 
All in all, it can be concluded that even though processes of learning are 
crucial for making organizational adaptation possible, the very same 
processes also contribute to organizational inertia in their own right. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Research Design and Analytical 
Approach 
As the purpose of this study was to provide insight into what was going on 
in a particular poorly understood organizational transformation, it was 
natural to adopt an exploratory case-study-based research design 
(Eisenhardt 1989). The data set available enabled a longitudinal design 
covering one year before and one year after the merger under study.  
I chose a grounded and interpretive approach for analyzing the data as 
my goal was to reach deep explorative richness. As Van Maanen (1988) 
points out, an interpretative approach gives voice in the interpretation of 
events to the people experiencing them, and this ―native‘s point of view‖ is 
an important constituent of the analysis. Obviously this approach doesn‘t 
imply that the researcher wouldn‘t be an active participant in interpreting 
and structuring the data based on existing theory and other contextual 
factors (Strauss and Corbin 1990). I had no theoretical preferences or a 
priori hypotheses, but let my research question ―How has organizational 
inertia affected the forming of the Aalto University?‖ be the lens through 
which to seek and view my data (Eisenhardt 1989). 
In data collection, I followed the principles of constant comparison 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) and naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln and Guba 1985), 
inductively analyzing the data as it was gathered. I employed the processes 
of theoretical sampling, pursuing data that was relevant to the themes and 
grounded theory emerging from the on-going analysis. The data was 
constantly compared across informants and over time, allowing the search 
for new informants and to guide the focus of the ongoing interviews based 
on prior information. This approach created a constantly evolving and 
increasingly focused data set, until a ―theoretical saturation‖ defined by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) was reached. 
The basis of analyzing the data was identifying initial concepts in the 
data and grouping them into categories through open coding (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990). Actual phrases used by the informants (in-vivo codes) were 
used whenever possible. Next I searched for relationships between the early 
categories through axial coding, which enabled the establishment of higher-
order themes, and assembling these into overarching dimensions.  
Furthermore, after this data structure had emerged, it proved useful to 
split the data again into three original subsets representing the different 
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groups of participants: pre-merger transformation team, post-merger 
management team, and ordinary employees. Through this arrangement it 
was possible to first identify the patterns, categories and overarching 
dimensions relevant to the whole without bias induced by informant-group 
-specific preferences, and then compare these preferences through a 
common framework.   
The trustworthiness of the data was ensured by careful management of 
the gathered data, and peer reviews with other researchers not engaged in 
this study as well as periodic discussions with informants aimed at 
assessing the plausibility of conclusions made during the course of 
research.  
 
4.2 Data Collection 
I relied on multiple primary and secondary data sources while conducting 
the research. There were three primary sources: 1) Interviews of Aalto 
University top management, committed by myself between November 2010 
and January 2011 (60% of the primary material), 2) Interviews of ―Aalto 
University Transformation Team‖, committed by researcher Jari Ylitalo 
between October 2008 and March 2009 (20% of the primary material), and 
3) Feedback gathered by Aalto University top management from all 
departments of Aalto University in November 2009 (20% of the primary 
material).  
In addition to these primary sources, additional data could also be 
gathered from 4) documentation 5) non-participant and participant 
observation, and 6) I had been involved in Aalto University project as a 
representative of a central stakeholder 2008-2009 and therefore had 
understanding of the key dynamics of the project even before this research. 
These secondary data sources acted as important triangulation and 
supplementary sources for understanding events and phenomena 
encountered during the research. The secondary data sources also assisted 
in finding the most relevant primary data sources. 
1) Interviews of Aalto University Top Management 
Prior research by e.g. Kiesler and Sproull (1982), Isabella (1990) and 
Kumar, Stern and Anderson (1993), has identified top managers as key 
players in perceptions about change in organizations, and key informants as 
active participants in the change itself. They have unique access to 
information about the strategies, plans and organizational structures, and 
they wield an important insight into an organization‘s intended identity 
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before it has realized for the organization as a whole. Therefore it was 
natural to choose the university top management as the core source of 
information about the organizational change. It was, however, also 
important to ensure that the informants would represent a variety of 
backgrounds to avoid bias towards the views of any particular interest 
group within the top management. 
The informants and their different roles during the transformation are 
listed in Table 2. Only executive roles within Aalto University or the old 
three universities are listed. The 11 informants representing the Aalto 
University top management interviewed for the purposes of this study are 
marked with ‗x‘ in the last column labeled 2010/11. 
 
Informant Position of Informant Interviewed 
 
Old Universities Aalto planning phase Aalto University 2008* 2009* 2010/11 
1 - - President - - x 
2 
President of 
University A 
President of University 
A Dean - - x 
3 
President of 
University B 
President of University 
B Dean - - x 
4 
Administrative 
Director of 
University C 
Member of 
Transformation Team 
Administrative 
Director of School C x x x 
5 
VP of 
University A 
Member of 
Transformation Team Dean x - - 
6 
VP of 
University B 
Member of 
Transformation Team Vice President x x x 
7 
VP of 
University B 
Member of 
Transformation Team Associate Dean x - - 
8 - - Vice President - - x 
9 - Project Leader Director x x x 
10 
Administrative 
Director of 
University B 
Member of 
Transformation Team Manager x x - 
11 - 
Member of 
Transformation Team - x x - 
12 - - CFO - - x 
13 - - HR Director - - x 
14 - - Director - - x 
15 - - 
Member of the 
Board - - x 
    
* Interviews by Jari Ylitalo 
Table 2: The Informants 
 
The purpose of the interviews was to obtain multiple perspectives on the 
strategic change effort from the people who were key players in the 
transformation and were supposed to have the best overall picture of what 
was going on. To ensure heterogeneity of the information I wanted to make 
certain that I had representation from the different organizational and 
social sub-groups of the top management: the President of Aalto University, 
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the Presidents of the old universities, the Board of Aalto University, 
academic vice-presidents, management that had worked both in the old 
universities as well as in Aalto, new management that had not worked in 
the old universities, professional managers with private sector background, 
people involved with the Aalto project from the very beginning, people who 
had been involved only in the beginning, and people who had been involved 
only in the end, as well as people from all the three old universities as well 
as people without history in any of the old universities. 
The goal of reaching this diversity of informants was the other key 
principle in their selection in addition to the need to find the best informed 
informants. Third principle was snowball –technique, starting from the top 
with informants capable of recommending informants through all the levels 
of organization, and then using their suggestions in finding the best 
candidates. I could also use the existing interview material from 2008 and 
2009 to sort out which interviewees would be the most potential for the 
purposes of this study. 
It is worth noting that almost all informants continue to work in the top 
management of Aalto University during the publishing of this thesis, and 
the researched transformation is still ongoing. This fact gives rise to certain 
sensitivity and political issues. Therefore the informants are not quoted by 
name or title, except in certain occasions where this has been absolutely 
necessary to put the quote to a correct context. If there have been strongly 
disagreeing views among the informants, an effort has been made to 
illustrate the points of the different sub-groups. I have also tried to make a 
distinction if a certain theme has been generally supported by all or most 
informants, or if only a few have commented for its favor. 
The final interviews ranged from 45 to 120 minutes in length, and were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Most interviews had informal ―off-
record‖ parts that were not recorded. These parts were either small-talk or 
meant to increase the awareness of the interviewer in some sensitive 
matters. The interviews were semi-structured with some customization for 
position and organizational tenure. The idea was to keep the conversation 
in organizational phenomena, but otherwise to keep the scope as wide as 
possible to allow the informants to concentrate on what they considered 
most significant. 
The interviews included questions about the informants‘ tenure in 
universities in general and in Aalto project, how they saw their own 
contribution to the project, what they thought to be characteristic for 
universities in general and if Aalto was somehow different from the rest, 
what were their personal goals in the project and why they thought that the 
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construction of Aalto was necessary, what challenges they had faced and 
what they had done to overcome them, and how the decision making in 
universities worked in their opinion. Subsequent interviews became 
progressively more structured and focused as themes emerged from the 
data, which allowed for concentrating data collection to identify patterns 
across informants and consistencies and inconsistencies across the 
organization. 
All other informants were interviewed only once except informants 1 and 
9 (Aalto University President and Aalto project director), who were 
interviewed three times, with the initial two interviews aimed at guiding the 
research into relevant direction. These initial interviews were not recorded 
but notes were taken. 
2) Interviews of Aalto University Transformation Team 
When studying an organizational transformation, the longitudinal 
perspective – before vs. after – is paramount. This posed a challenge as the 
time frame of a master‘s thesis –scale research project is limited and the 
transformation of interest had already passed many critical periods. 
Furthermore, natural human behavior like retrospective sense making and 
enactment (Scott 2003, Aldrich 1999, discussed in chapter 3.2.2) make it 
difficult to obtain unbiased information about the previous doings of 
informants. To overcome these shortcomings, it became necessary to obtain 
such material from the earlier phases of the transformation that was 
actually gathered during the early events. 
Luckily, such raw data did exist, gathered in 2008-09 by researcher Jari 
Ylitalo for his research (unpublished) that takes a leadership perspective on 
the Aalto project. As we saw out perspectives as mutually supportive rather 
than competitive, it became beneficial to share our raw data. Naturally I 
had no chance of influencing the course of these interviews as they had 
already taken place, but they were semi-structured in nature and many 
topics revolved around themes that were relevant also for my perspective, 
such as the goals of the project management, breakthroughs and 
challenges, and internal dynamics of the project team. This material was 
also processed and analyzed with exactly the same process as my original 
material to ensure comparability. Even though this set of raw data was 
almost identical in size with my original material, it contributed only about 
20% of findings of my primary data, compared to 60% of my customized 
interviews. However, as already mentioned, this set of data was crucial in 
establishing the longitudinal element of my study, and I wish to express my 
deep gratitude to Mr. Ylitalo for making his material available. 
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The informants covered in 2008 and 2009 interviews are listed in Table 
2. 
3) Feedback from the Departments and Units 
To support the Aalto transformation effort, the university top management 
instructed the department and unit leaders of the university to arrange 
discussion sessions for their own personnel in October or November 2009, 
and chart the worries and open questions of the academic and 
administrative staff. The leaders were given pre-prepared material for 
communicating the undergoing change with a focus in university strategy, 
policies and a new career system. The leaders were also asked to gather the 
current issues causing concern among the staff and report these issues to 
the President of the university. 
The unit leaders were given three weeks to arrange the discussion 
sessions. Only general level instructions were given about practical 
arrangements of the sessions and how the results should be reported, but 
the minimum requirement was to provide the key concerns as a list of bullet 
points. Many units reported the discussion and atmosphere of the events 
with considerable detail, while others were more compact. 
Reports from 48 units were received on time. All academic units of the 
School of Economics (ASE) and the School of Art and Design (AAD) 
responded. In the School of Science and Technology (AST) feedback was 
received from 16 units out of 32. Concerning administrative and support 
services, the AST central administration reported as one unit, while the 
service units of ASE and AAD reported individually. All received reports 
totaled 56 pages, mostly bullet point –type listings of concerns and open 
questions of the staff. 
Analyzing this feedback material provided an important ‗reality check‘ of 
the management‘s plans, goals and situational awareness. Combining these 
reports with my other primary data made it possible to assess to what 
degree the management seemed to concentrate its efforts to solving such 
problems that were deemed relevant by the majority of the organization. 
Because this data came automatically structured by the organizational 
structure, it was also possible to analyze how the concerns and attitudes 
towards the merger differed e.g. between administration and academic 
units, between disciplines and between types of units. 
4) Documentation 
I had access to all key documentation related to organizational planning 
and goals of the Aalto project. Most of the material of 38 documents was 
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intended for internal use only, but there were also i.e. slideshow 
presentations the purpose of which was to communicate the Aalto message 
and the status of the project to external stakeholders. The material was 
generated quite evenly between 2007 and 2010, and included data sets such 
as blueprints for possible organizational configurations, analysis of the 
current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the emerging 
university, reports from different teams planning various details of the 
organization, and international best-practice benchmarking. Significant 
amount of the strategic planning was done with the aid of external 
consultants especially during the early phases of the project, and some 
reports were also provided by external sources. 
Such documentation provided an interesting contextual secondary data 
source for better understanding the key organizational choices made by the 
management, but also worked as a tool for focusing the interviews to 
relevant topics. Because the available documentation was also well 
distributed along the entire time span of the Aalto project, it became 
possible to see the development of the goals and plans through the years as 
well as periods of discontinuity providing an interesting longitudinal 
element to this study.  
5) Non-participant and participant observation 
I was employed as a project developer in the strategic planning department 
of the Aalto University from early 2010 until the completion of this thesis. 
Prior to focusing to this research, I took part in the planning of several 
strategic development projects to support the university management. This 
work provided practical insight to issues discussed in this thesis, but also 
allowed non-participant observation of the ongoing transformation from 
internal perspective and meeting with various people. Furthermore, I took 
part in the weekly briefings of our team and several larger events aimed at 
university staff, and in most cases I had the chance to take notes also for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
The trustworthiness of such data may be lower due to the involvement of 
the researcher into the research subject, but on the other hand such data 
can be collected from the natural environment without the research setting 
causing bias to the data. Nevertheless the possibility to live through events 
as a member of the Aalto central administration has been a unique 
observation spot for developing deeper hands-on understanding about what 
is going on in the organization under study. 
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6) Prior knowledge of the Aalto project 
It should be also noted that I have been involved with the Aalto project as a 
representative of a major stakeholder group in 2008-09. I worked as a 
member of the Board of the Student Union of Helsinki University of 
Technology and was responsible for the Aalto project in 2008, and 2009 I 
was the Chairman of the Board of the student union. Effectively this means 
that I have represented the largest internal stakeholder group of Aalto 
University during the key planning phase of the project. I have also held 
numerous positions of trust within TKK administration 2006-08, including 
being a member of the university Board in 2008. These years bring me a 
deep longitudinal understanding of the different phases of the Aalto project 
and knowledge of key informants. In order to ensure the scientific 
objectivity of this work, I have left the analysis of significant events 
involving the student community of Aalto University outside the scope of 
this thesis. For an analysis of these events, see e.g. Peltonen (2010). 
Even though this prior involvement with the research subject inevitably 
has some effect on my approach as a researcher, I argue that in fact exactly 
this prior knowledge has made a pure grounded theory approach possible. 
As Strauss and Corbin (1990) point out, no prior hypotheses should be 
constructed on the basis of a literature review when choosing the grounded 
approach, but the study should start with data collection and the theory 
should then be allowed to emerge from the data. Essentially the process 
should be iterative with alternating phases of theory building and data 
gathering. Exactly this took place in this study. My prior knowledge of the 
subject aimed the literature review into explaining the observed 
phenomena, giving rise to an early model that worked as a starting point for 
the gathering of the primary data, after which it became possible to 
construct the final grounded model.  
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5. Data and Analysis 
This study of a major university merger and turnaround involved a number 
of complex phenomena, but the framework of organizational inertia 
described in Chapter 3 proved capable for describing and explaining the 
observed organizational behavior. Tables 3, 4 and 5 portray the emergent 
data.  
The original language of the interviews and feedback from the 
departments was Finnish, and therefore all quotes presented from the raw 
data are translations into English.  
In-vivo codes or natural expressions used by the informants were used 
for labeling the first-order categories as extensively as possible (marked by 
category labels in parentheses), but occasionally I had to develop a 
descriptive label in the absence of a natural one. The 1st order categories can 
be found in the cells of Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Assembling these 1st order categories into 2nd order themes and further 
to aggregate dimensions, it soon became apparent that grouping the 
categories into a single tree-type data structure offered only a partial 
solution and dissatisfactory results. Instead, a more complete picture 
emerged by assembling the categories in two dimensions to produce a data 
matrix instead of a tree. The dimensions of this matrix can be seen in the 
columns and rows of Tables 3-5. 
The first dimension (the rows of the tables) becomes evident when the 
empirical data is grouped through the lens of the research question ―What 
are the most significant sources of organizational inertia in the forming of 
the Aalto University?‖ Although eight principal sources of inertia can be 
found from the integrated primary data, it is evident that four emerge as 
clearly dominant: information constraints, internal political constraints, 
internal institutional constraints and external legitimacy constraints. Also 
limitations of collective rationality and limitations of learning seem relevant 
to the overall picture. Furthermore, some findings support themes that can 
be classified as sunk costs or barriers of entry/exit, but this evidence is only 
limited.  
It is obvious that the dimension that results from grouping the 1st order 
categories into themes representing sources of inertia is of great relevance 
to our main research question ―How does organizational inertia affect the 
forming of the Aalto University?‖ However, the picture is still quite static. A 
more dynamic model emerges when it is noticed that the 1st order categories 
can be grouped into higher order aggregate dimensions (the columns of the 
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tables) that are independent from the 2nd order themes, namely separating 
the goals, process and tools of the transformation from one another.  
First, all informants illustrate why Aalto University had to be done, and 
most arguments revolve around the inertial elements of the ―old system‖, in 
fact underlining that organizational inertia itself was a key driver for the 
whole transformation to take place. The arguments supporting this 
perception of inertia of the old system as a key trigger of change can be 
found in A-columns of the Tables 3-5. Second, informants also bring up the 
challenges they have faced during the transformation process, and again the 
vast majority of their arguments can be interpreted as fighting the inertia of 
the system that the key players struggle to change. The arguments 
supporting this perception of inertia as a key context of the change effort 
can be found in B-columns of the Tables 3-5. Finally, the informants also 
describe in detail what they have done in order to reach the goals of the 
transformation and to overcome the obstacles they have faced in the change 
process (C-columns of Tables 3 and 4). This made it possible not only to 
study how the inertial elements in a static (pre-merger) university 
environment differed from the inertial elements faced during a university 
transformation, but also which inertial elements the management had 
recognized and where they had concentrated their change management 
efforts.  
The final dimension of the data is the emergence of clear eras or phases 
in the project, characterized by different management teams and operating 
models. In the description of the timespan of Aalto project in Chapter 2.2.3 
the distinctive phases were labeled ‗preparation‘, ‗planning‘ and 
‗implementation‘. Because an adequate discussion of the preparation phase 
would require moving the perspective from the research site to a national 
perspective, it has been mostly left out of the scope of this thesis, and the 
analysis focuses on the differences of planning (Table 3) and 
implementation (Table 4) phases. Some phenomena originating in 
preparation phase are briefly mentioned in the discussion of the planning 
stage.  
For clarity, the feedback data gathered from the staff is presented in its 
own table. The dataset obviously does not have the element of leaders‘ 
responses. In principle the feedback could have been integrated with the 
implementation phase data based on when it was gathered. However, the 
feedback results from all events witnessed by the staff, including the 
planning and even preparation phase, and so it would have been misleading 
to associate it with a single era. The feedback data makes it possible to 
assess the management‘s ability to identify and resolve key issues relevant 
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to the wider academic community, and even find out if the management 
itself had set into motion some inertial forces through its own actions. 
 
Table 3: Planning phase 2007-09: 1st order categories by 2nd order themes and 
aggregate dimensions 
 
1. Planning phase Aggregate Dimensions 
Second Order Themes A) Triggers of 
Change: Inertia in 
the old system 
B) Change Context: 
Inertia in the 
Transformation 
C) Leaders' Responses 
i) Sunk costs 1.A.i) “Have to take 
care of students 
that take 7 years to 
graduate” 
1.B.i) - 1.C.i) - 
ii) Information 
constraints 
1.A.ii) - 1.B.ii) “Unclear goals” 
“Communication 
challenges” 
“Hurry” 
1.C.ii) “Meeting key 
people across 
organization” 
Informal 
communication 
“Move to 
transformation office” 
iii) Internal political 
constraints 
1.A.iii) ”University 
democracy” 
1.B.iii) “Internal politics 
and self-interests” 
Users vs. supporters 
Discontinuities between 
management teams 
1.C.iii) “Converting key 
opponents” 
“Encouraging 
commitment” 
“Workgroups and 
discussion forums” 
iv) Internal 
institutional 
constraints 
1.A.iv) “Academic 
freedom” 
“Lack of trust 
between academic 
community and 
administration” 
“Bureaucracy” 
1.B.iv) “Resistance to 
change” 
“Change has to be pulled 
through by present 
personnel” 
Scepticism: “Nothing will 
really change” 
1.C.iv) “Avoiding the 
refreezing of 
organization” 
“Positive example” 
“New procedures” 
“New story”, imposed 
cultural change 
v) Barriers of 
entry/exit 
1.A.v) “Lack of 
entrepreneurial 
spirit” 
“General negativity” 
1.B.v) “Rearranging staff 
is a challenge” 
“Lack of resources” 
1.C.v) - 
vi) External legitimacy 
constraints 
1.A.vi) External 
control by 
authorities 
Resource control 
Loose coupling 
1.B.vi) “External 
pressure” 
Talk vs. action 
1.C.vi) - 
vii) Limitations of 
collective rationality 
1.A.vii) - 1.B.vii) “No clear 
ownership or leadership” 
1.C.vii) - 
viii) Limitations of 
learning 
1.A.viii) - 1.B.viii) Transformation 
team depending on own 
experience 
Lack of experience and 
necessary skills 
1.C.viii) Use of external 
expertise 
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Table 4: Implementation phase 2009-: 1st order categories by 2nd order themes 
and aggregate dimensions 
2. Implementa-
tion phase 2009- 
Aggregate Dimensions 
Second 
Order Themes 
A) Triggers of Change: 
Inertia in the old 
system 
B) Change Context: Inertia in the 
Transformation 
C) Leaders' Responses 
i) Sunk costs 2.A.i) - 2.B.i) “Old people and new 
positions don't always meet” 
“We should focus our resources 
but don't know what to give up” 
2.C.i) The early actors, structures 
and culture have a long lasting 
impact on the organization 
“A common dream” shared by the 
key actors, idiosynchronic jobs, 
homogeneity 
“We should get rid of symbols of 
power because they alienate 
people” 
ii) Information 
constraints 
2.A.ii) - 2.B.ii) “Communication 
challenges” 
“Controlling expectations” 
Management's limited situational 
awareness 
2.C.ii) “Such organization where 
people don't complain about 
communication has ceased to 
exist.” 
“Dialogue with the community” 
“Encouraging model behavior” 
“Matrix organization” 
iii) Internal 
political 
constraints 
2.A.iii) “University is 
an arena, not a line” 
“The ultimate power 
lies in the hands of 
professors” 
“Zero-sum game” 
“Laissez-faire 
leadership” 
2.B.iii) “The more people 
involved, the more diluted the 
solution” 
“Any change needs the support 
of the academic community” 
The change in informal power 
structure 
“Internal politics and self-
interests” 
2.C.iii) Enabling activities that 
support management's goals 
Resource control 
“Using change agents within the 
academic community” 
“Encouraging commitment to 
change effort” 
Strengthening leadership to 
oppose political games 
iv) Internal 
institutional 
constraints 
2.A.iv) “Criticism” 
“Control culture” 
“Bureaucracy” 
“Government 
financial office 
culture” 
2.B.iv) “You will fail anyway” 
“We like things as they are” 
“Passive resistance from key 
leaders” 
“If I need motivation, I don't go 
to meet my own subordinates” 
“We support all good changes 
and oppose all bad ones” 
“Nothing really changes” 
“People think the change won't 
happen if they fight against it” 
“Valuable traditions” 
2.C.iv) “Attempt to rid the 
academic community of 
administrative duties and allow 
them to concentrate on research 
and teaching” 
“Implementing new procedures 
and policies” 
“Setting a new vision” 
“New leadership from outside” 
“Reorganizing personnel to break 
old ways of working.” 
v) Barriers of 
entry/exit 
2.A.v) - 2.B.v) “The old universities have 
their distinctive responsibilities 
to the country” 
2.C.v) - 
vi) External 
legitimacy 
constraints 
2.A.vi) Loose coupling 2.B.vi) Talk vs. action 
“External pressure from a wide 
variety of stakeholders” 
2.C.vi) - 
vii) Limitations 
of collective 
rationality 
2.A.vii) “Tripartite 
decision making is the 
worst of systems” 
“Administrative 
efforts concentrate on 
avoiding mistakes” 
2.B.vii) “Decisions are 
concentrated on few key leaders” 
“Decision making is slow” 
2.C.vii) - 
viii) Limitations 
of learning 
2.A.viii) - 2.B.viii) “The new leaders have a 
lot to learn” 
2.C.viii) Utilizing internal academic 
specialists in planning the change 
Utilizing and adapting theoretical 
models of controlling change 
Hiring external professional 
managers 
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Table 5: Staff Feedback 2009: 1st order categories by 2nd order themes and 
aggregate dimensions 
 
3. Staff Feedback 
2009 
Aggregate Dimensions 
Second Order 
Themes 
A) Triggers of Change: Inertia 
in the old system - Staff's 
hopes for a better future 
B) Change Context: Inertia in the 
Transformation - Staff's fears and resistance 
i) Sunk costs 3.A.i) “Aalto has better goals, 
mission, vision and strategy” 
Many units share the 
management's dream of 
Aalto 
“We are still a little cautious 
but with positive 
expectations” 
3.B.i) Lots of talk, little action 
Personal fears about future employment in 
administration 
“Administrative staff overwhelmed by change” 
ii) Information 
constraints 
3.A.ii) “Good understanding 
of the transformation 
because we've been involved” 
3.B.ii) “Transformation process is secretive and 
closed, administrative staff is left out” 
“It is unclear who is responsible for what” 
“Management is invisible and impossible to 
contact, contact attempts are not responded” 
“Strategy is complex and difficult to 
understand” 
“Most communication is very high level and 
abstract, information about acute practical 
issues cannot be found” 
Overall lack of understanding what is going on 
Rumors and gossip dominate over facts 
“Lack of professionalism in external and 
internal communication”, heterogenous 
messages 
Unclear goals 
“Arrogant goals” 
“The goals are vague. Strategy should not be 
just a list of good things but there should be 
courage to choose what not to do.” 
“Successful examples needed” 
iii) Internal 
political 
constraints 
3.A.iii) - 3.B.iii) “Career system encourages inequality 
between personnel groups, others than those 
in the tenure track are ignored” 
“Our opinion has not been listened to, or at 
least it has not been heard.” 
“Encouraging personnel involvement has been 
only a façade” 
“Aalto is lead from Otaniemi, other campuses 
can only follow orders” 
“Everywhere the TKK's practices are becoming 
the practices of Aalto, the good practices of 
HSE are ignored” 
“We are concerned about the independence of 
our school” 
We want more resources for our school 
“Is the President calling all the shots in 
recruitment decisions?” 
“Transformation teams have been chaotic and 
poorly organized” 
“Internal administrative expertise has been 
ignored” 
There is suspicion between schools if the 
resources are distributed fairly 
“RAE was politically motivated and now Aalto 
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is using it to distribute resources to wrong 
places.” 
“Equality between schools means lower 
standards for HSE” 
How is the representation of our personnel 
group / school guaranteed in decision making? 
“There are no seats for all the subgroups of 
personnel in the council, will this cause 
tensions between the groups?” 
“Our unit is so much different from the rest of 
our department, so we wanted to comment 
separately” 
iv) Internal 
institutional 
constraints 
3.A.iv) “The transformation 
process has been inspiring” 
“Aalto has a more 
professional administration” 
“Aalto means better co-
operation between 
administrative units” 
“Tenure track means more 
professional and better 
quality research” 
Efforts to improve 
management and leadership 
are welcome 
“Aalto is a good reason to 
improve internal processes” 
Professional managers from 
outside are welcome in 
administration 
"We will create Aalto" 
3.B.iv) “It seems that there will be more 
bureaucracy in Aalto than in the old system 
because additional hierarchical levels” 
“We suspect that the Aalto central 
administration uses most of the extra 
resources” 
“How can we prevent mistakes in decision 
making if there are no officials controlling the 
procedures?” 
“There is no use for TKK-level in the 
organization” 
“The process for filling the key manager 
positions has been secretive and closed, 
competent internal applicants have been 
ignored” 
“The new career system should be an 
opportunity, not a threat to people who don't 
fit the model.” 
“What is so bad in the current system that it 
must be changed?” 
“Lack of concrete plans and practical decisions” 
“Don't the new leaders see how productive we 
have been” in our administrative unit? 
“The culture of efficiency and strong leadership 
fits poorly into a university” 
“Are our current good procedures saved or are 
they sacrificed to the altar of harmonization?” 
v) Barriers of 
entry/exit 
3.A.v) - 3.B.v) “Tenure track is too slow to satisfy 
demand” 
vi) External 
legitimacy 
constraints 
3.A.vi) - 3.B.vi) “We understand that the progress has 
been hindered by the delays of the new law” 
vii) Limitations of 
collective 
rationality 
3.A.vii) - 3.B.vii) - 
viii) Limitations of 
learning 
3.A.viii) - 3.B.viii) “The professional managers from 
outside don't have a deep understanding of 
academic world, cooperation requires a 
process of mutual learning.” 
“It is difficult to be creative in the middle of a 
terrible hurry.” 
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Structure 
Tables 3 and 4 are discussed in following Chapters 5.1-3. The Chapters are 
labeled by the emergent aggregate dimensions, with the triggers of change 
discussed in Chapter 5.1, change context in Chapter 5.2 and leaders‘ 
responses in Chapter 5.3. The staff feedback summarized in Column B of 
Table 5 is discussed in Chapter 5.4 as separate change context from Chapter 
5.2, because from the staff‘s point of view also the leaders‘ responses are 
part of the context. The triggers of change as perceived by the staff (Column 
A from Table 5) are discussed in Chapter 5.1.3 alongside the other triggers 
of change. 
The subchapters of Chapters 5.1-4 follow a unified structure based on the 
second order themes (rows) in Tables 3-5. The themes are discussed in the 
approximate order of their relative significance. Furthermore, the 
paragraphs of the discussion of a certain theme approximate the first order 
categories listed in the corresponding cells of the Tables 3-5. 
Finally, the relative significance of different themes and the 
corresponding observed variation in foci between different project phases 
and aggregate dimensions is discussed in Chapter 5.5.    
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5.1 Triggers of Change: Inertia in the 
Old System 
The purpose of this Chapter is to present the data showing how Aalto 
Transformation Team, Aalto University management and the university 
staff analyzed the starting conditions of the Aalto transformation. Key 
themes revolve around the perceived need for a change in the ―old system‖ 
during different phases of the project. The Chapter illustrates how 
overcoming certain inertial elements in the old universities was actually a 
central driving force and motivation for the change itself.   
5.1.1 Triggers of Change: Planning  2007-09 
The Aalto Transformation Team was the driving force in the construction of 
the new university in 2008-2009 before the actual Aalto University 
management could be established. The team was essentially a handpicked 
voluntary group gathered from senior vice-president or administrative 
director –level executives of the old three universities. 
Based on interviews it is apparent that the transformation team became 
a close-knit group that shared a common dream and mindset to build 
something new and extraordinary. There were some more conservative 
minority voices in the team as well, but these became marginalized as the 
project went on, and some of the original members left the team. All 
informants confessed that they worked mercilessly long hours at and 
beyond the limits of their skills and stamina. Many emphasized that the 
Aalto project was unique and of national significance, an once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to make a difference, and a chance to make history. 
The informants shared a strong common perception what was wrong in 
the ―old system‖, meaning the Finnish universities as they were in 2008. 
They painted a rather grim picture of universities where the key features 
were inability to make decisions on all levels, lack of trust between 
academic staff and administration, and excessive regulation by external 
authorities. 
Internal Political and Institutional Constraints 
According to the informants, the inability to make decisions in 
universities originates from several reasons, mostly related to ―how 
things are done in a university‖ representing internal institutionalized 
practices, as well as issues revolving around the internal power structure or 
internal politics. They claim that part of the problems is caused by 
characteristic features of the academic community itself, such as critical 
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researcher attitude and the overemphasized notion of academic freedom. 
Many emphasized that it was impossible to run a university like a company 
and the academic freedom and critical thinking were necessary 
prerequisites of any university‘s success, but that these fundamental and 
highly valued academic characteristics had also a significant negative 
impact on the university as an organization. As one informant put it: 
 
In universities there‟s a lot of the problem that people are 
overtly critical. It‟s not enough to be critical but you should 
also have some answers and ideas. It‟s not enough to just ask 
tough questions like the opponents in the public defense of a 
doctoral thesis. 
 
The critical and often also negative attitude towards any reforms was 
further amplified in the old system by the tripartite university democracy 
(the three parties being the professors, other staff, and students), 
characteristic for the Nordic universities. Another informant illustrates the 
downsides of the system: 
 
The current committees [in our university] are just so 
frustrating. People drink coffee and occasionally come up 
with some kind of solution, and then the solution is slowly 
ground to dust in codetermination talks and especially in the 
Board, and then the deans after that, it just doesn‟t motivate 
people to get involved.  
 
Furthermore, the informants widely saw the needs of the academic 
community for ―endless‖ discussion and communication impossible to 
satisfy if anything wanted to be done. As one informant put it: 
 
You can‟t always have a conversation with 20 000 people 
about everything, and that‟s what makes people pissed off. 
 
The lack of trust between the academic staff and administration 
was another institutional key issue identified by the informants to make any 
reform more difficult. There seemed to be a shared feeling in the Aalto 
Transformation Team that they had inherited a university where the 
bureaucratic administration often made the lives of researchers and 
teachers more difficult instead of supporting them at their work. The case 
was not that the informants would have complained the administrative staff 
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to perform poorly in their tasks, but instead that the previous regulatory 
environment had forced the administration to concentrate on wrong things 
in a force majeure fashion eventually resulting in a controlling instead of 
supporting administrative culture. 
 
Administrative staff was celebrating how they were 
successful in making the researchers and teachers use the 
new work hour allocation system. It‟s a tough process to 
learn away from this culture. When I‟m talking with the 
professors, they ask how they should rethink this, they‟re 
used to this system. 
 
A further problem was that some of the shortcomings of the old 
administrative culture had been identified and tried to be changed before, 
but the efforts had been unsuccessful due to the resilient nature of the 
ministry-sponsored control culture. This history induced skepticism also 
towards the work of the Transformation Team as an informant from the 
administration of one of the old universities points out: 
 
This isn't the first time improvements have been promised. I 
just hope that now we could also keep those promises. 
 
Some informants pointed out that there were some differences between the 
three old universities, however. It seemed that all the universities had some 
problems but the issue of trust between academic staff and administration 
became worse as the organization grew larger and the administration more 
complex and ‗faceless‘. 
 
The value of trust between the academic community and 
administration is negative. I‟ve noticed that the academic 
community is suspecting that there are again some 
administration‟s plots hidden in this project. I think this is 
mostly a problem in TKK. In HSE and TaiK there is more 
trust, based on direct communication made possible by the 
smaller size. 
 
The culture in TKK is quite strict. In co-creation the decisions 
could be made through discussions with the subject. Here we 
don‟t have things like that. Everything comes from the top 
downwards through the line. And not necessarily even 
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through the line, but somehow from the administration. A 
little past the line. 
External Legitimacy Constraints 
The third large issue in the old system that the informants saw as a burden 
was the excessive regulation by external authorities. Many actors 
contributed to the regulation, most importantly the Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Finance, the trade unions and the government-controlled 
sources of research funding. 
  
If you try even a little to do things differently, there‟s always 
at least some organization that says you cannot do that, let it 
be the trade unions or Ministry of Education or someone else, 
that‟s why we have seen that [making any reforms] is very 
difficult. 
 
The informants felt that the old universities were powerless to improve 
their governance processes because they were expected to adapt their 
internal procedures to the demands of the overseeing ministries. 
Universities really didn‘t have much power to choose what to research and 
teach because they were so dependent on the focus areas and metrics set by 
their funders. Furthermore, many informants felt that the government-style 
recruitment policy of filling official positions instead of hiring employees 
made a dynamic human resources management and hiring the best people 
very difficult. 
 
All the important decisions concerning our recruiting, career 
system and strategic focus areas are made somewhere 
outside this university. Half of the research funding comes 
from the outside. It might be great if we could change the 
system so that we could make the strategic decisions by 
ourselves. 
 
It was also interesting to note what the informants told about how the 
universities had adapted to these external legitimacy constraints. There 
were multiple hints of a system based on loose coupling, a notion supported 
by evidence from secondary data sources such as non-participant 
observation. An account from one of the informants illustrates the system: 
There's something strange going on. It‟s like the Soviet Union 
that we have these so called official procedures and 
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administration, but then these academic units ... have 
developed their own ways of getting things done around the 
system. And the administrative procedures maintain all this.  
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5.1.2 Triggers of Change: Implementation 
2009- 
Most of the key executives of Aalto University were appointed by the 
university Board and the President during 2009 and 2010. The top 
management can be divided into three basic sub-groups: the academic 
presidents (professors), the top managers of different support services 
(external management professionals) and the academic deans (professors). 
In addition to this segmentation, some executives were executives also in 
the old three universities and many were also members of the Aalto 
Transformation Team, while others had their background in external 
organizations prior to being appointed Aalto executives.  
It is worth noting that three of the informants had also been members of 
the Aalto Transformation Team (including the Aalto project director 
leading the Transformation Team and the whole project until the 
appointing of the President), six had joined the project only after being 
appointed executives in Aalto (including a member of the Board and the 
President and a vice-president of Aalto), and two were the presidents of the 
old universities, continuing as deans in Aalto for a short interim period. 
This dynamism in the roles of the key executives necessarily contributed to 
some degree of continuity issues and role ambiguity resulting in observable 
tensions between some of the informants. Therefore more divergence 
between the perceptions of different informants was evident compared to 
the interviews of the more homogenous Aalto Transformation Team.  
However, the informants still identified largely similar issues failing in 
the ‗old system‘ and driving the reform than the Aalto Transformation 
Team. Most serious concerns can be again classified as internal political 
constraints and internal institutional constraints, but in addition there was 
also substantial evidence of behavior indicating limitations of collective 
rationality, and some evidence suggesting external legitimacy constraints. 
Internal political constraints 
All informants produced vivid accounts how the very essence of academic 
freedom, characteristic and necessary for a university community, 
simultaneously produced a peculiar power structure that was very resilient 
to any attempts of strategic leadership.  
The university was described as an ―arena‖, instead of a line 
organization. The university organization received credit for being ―more 
civilized‖ with brilliant people compared to most private sector 
organizations. In such an environment the role of the management was 
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seen as providing a ―playground‖ or a ―business park‖ for the professionals 
that ―play the games they want‖. However, this culture with individualistic 
professors ―leading their own product lines with very long product cycles‖ 
made any changes very difficult to impose and everything was guaranteed 
to take an excessive amount of time. The informants saw the power to 
ultimately lie in the hands of the professors, which was the correct way to 
control the focus areas of the university, but effectively hindered any 
structural reforms. As one professional manager put it: 
 
Every professor has his own hot-dog stand and they have the 
liberty to do almost whatever they want with their stand. 
And then the purpose of the university is to build the 
shopping mall around the hot-dog stand. I think this is what 
makes a university different from any other organization. 
 
Another manager continued: 
 
When I came here I was told to remember that this is not a 
university but a thousand small kingdoms. 
 
Such distribution of power made also the task of a university president 
particularly challenging. One former president described the system as 
follows: 
 
[The power structure] has been based on the collegial 
interpretation that we are all equal and doing this together, 
and there might be someone taking care of the common 
matters but he is not a superior. The professors … have 
recognized only the President as their superior, occasionally. 
 
The academic community also demanded to be involved in all decision 
making, which placed particular challenges for the communication efforts. 
Any message from the management was expected to create ―excessive 
amount of speculation‖ and ―the worst anti-aircraft fire [critique] comes 
from some department complaining that ‗nobody has asked us anything‘‖. 
There was also a perception in the management that the prevailing 
system was suboptimal and something should be done about it. The 
informants recognized that a research group or similar unit was the correct 
level to lead the research of the university, but that sometimes the 
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professors overextended the concept of academic freedom and mingled 
with affairs they didn‘t have sufficient expertise of. 
 
There‟s a belief that the academic freedom would not mean 
only academic freedom, but also for instance a freedom to 
hire whoever you like or use the university money to 
whatever you like. I think such is not academic freedom. 
Academic freedom means the freedom of research and 
teaching. 
 
Another informant continued that the principles of collegial decision 
making had probably worked sufficiently well decades ago when the 
university had been small enough for the ―staff to fit in one room and talk 
matters straight‖. However, the informant continued that 
 
When [the organization grows and] splits into smaller 
segments, the ability to see the whole disappears, a shared 
sense of responsibility vanishes and people mostly look only 
after their own interests. 
 
There were also differences in the power exercised by different professors. 
The academic community was described as a ―meritocracy‖, where the 
power was associated with the scientific prowess of the member. Those with 
the most distinctive academic records could use their authority for instance 
in pulling the strings in and behind the various tripartite committees of the 
university. 
  
Those who are recognized, say, have widely published 
internationally, they are respected. I think that sometimes it 
goes a little too far, because, well, you may have studied 
some particle a lot but it doesn‟t make you an expert of all 
fields. 
 
Additional phenomenon affecting the university was the intense academic 
rivalry fueled by battle over limited resources. According to some 
informants, this created an atmosphere of a zero-sum game, where it was 
advantageous to oppose any changes that favored only a sub-group of the 
community. 
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Here people have got used to a zero-sum game, where any 
change in balance of power, or any change in general for 
that matter, may create a difference between you and me, 
and in a zero-sum game it means that if you are doing better, 
I‟m doing worse. 
 
A powerful term used by one informant to describe the leadership in a 
traditional Finnish university, was laissez-faire leadership. Regardless 
of their background, academic or corporate, the Aalto management 
considered the overall quality of leadership in universities to be very bad.  
Ultimately the problem had been that good leadership had traditionally 
been undervalued in universities. The only credits that had made it possible 
to advance in a university had been scientific credits, and this had not 
necessarily much correlated with leadership abilities. The academic 
community had favored leaders that ―did not cause trouble by trying to 
lead‖. 
 
I‟ve been voting for the president in a couple of universities, 
and the discussion has always been about finding a visionary 
person who wouldn‟t be too visionary. …  It‟s been also 
typical to vote against instead of for a candidate in an 
election.  
 
The leadership had been regarded as a distasteful obligation circulated 
among the professors, with leaders ―sacrificing themselves‖ for the 
community to carry the common burden, and receiving very limited 
support for their leadership. 
 
The given governance model has lead into a situation where 
you cannot lead, and even if you have tried there has always 
been some committee that can have voted you over and 
announced that “we have decided not to do what the leader 
says”. That means you haven‟t had the mandate to lead.  
 
These features had created a strong tendency for leaders to avoid and 
muffle conflicts trying to save everyone‘s face and to move the problems 
somewhere else, while trying to build a consensus that wouldn‘t hurt 
anyone. 
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For instance the President‟s possibilities for exercising power 
are almost zero outside the framework that on the other 
hand has been given to him from the Ministry of Education 
and on the other hand because he has been chosen by his 
community and he has to try to respect the wishes of the 
community. 
 
Some informants saw the resource allocation models of the old universities 
to illustrate this lack of leadership. The models were also thought to 
encourage mediocrity, where everyone was treated the same way regardless 
of their accomplishments.  
 
The weak leadership leads into constructing a mechanical 
resource allocation model, after which the model leads, not 
the President. 
A typical example: I was listening in one Finnish 
university where they were introducing the results of their 
Research Assessment Exercise, and then someone asked how 
the results would be used. The answer was pretty much like 
„we support those who did well, in addition to supporting 
those who did badly, while those who are in between are 
supported as well‟.   
Internal Institutional Constraints 
The informants shared a view that there was definitely a certain way of 
doing things in a traditional Finnish university, and this traditional way was 
overtly bureaucratic, making the system static and responding to a 
changing environment difficult. As one informant put it: 
 
I had been working in two ministries before coming here, 
and the life here was much more regulated. 
 
Although most informants didn‘t express it directly, it was apparent that 
when talking about bureaucracy informants often described their 
impression about TKK administration or in some cases another large 
university, University of Helsinki. Problems caused by bureaucracy were 
seen in the administration of HSE and TaiK as well but to a far less extent 
(even though even there one informant told the bureaucracy to be ―quite 
massive‖). As one informant not associated with any of the old three 
universities said: 
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The character of the schools has been very different. I 
actually think that both HSE and TaiK have had less need to 
abandon the government bureaucracy than TKK, because 
their small size has allowed them to maintain a higher level 
of agility.  
 
This is an important notion because it has a direct impact on the 
expectations concerning the merger in the different parts of the 
organization. If people are happy with the status quo more resistance to any 
change would be expected. 
The informants gave two sources for the control culture contributing 
to bureaucratic processes in universities: in part the regulation was 
imposed by government policies that the universities had to comply with, 
but in part universities themselves were responsible for limiting their own 
actions.  
Even though the governmental regulation could also be discussed later 
under the theme ‗external legitimacy constraints‘, it is discussed here 
because the examples given imply internal enforcement of external policies, 
and because I find this structure to be more illustrative. One informant 
describes the system: 
 
We have here a governmental work culture. People are used 
to certain processes and reward systems, and also people we 
have recruited and who have enjoyed working in such a 
system and sought to work there, such things have a major 
impact. 
 
Another informant continued: 
 
I think the Finnish universities are somehow introverted and 
staring into governmental and self-made regulation. 
Government pays for everything, it‟s the only customer we 
have. It encourages a system where you are never in a hurry 
and you don‟t have to respond to any customer needs but 
instead … you are free to focus on the internal administrative 
needs of the administration. 
One of the most serious constraints set by the government regulators was 
seen to be government recruitment policy. Many informants felt that the 
system was slow and incapable, and had made it very difficult for 
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universities to hire the best talent. Especially difficult was the hiring of 
foreign professionals and trying to convince young promising researchers to 
stay in a university instead of moving to private sector. 
 
We haven‟t been able to control who we hire to our 
university. It‟s been a process with an open vacancy and 
you‟ve not been allowed to talk with the applicants and 
definitely not allowed to influence them. And then the 
external reviewers make their choice and we have to take the 
applicant even if he wouldn‟t be good. And then we have 
bound our resources for twenty years into a person who 
wasn‟t the best possible match.    
 
However, many informants with a background in the administration of the 
old universities confirmed that the universities couldn‘t blame only the 
government for their rigid governance model. 
 
The universities are very good at generating more controls 
for themselves. We always find some new issue and think 
„wait a minute, we haven‟t regulated that yet, we must do 
something about it‟. I‟ve been laughing at our process 
descriptions – there are an awful lot of those – that they have 
become so detailed that soon I‟ll have to check from the 
process chart how to say „hello‟.  
 
Additional characteristics used by the informants to describe the typical 
behavior in university administration were for instance old-fashioned very 
formal decision making and meetings, a steep hierarchy, lack of ambition, 
lack of trust between academic staff and administration, and a critical 
attitude towards anything new. 
Even though there were not many positive comments regarding the 
current state of the university administration, it must be emphasized that 
the informants didn‘t feel that the administration would cause all the 
problems in the university because they were incapable or ‗evil‘. Rather the 
message was that the administration was the most central part in a chain of 
bad policies and undesirable control culture originating in the ministries 
and amplified in the administration before taking grip of the academic 
departments. The academic staff wasn‘t left without critique either, as two 
different informants point out: 
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It is a different matter to be critical in such way that it 
constructs something new, than to be critical by complaining 
about everything. 
 
Always when there are some new instructions from the 
central administration, the academic staff reads the 
instructions like the Talmud, trying to interpret what is being 
said between the lines instead of simply calling the 
administration and asking what something means.  
Limitations of Collective Rationality 
There were two issues brought up by the informants that suggested failures 
in the collective decision-making in a university, namely the downsides of 
tripartite system and the administrative culture concentrating on avoiding 
mistakes instead of making decisions. 
When asked what was characteristic for a Finnish university, all 
informants mentioned the university democracy where all internal 
parties – the professors, other staff and students – were all involved in 
decision-making. However, most comments were formulated like ―it is very 
nice to ask everybody how they feel about everything, but…‖ Even though 
many informants thought that it was essential to somehow involve the 
academic community to decision making, the current system was seen to 
have mostly a negative effect on the capability to make good decisions in a 
university. 
  
I think this humboldtian university model is used again and 
again as a pretext for the mostly nostalgic descriptions of 
values of the Finnish university system. Since the 1970s it has 
been associated with the tripartite thinking representing a 
façade democracy. … It‟s a very curious system where people 
are governing themselves and then someone else pays the 
bills.     
 
According to informants, the most serious problems caused by the 
tripartite system were that it encouraged the internal parties to think 
only their own benefits at the expense of the whole, that the system lead to 
inability to make strategic decisions on strategic forums, and, consequently, 
the key decisions where tried to be made somewhere else. Therefore the 
discussion on tripartite forums was concentrated on encouraging 
commitment of internal parties to the decisions de facto already made 
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somewhere else instead of being true fact-based decision making, or often 
decision making at all. This applied especially to the university Board. A 
further challenge to fact-based decision-making presented by the tripartite 
system was that the different interest groups interpreted the ―facts‖ 
differently, making rational decision even more difficult. 
 
I think the tripartite system is the worst of all possible 
models, because it makes the internal groups to vote against 
one another. … We have been forced to make poor 
compromises, because the three interest groups have been 
unable to reach a consensus. 
 
Another informant continues: 
 
I‟ve been sometimes so frustrated with the decision making. 
The Board should be running the university, but the 
extremely narrow views of the interest groups dominate. Any 
big picture of where we are going was bound to be overrun 
by the tyranny of the details. 
 
Much of the decision making was also seen by the informants to revolve 
around processes designed to prevent decision makers from making 
mistakes. The capability for dynamic decision-making was less important, 
as was concentrating on the essential. Instead often trivial details and 
formality issues had the tendency to dominate. 
 
It‟s a world where your primary occupation is avoiding 
mistakes. … It takes all your creativity, it takes all your 
entrepreneurial spirit, and you‟re only afraid to make a 
mistake. And then all your efforts focus on control because 
you are controlling not to make the mistake. It makes it also 
impossible to take any risks.   
External Legitimacy Constraints 
The informants brought up two clear ways how external interest groups had 
a significant effect on the old three universities: First, the government 
influenced the internal processes and contributed to the build-up of 
bureaucracy through legislation and policies (as discussed earlier under 
the theme ‗Internal Institutional Constraints‘). Second, the institutions 
Triggers of Change: Inertia in the Old System 76 
 
providing most of a university‘s funding had a major impact on the focus 
areas of the university through their resource allocation models.  
However, perhaps the most interesting phenomenon described by the 
informants was how the academic community really responded to the need 
to comply with government-induced regulation. Because many internal 
rules and policies within the universities were the result of the university 
being a government institution, the rules were deemed to be impossible to 
change, no matter how ridiculous they were perceived. 
  
If I decided that the best way to improve the performance of 
my team was to organize a sauna party, to give a simple 
example, it just had to be „fixed‟ somehow under the radar. It 
was possible to arrange but officially it wasn‟t allowed to 
show anywhere. … In TKK people have actually been very 
creative and agile, but knowing that it won‟t necessarily go 
along the governance principles that are official and public. 
 
Open disobedience wasn‘t a possible solution, but things weren‘t always 
done by the book either.  This was seen as a characteristic feature of TKK, in 
particular. Another informant continued: 
 
I think that the policy papers produced by the central 
administration didn‟t get much attention in the faculties and 
departments. … Effectively this meant that there were two 
separate organizations: the official, and then the unofficial 
that operated in the space between the official rules. 
 
All in all, the evidence suggests that at least some degree of behavior related 
to loose coupling has taken place in the old universities.  
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5.1.3 Triggers of Change: Feedback from the 
Staff – Hopes for a Better Future 
Based on empirical data presented in Chapters 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, it is obvious 
that the key people building Aalto University have had a clear mission and a 
shared sense of urgency in trying to improve the shortcomings of the old 
three universities. It is interesting to compare how the broader academic 
community perceived the same situation and whether they found the same 
problems in the old system to be in need of a reform. For illustrative 
purposes the representative quotations have been classified by background 
organization (TKK/HSE/TaiK) and organizational function 
(academic/administration). It must be stressed that there is much 
heterogeneity beyond this simple division, but the most important trends 
relevant for the purposes of this study should become visible even without 
further segmentation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the purpose of gathering the 
feedback from the academic and administrative units in fall 2009 was to 
collect feedback from the transformation process and give the staff a chance 
to list issues that caused them concern. This dataset concentrates primarily 
around these issues, and the pre-merger situation is commented only 
briefly. The context of these comments is most often being for or against 
some reform announced by Aalto management, making the dataset more 
suitable for the analysis in Chapter 5.4. 
In general all units, both academic and administrative, expressed their 
support for the overall goals of the Aalto University. Almost everywhere the 
Aalto was seen to have much potential, and the ambitious strategy and 
vision of the university was welcomed. There were many concerns as well, 
but they were mainly focused on the practical implementation of the merger 
and were very similar across all units. These implementation issues are 
covered in the next Chapters. All-in-all, it can be stated that there was little 
feedback suggesting that the units would have considered the pre-merger 
operating environment so excellent that they would have been skeptical 
about a possibility of change to the better. On the contrary, the units 
brought up several practical issues which they hoped that could be 
improved by Aalto. 
  
The creation of the Aalto University has made us think about 
the core of our activities and also to plan for significant 
reforms in the future. (TaiK, academic) 
The goals are positive and ambitious. (HSE, administration) 
Triggers of Change: Inertia in the Old System 78 
 
We are doing well already and the coming of Aalto will 
support this good development. (TKK, academic) 
 
The most of the academic units shared the management‘s view that the 
government career system had caused a lot of problems and were eager to 
get rid of the old system. Many considered a new career system to be the 
most important improvement offered by Aalto and believed it to provide a 
more professional impression of the university‘s research organization as a 
whole. 
 
It‟s great to have a career system, because earlier we didn‟t 
have anything.  (HSE, academic) 
 
The academic units also saw the bureaucratic administration to make their 
life more difficult, especially in the TKK. The administrative units did not 
share the same hopes, except in TaiK where there was willingness for 
reform. The departments were hopeful that the administration could be 
turned more service-oriented, although they were also skeptical towards the 
growing Aalto central administration. 
  
The amount of administrative routines has to be decreased: 
filling all kinds of coupons, bad IT-services, applications for 
funding and polls take a way too much time and get on 
people‟s nerves. (TKK, academic) 
 
We hope that things would really change and that such a 
service organization would be built for Aalto where 
reporting would go in a line. We hope that next year [2010] 
there would be no more HSE administration, TaiK 
administration and TKK administration, but instead Aalto 
services. This would make it possible to professionally 
develop services. (TaiK, administration) 
    
Third positive development brought up by the staff was the need for 
developing academic leadership and management from a level that was less 
than ideal. The staff believed that good leadership would enable everyone to 
better concentrate on research and teaching. 
 
It is positive that Aalto pays more attention to academic and 
administrative management. Leadership culture should be 
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consciously developed so that researchers and teachers 
would have more time to concentrate on their primary jobs. 
(TKK, academic) 
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5.2 Change Context: Inertia in the 
Transformation 
As discussed in Chapter 5.1, the Aalto project management shared a largely 
unified story of the shortcomings of the ―old system‖ and had a vision what 
should be done differently in Aalto. Many of these thoughts were also 
shared by the staff. However, the largest challenges in such an ambitious 
project are rarely associated with the planning, but instead with actually 
pulling through the transformation. Overcoming the inertial elements 
associated with the pre-merger organization may have been an important 
motivation for the change itself, but when the change really starts to take 
place, the organizational inertia becomes a challenge for the change 
management. The inertial elements found to be at play during the change 
effort are discussed in this Chapter. 
5.2.1 Change Context: Planning 2007-09 
Based on the 2008-09 interviews of the Aalto Transformation Team, the 
project management ran across a broad range of inertial challenges. Almost 
all inertial themes discussed in this study are present, but the most 
dominant were problems associated with information constraints, internal 
political constraints, internal institutional constraints and external 
legitimacy constraints. Limitations of collective rationality and limitations 
of learning emerge as secondary themes. 
Information Constraints 
In a fast-moving and complex endeavor such as the Aalto Transformation 
the communication is likely to cause significant issues. Based on the 
interviews, this indeed was the case with challenges both in maintaining 
situational awareness of the management and in communicating the story 
of the management to the larger community. 
The dominant factor limiting the situational awareness of the project 
management was simply the lack of time and resources. Almost all 
informants felt that they had been stretched to and beyond the very limits 
of their capability and had little time to communicate with others what they 
were doing. Combined with the heavy burden of expectations contributed to 
a high-stress situation, but on the other hand integrated the management 
into a close-knit team. 
 
81 Data and Analysis 
 
If you receive an e-mail from someone at 3 AM in the Sunday 
morning and then many people react to the mail, it‟s a sign 
that we‟re actually doing quite a lot. 
 
I can‟t believe how anyone can pull through something like 
this in a year. 
 
It‟s not easy, it‟s like a constant feeling of inadequacy. 
 
The hurry contributed to difficulties in maintaining situational 
awareness. Many informants felt that even though they shared a common 
mindset of the grand goals of the project, on a more practical level the goals 
were often vague. Some informants also expressed concern that as a result 
the work on the different fields might not be compatible. 
 
Well, we're dabbling around with terrible intensity, but it's 
not clear what we're doing. 
 
There‟s a big risk that the project will split up into silos at this 
phase. We have to keep the big picture in mind. 
 
The fragmented picture of the situation and lack of time caused also 
problems for external communication, telling the academic 
community and the outside world what the project management was doing. 
All informants recognized these challenges, but most thought that not much 
else could be done. 
 
The professors don't have a clue of what is happening: “Does 
this affect us somehow?” 
 
Communication is something that is always failing because it 
hasn‟t been completely thought through, but on the other 
hand you just don‟t always have the time to think it through. 
 
Some informants thought that the Transformation Team needed extra help 
for handling the communication, while others dismissed the problem. 
 
Communications is something where we need help both 
internally and externally. 
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I think the upcoming change is terribly small compared to 
how much it is feared. 
 
The challenges in external communication were also one of the primary 
sources of negative feedback to the Transformation Team, which caused 
frustration. 
 
Some of the feedback makes me astonished and also a little 
depressed. People are writing that nobody is telling them 
anything. There are like dozens of people working very hard 
to arrange all the time information sessions and everything, 
and it just feels so unfair to read such comments. 
 
Internal Political Constraints 
A major organizational transformation necessarily causes changes also in 
the power relations of the organization. Therefore it was not surprising to 
find plenty of evidence of internal politics being played out during the 
transformation. However, it was interesting to find out that much of the 
power games –related empirical evidence actually pointed to games where 
the Transformation Team itself was involved. Three different types of 
games emerged from the data: 1) games played by individuals, departments 
and schools to protect their self-interests against others 2) tensions 
between the ―original‖ Transformation Team and ―outsiders‖ joining the 
project, and 3) periods of discontinuity, where the leadership of the project 
was handed forward to a new team. All-in-all, the quite pessimistic 
expectations of one informant during the early phases of the project 
received extensive support from the empirical evidence: 
 
I can't tell if there is any internal politics to be seen right 
now. But it's obvious that it will be there. It won't be any 
different from what we're used to. 
 
All the three old universities preceding Aalto had their own strong 
identities, and especially during the early planning of organizational 
structure and decision-making system of the new university, most members 
of the academic community saw themselves primarily as representatives of 
one of these three original identities. After the Aalto University was 
officially formed these identities had little reason to change, because there 
were few visible changes in the work environment of the individuals. 
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Therefore the old identities were much inherited by the three original 
schools within Aalto. The setting encouraged key managers of the old 
universities to guard the interests of their own schools. As one HSE 
executive put it: 
 
One of the neuroses of HSE and the other schools is to 
guarantee that they get enough power.  
 
Another informant continued: 
 
The trio of current presidents unavoidably looks at matters 
from the perspectives of their own schools. 
 
The situation sparked frustrated comments from some informants, for 
example: 
 
If the game has this far been about who gets what, we are 
now facing the fact that we really have to start thinking 
about and building the new university. 
 
According to the informants, much of the same dynamics seemed to take 
place also in the lower levels of the organization, between departments and 
professors. 
 
The situation is such that some are actively constructing the 
new university while others are preparing their own 
positions. 
 
If someone would already know that he would become a 
dean in one of the schools, he would probably be building this 
with a little different intensity than now when there are still 
a couple of power struggles to be fought. 
 
The power was a limited resource also within the Aalto project 
management. Although the members of the Aalto Transformation Team 
(also known as the ‗A8‘) were well aware of the temporary and preparatory 
nature of their position, the immense work effort they had given to shape 
the form of the new university had also created a strong sense of 
―ownership‖ in ―their university‖. Their dedication to the task identifies the 
Transformation Team as ―supporters‖ (see Chapter 3.2.3 or Scott 2003: 
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133) of the emerging organization, as opposed to less dedicated ―users‖ 
normally much more abundant in organizations. 
The deep commitment of the A8 meant that the team was anxious about 
what would happen after the actual Aalto University management, led by 
the new President, took over the project. The expectations of the informants 
seemed to be somewhat contradictory: on one hand they hoped that the 
new management would start as soon as possible to establish a clear 
leadership and ownership, but on the other hand they wanted to be there to 
ensure that the new management took the project in ―right‖ direction.  
  
It would have been good if [the new President] could have 
started earlier. 
 
This process needs a leader capable of making decisions, and 
[the new President] is such leader. 
 
There has to be some continuity. If the A8 would completely 
step aside and new people would be sought to pull through 
the implementation, it would not be optimal because we 
would lose an awful lot of tacit knowledge.  
 
The Transformation Team was apparently expecting an incremental 
transition where the President would start as the chairman of A8, ensuring 
a controlled communication of tacit knowledge and an uninterrupted 
continuation of the A8‘s work. Then eventually the President would have 
had time to gather her own management team, which might include some 
members coming from the A8, again ensuring continuity.  
 
We have to hold on to these people, this is the team which is 
going to pull this through. Somehow we just have to get [the 
new President] in the team. 
 
I hope that [the new President] will be chairing our meetings 
every Thursday. 
 
I think that the coming of [the new President] won‟t have 
much impact on our routines. 
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Furthermore, many members of the Transformation Team also faced 
significant personal ambiguity, as many had no positions to return to in the 
old organizations, should the A8 be disbanded. 
 
Personally I don‟t know if there‟s any work for me after this 
ends, but I believe that I can come up with some job. Some 
people are just climbing the walls because they can‟t take the 
situation any more. 
 
What actually did happen was that the new President disbanded the Aalto 
Transformation Team almost immediately and concentrated on creating the 
actual Aalto University management team, or ‗President‘s Management 
Team‘. The sudden shut down of A8 apparently caused much time to be lost 
during the final year of preparations before the new university was 
supposed to start its operations, as there was not yet any new management 
to take over the A8‘s work. However, all A8 members continued to work for 
the Aalto University, many of them in senior executive roles, so the fears of 
permanently loosing tacit knowledge or the personal risks of the team 
members did not actualize. Yet still, the significance of sudden major 
changes in the power structure of the project management for the capability 
of senior leadership at the critical phases of the project should not be 
underestimated. 
  
Internal Institutional Constraints 
A multitude of institutional pressures affects the life in universities. A 
governmental work culture was merged with a culture of perceived 
academic freedom, producing a bureaucratic system where everyone 
expected to be involved in decision-making. The traditions are long and all 
the studied three old universities have played a central part in the century-
long national success story. On the personnel side, the careers in these 
universities are long, circulation of staff is very modest and the average age 
of the work-force is very high (Aalto University 2008). All the studied 
universities are also large organizations, especially TKK and Aalto. All these 
factors contribute to the fact that there is certainly an established ―right way 
of doing things‖ that may not be easy to change. 
From the perspective of management trying to conduct some form of 
change management the institutional constraints often take form as 
“resistance to change” by the subjects of the change effort. The term is 
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quite ambiguous, but the corresponding phenomena were clearly evident in 
the data. 
 
There‟s an immense source of well-founded and unfounded 
fears, like a thought that can‟t you just leave us alone and 
simply give us the money and we will continue just like 
before. 
 
The informants perceived that personal fears contributed to resistance 
especially in the administration, while a ―change of mindset‖ was necessary 
for the whole organization. 
 
Then we have this administration that has grown too large 
and where there is uncertainty about the future and 
probably also fears about what will happen. 
Also the mindset of the teaching staff has to change quite a 
bit. Improving the quality of teaching will be a tough nut to 
crack for many. 
 
However, all informants saw it most difficult for the administration to take 
a constructive stance in the transformation. 
 
The idea that the central administration must be determined 
to pull this transformation through, actually means in 
Finnish that the central administration must be determined 
to hold its own ground. 
 
The last quote also illustrates the additional challenge resulting from the 
fact that the transformation really had to be implemented by the 
existing personnel. The informants were very well aware that it was 
impossible to recruit but a very limited number of new professionals from 
outside. Therefore it was important to try to circulate existing personnel to 
new jobs within the organization to ease a change in culture, habits and 
processes. At the early phases of the project, communicating this 
requirement to the staff seemed to pose serious challenges. 
 
The key thing to be changed is the thinking of the community. 
The people are referring to some foundation that is like some 
god somewhere far away and they're waiting for the 
foundation to come like some god from a machine and to 
87 Data and Analysis 
 
save them. People don't understand that it‟s all of us together 
who will have to provide that salvation.  
 
There was also a lot of skepticism questioning if Aalto really could fulfill its 
promises and if any of the changes would actually be implemented, because 
based on their previous experience people believed most changes to make 
things only worse. Therefore it was crucial to win key people with authority 
to the support of the cause. 
 
Most people didn‟t believe this would actually happen before 
the Board was appointed. But if those people believe in this 
project, perhaps I should start believing too. 
 
External Legitimacy Constraints 
When discussing the impact of external interest groups on Aalto University, 
it has to be remembered that the whole university would not exist without a 
concerted effort of the government and the Finnish economy. Furthermore, 
the larger framework of national university reform came largely as a 
response to broader needs of the whole higher education sector, with Aalto 
spearheading the entire reform. Therefore the whole essence of Aalto was to 
have a broader societal impact, not to simply exist in isolation. This meant 
that there existed a broad range of interest groups with a stake in Aalto, and 
that there were a lot of external expectations that Aalto struggled to 
fulfill. 
 
It‟s about a historical change, where the role of the whole 
university system is being rethought … and frankly this has 
been understood only by a handful of people. 
 
As the importance of Aalto was realized already during the first phases of 
the project, many actors tried to code their own goals into the 
goals of Aalto. This was evident especially during the creation of the so 
called ‗Sailas report‘ that became the backbone of all later planning efforts.  
 
The political lobbying was already fierce much before the 
Sailas report was published. 
 
According to the informants, other key players included for instance the 
Ministry of Finance that tried to regain government influence on some 
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issues that the Ministry of Education had left for Aalto to handle as the 
university saw fit. Another game was apparently played by the University of 
Helsinki that used its influence to shoot down benefits and freedoms 
designed for the foundation-based universities by demanding changes to 
the proposed new Universities Act. Also the other universities resisted 
any ―special treatment‖ and especially extra resources that would benefit 
only Aalto, and the trade unions lobbied fiercely against the abandoning 
of the government career system which was feared to have a negative 
impact on the benefits of personnel. 
 
On this field the problem is that it's not about what we want 
but there is the surrounding society limiting and controlling 
what we're doing. If we change for instance any systems 
related to people's careers there is a lot to discuss with all the 
interest groups before anything can be realized.   
 
Internally it was naturally the task of the management to create a positive 
and empowering atmosphere to make the change possible. In addition to 
this, the external pressures on Aalto project management demanded the 
creation of a successful external image of a rapidly progressing project. 
Obviously creating and communicating this image externally meant that it 
was also visible internally. However from internal perspective, it was 
possible to effectively observe the difference between what Aalto 
communicated that it wanted to be and the reality in the units what the 
situation really was. There had been no time to yet implement most of the 
plans and promises of the management, and therefore this difference 
between the external image and internal reality created some credibility 
problems perceived by the staff as differences between talk and 
action. 
 
People know how to talk but the problems begin when you 
should really start doing things.  
 
We should be doing and planning at the same time so that 
some corrective movement would be possible. But we have a 
lot of things that have been planned for half a year, and god 
dammit nothing has happened. … The world has time to 
change in between if we try to plan everything ready before 
implementing any of it. 
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Limitations of Collective Rationality 
As stated before, the Aalto project had a lot of inherent complexity and 
ambiguity. Especially in the turbulent earlier phases of the project with no 
established ownership, hierarchy or many other key organizational 
characteristics, also the decision-making processes seemed to be diverse 
and not always very deterministic.  
 
The project has gone surprisingly well if we take into account 
that we don‟t have any owner at all. 
 
During the planning phase when the Aalto Transformation Team (A8) was 
the driving force of the project, there were three different decision 
makers on the scene: the Board, the A8-team and the old universities. The 
formal ownership and ultimate authority was within the Aalto University 
Board that had been recently nominated in fall 2008. However, the Board 
had only limited time available as it was made up of high-profile external 
members and gathered on average once per month.  
 
The challenge with the Board is that it‟s not very easy to 
understand the dynamics of this community and our 
ambitious goals if you spend only a day or two per month 
with this project. 
 
Therefore the issues discussed in the Board meetings where prepared by the 
A8. A8 also had to take care of all practical matters, but they were careful 
not to make any such decisions that would have a fundamental effect on the 
university before the new President was appointed. Also the Board wanted 
to wait for the President in many significant matters. 
  
I‟m just paving the way for the [the President], that is my 
role. 
 
The informants had also numerous other perspectives to the role of the 
Board, including readiness to make fast decisions and capability to steer the 
project towards the strategic goals, but also on the other hand tendency to 
mingle with affairs that the Board should leave for others to worry about. 
This suggests that the Board was willing to make decisions, but that some of 
these decisions should have been made somewhere else. 
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The people in the Board are used to making decisions, and it 
must be a strange culture for some of the university people. 
The Board has really taken the stance that we are now 
building a world-class university and not just some merger 
of three university administrations. 
 
It annoys a bit about the Board that some members seem to 
have trouble understanding their role … and to keep their 
fingers off the daily management. 
 
The third potential level of decision-making was the old three 
universities which still had all the necessary structures and processes 
running. The problem was that the Transformation Team and the Aalto 
University Board didn‘t want the old universities to have a significant role 
in making decisions on behalf of Aalto, because their involvement was 
feared to require bargaining and compromising the goals of the project. 
Also the authority issues of the old universities to make key decisions on 
behalf of Aalto were problematic, and so the old universities were largely 
sidelined from the key decisions. 
 
The three presidents [of the old universities] show themselves 
very little. I don‟t know if they show at all. I don‟t know what 
they are doing. … Some have surrendered, some try to still 
keep up something from the old culture, and some don‟t have 
a clue what we are doing.    
 
This setting effectively created a situation, where no one had the 
combination of capability, authority and willingness to make the important 
decisions, although the all three decision-making levels were capable of 
decision-making in smaller matters. In practice this meant that there was a 
power vacuum where the academic leadership, the President, of the Aalto 
University should have been. A picture emerges where many important 
decisions seem to have been made through flight and oversight as described 
in Chapter 3.2.7, while more trivial matters can have been settled through 
resolution but often by random decision-makers.  
 
Limitations of Learning 
As the change effort was rushed forward by the Aalto Transformation Team, 
the skills of the team obviously had a profound impact on the outcome of 
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the whole project. Because none of the participants had ever created a 
university before, the change was simultaneously a tremendous learning 
process for the change management. It was possible to learn some new 
skills, but the fact was that the members of the A8 were chosen for the task 
because they were experienced professionals. Therefore their key asset 
in managing the project was their experience, which set some limits to how 
innovative approaches they were capable of finding.  
 
When there are people involved who have been running an 
organization before, including myself, there is a danger to 
stick with what you already know. 
 
I think that we‟re not very close to creating anything new. 
 
Even though there was the risk of doing what was done before, many 
informants emphasized that there was no cynicism in their approach and 
they managed to maintain a mindset encouraging new approaches. 
 
There's a lot of enthusiasm that we're doing a good thing, 
there's no cynicism based on earlier experience. 
 
However, the experience had also its limits. Some ideas and plans could not 
be implemented because of insufficient skills. Often progress was also 
slow because people without earlier experience were forced to learn the 
basics of a new field. 
  
I haven‟t been running a large international group ever 
before. 
 
We need some decent external HR-person to take these kind 
of things through, we don't have a single such person here.  
  
Change Context: Inertia in the Transformation 92 
 
5.2.2 Change Context: Implementation 2009- 
The part of the data presented in this Chapter represents the perceptions of 
the Aalto University top management on the challenges they faced during 
the change effort. Capturing this perspective was the primary goal of the 
interviews, and luckily it also constitutes the largest category of the 
processed and analyzed interview data, signaling its significance. 
Largely the same dominant themes emerge as in the earlier interviews of 
the Aalto Transformation Team: excessive evidence concerning especially 
internal institutional constraints as well as information constraints, internal 
political constraints and external legitimacy constraints. However, also 
limitations of collective rationality emerge as a new dominant theme. In 
addition also sunk costs and limitations of learning emerge as secondary 
themes. 
 Internal Institutional Constraints 
Several inertial forces resulting from difficulties in altering established ways 
of doing things in a university were evident already in the planning phase of 
the Aalto project as demonstrated by the interviews of the Aalto 
Transformation Team in Chapter 5.2.1. However, the full force of internal 
institutionalized processes and culture became apparent only after the 
management really started implementing the plans. 
The whole process started with a lot of skepticism towards the ability of 
the management to pull through a visible change. 
 
There was certain slowness in the entire transformation 
process. Especially in the beginning people, most of all in the 
administration, just leaned back with their hands in hips and 
told that “you don‟t have a chance”. 
 
At the grass-roots level among the elder professors there‟s 
certain cynicism questioning if anything will actually 
change. 
 
One of the problems was that as there were also people looking forward to 
Aalto with enthusiasm and many positive expectations, but as 
implementing many improvements dwindled and took longer than people 
had expected, this was interpreted by the opponents as a proof that their 
skepticism had been justified. Much of this critique spawned because the 
academics perceived that the extra resources promised by the Aalto 
management were nowhere to be seen as of 2010. The situation wasn‘t 
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helped by somewhat contradictory messages from the management. Some 
managers said that the allocation of additional resources progressed as 
planned and the resources were supposed to be distributed only after 
careful planning no sooner than 2011. But others claimed that much of the 
extra resources actually had been distributed, and most of the critique 
simply came from units where the management hadn‘t allocated more 
resources. 
 
Many schools and faculties thought that the extra resources 
given to Aalto because of this transformation would have 
been visible in the schools‟ budgets already this year [2010]. 
But this has not happened, some money has been distributed, 
but nothing significant. And this is how it was originally 
planned. 
 
When we are now progressing with the strategy first [in 
allocating resources], it‟s a very slow process and it gives 
currently rise to a lot of debate. 
 
The management also believed that for some part the system would 
ultimately change only after a “new generation” of academics and 
administrative staff free from the old assumptions would get a foothold 
in the organization. The management didn‘t plan for any drastic measures 
to speed up the turnover of the staff, but rather believed that time and 
natural renewal of the staff through retirement would slowly but surely 
enable the organization to turn into a new course. 
 
A great generational change is taking place among the 
professors, and there is a chance that professors with fresher 
ideas will emerge and take over the field. 
 
However, most managers thought that the academics weren‘t the largest 
problem, but they faced the fiercest resistance within the administration, 
effectively within their own organization. 
 
If I need some kind of motivation, I definitely don‟t go to seek 
it among my own subordinates because they think that we 
are scrapping many great things. Instead I go to meet 
students or researchers, because they are thinking about the 
possibilities and not the negative side, such as “before 
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everything was so well when we had the quality manual and 
the best processes”. The patient died but we did everything by 
the book. 
 
Naturally the distinction between good and bad processes depends on the 
point of view. As one informant (one of the old presidents) pointed out 
 
The change, separation from the government, doesn‟t mean 
that there would be a lot of freedoms. It doesn‟t bring 
anarchy where everyone can do whatever he wants. Actually 
it brings in many cases at least as disciplined or even more 
disciplined ways of working for the administrative side, but 
on the other hand hopefully more possibilities for the core 
businesses [teaching and research]. 
 
Therefore the administrative change was more about replacing many of the 
old processes than significantly shutting down old services or starting new 
ones. As in many cases the old administrative professionals also continued 
in similar duties as before the merger, many new processes came under 
intense scrutiny. Often the new ways of doing things were perceived inferior 
to the ―good old times‖. As another old president described the dynamics: 
 
I just wrote that our school supports all good changes and 
opposes all bad changes.  
 
The fact that the new management tried to establish a firm control over the 
support services but at the same time emphasized the freedom of academic 
activities, teaching and research, apparently caused some communication 
challenges. The problem was that the Aalto management wanted the 
academic leaders to really lead and ―free them from the administration‘s 
oppression‖, but the efforts to standardize service processes gave 
contradictory signs of increased control, even though this was not the 
management‘s intention. The resulting confusion caused some frustration 
on all sides: the top management, the academics, and the administration. 
 
People are shouting for more rules all the time. And then 
when we try to prevent this escalation [of control] and say 
that “no, you do it on your own”, people ask “but where are 
the rules, what are we allowed to do?” And if you say “ok, 
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here are the rules,” then people answer that “we don‟t want 
that kind of rules, we wanted different ones”.   
 
If the management wanted the academic leaders to be more independent 
but had some trouble at least initially to get this message through, the 
straightforward way of reshaping the support services top-down gave out 
the opposite message for the administrative staff. Many support service 
professionals interpreted that the management didn‘t value their expertise 
or the traditions of the old universities. Based on the feedback gathered 
from the administration there were some administrative units, especially in 
the TaiK, that saw the transformation process as inspiring and felt that they 
had been involved and committed to the change effort. However, in most 
cases this perceived Aalto management‘s lack of respect for the previous 
administration was a major source of opposition, mistrust and 
demotivation among the administrative staff. 
 
It is a great source of discontent that people feel in TKK now, 
as they felt quite strongly already during [the Aalto 
Transformation Team], that the skills and experience of our 
people in governing such a large university, has not been 
appreciated. At least people perceive it so that the new 
management thinks that nothing works here. 
 
Actually the new management did recognize this problem, but the challenge 
was that they wanted to change the mindset and working culture of the 
administration from controlling to servicing, and didn‘t know how to merge 
the story of valuable traditions with this story. As a result the 
communication was always about future, almost excluding the past. 
 
Every now and then we make pretty serious communication 
failures when we never remember to respect the significant 
traditions of the three schools. 
 
All-in-all, there was considerable evidence of organizational inertia 
observable in the accounts of the informants. Although there was also some 
evident frustration, in general the managers were very aware that a major 
change in processes, not to mention culture, could not take place overnight. 
Many of the managers were also confident that there were different 
phases in the change as experienced by the community, and that 
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skepticism and resistance to change were almost inevitable in the 
beginning. 
 
Often it takes surprisingly long time, before people realize 
that this is actually going to happen. Some think that they 
can resist the change so that it won‟t happen. … Some have 
thought that “I can continue my life as if nothing would have 
happened.” … But luckily there are others thinking that 
“wow, finally something is happening”, and they start to 
move. 
 
The managers recognized that individual members of the community 
experienced the change very differently. Some were optimistic while others 
pessimistic, and some could move through the change faster than others. 
The management also acknowledged that there would be a minority of the 
staff that could not or would not adapt, and would eventually leave the 
organization. Some had already left.  
One strong visualization of the expected change behavior shared by 
many of the informants was a ―change curve‖, a version of the Kübler-Ross 
curve (applied to change management as ―The death valley of change‖ e.g. 
by Elrod and Tippett 2002). As a result of accepting this model as their tool 
the management was prepared to encounter a sequence of reactions from 
their organization, such as ―shock, numbness, denial, fear, anger, 
bargaining, depression, understanding and testing before acceptance and 
finally moving on‖. The managers even believed themselves to go through 
the same cycle but faster than the others because they were better informed. 
 
Usually it goes so that there is a phase shift between people. 
While some are already rising from the abyss, and you are at 
the same time desperate why people don‟t come along, but 
the other half of the organization is only just falling in the 
abyss. 
 
If you look at an individual person, he will have multiple 
change processes one following another. 
 
Everyone has a similar change curve, and the organization 
changes only after the people change. 
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This has also the curious side that the management will go 
through the cycle faster than the others, because the 
management knows about things, and is involved in making 
the decisions. 
 
Information Constraints 
As the Aalto Transformation Team, also Aalto University management saw 
communication challenges as a major factor making the change more 
difficult. The Aalto Transformation Team was still small and informal, and 
so most of the information challenges were external, even though the hurry 
contributed to problems with internal situational awareness as well. The 
Aalto management faced largely the same problems, but the fact that they 
really had to implement the change through transforming the everyday 
work of people within the organization made successful communication 
even more critical. Furthermore, they faced an additional challenge because 
they simultaneously had to construct their own management organization, 
giving rise to new internal communication challenges. More and more 
people were involved with cumulating responsibilities that no one else than 
the Aalto management would take care of. 
Externally the management was primarily concerned with difficulties in 
communicating on one hand the goals of the project and on the other 
hand what was being done. 
 
We haven‟t been very good at describing the journey into 
being a world-class university, what it means. … Our 
message about what kind of university we want to be has not 
been clear enough. It‟s apparently very difficult to share even 
among our professors. 
 
Many people don‟t know what the name of the game is. This 
lack of information, bad communication, is the partial cause 
of mistrust and people‟s concern over their own future. 
 
All managers agreed that the principal cause of communication problems 
was the lack of time. However, some thought that the problems could have 
been helped if they would have had more communication professionals 
available to support the management, while others thought that the 
situation could not have been helped because only key leaders could 
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communicate the change effectively and their time was a very limited 
resource. 
 
If I would do this again, I would demand a lot bigger team 
with the other half doing just communications. 
The people who can tell where we want to go are huge 
bottlenecks. For instance [the President] should clear her 
calendar from everything else than communication and 
dialogue.  
 
Some managers also saw the flawless communication of such a complex 
change inherently impossible task, and had given up trying to solve the 
problems beyond ―appropriate‖ level of communication. 
 
Such organization where people don‟t complain about 
communication has ceased to exist. 
 
In any case, all informants strictly denied that the management would be 
secretive on purpose, or that limiting information would have been used as 
a source of power. 
Finally, the informants also listed managing expectations as a key 
communication challenge. Again the issue was communicating the right 
goals. 
 
Managing expectations both inside the university and 
externally is a huge challenge. How to keep the expectations 
high enough without giving such promises that turn out to be 
impossible to fulfill. 
 
The other side of the coin was the challenge of maintaining a coherent 
situational awareness to ensure that the change effort was coordinated 
between different areas of responsibility. As in earlier stages of the 
transformation, the key problem was that the management was heavily 
overemployed with every manager having to build his or her own team and 
organization ―from scratch‖. However, in contrast to earlier stages also the 
size of the organization had started to grow, which effectively meant 
that everybody could no longer communicate with everybody. The situation 
was made more challenging by the fact that the organization itself and the 
management processes were still at their early stages of development. 
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People are talking on the campuses that all the things are 
happening in [Aalto central administration] and that they 
don‟t know what is going on in there. But unfortunately often 
the situation is that we who are not members of the 
[President‟s Management Team] don‟t know what is going on 
either. And this is caused by the hurry. … Communication is 
based on informal occasions. And unfortunately it is also 
coincidental.  
 
The informants reported at least four kinds of problems in 
management’s internal communication: 
 
1) Most important decisions were made by the President 
based on information she had been able to gather from the 
organization. However the information required was 
limited by the president‘s preferences and the information 
provided was limited by the capabilities of the still 
emerging organization. The whole process was limited by 
overextended resources, especially time. 
2) The clear overall picture of the goals and recent 
developments was mostly shared only by the President‘s 
Management Team (PMT). The communication of this 
picture to the rest of the central administration was based 
on members of the PMT informing their subordinates. 
There were large differences to what degree this was done, 
again limited by the time resource. Therefore many 
managers within the central administration were not 
certain of the overall goals. 
3) As a result of problem 2, the managers that were not 
members of the PMT had trouble in informing their own 
stakeholders within and outside the organization. In worst 
cases this could lead to sharing contradictory or outdated 
information ‗on the field‘. 
4) There was no established way for managers below PMT to 
communicate and discuss with one another. Therefore the 
sharing of the situational awareness between the different 
responsibilities of the administration was based on 
informal ad hoc communication, in some cases resulting 
in ―right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing‖. 
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Internal political constraints 
Internal politics play a part in any organizational transformation. In the 
case of the Aalto transformation the politics seemed to emerge as three 
themes: 1) the imperative of the management to win the support of the 
academic community to make any tangible change possible, 2) the 
transformation of the informal power structure, and 3) self-interests and 
power battles between faculty members and organizational units. 
The proponents and managers of the Aalto transformation saw the weak 
leadership a critical shortcoming of the ―old system‖, and therefore 
strengthening both academic and administrative leadership was one of the 
key goals. Nevertheless, the informants had also a clear understanding that 
this could not mean dictating an arbitrary change top-down, but for the 
change to actually occur, it would need the support of the staff. This was 
seen to be especially important in the case of the academic faculty, while the 
management of the support organization was thought to be more 
straightforward. 
 
It‟s impossible to implement any change among the 
professors. Any change has to originate within the ranks of 
the professors themselves.  
As long as people haven‟t emotionally bought all this, as long 
we‟re not moving optimally towards the target. 
 
Actually the faculty had two principal ways of shooting down a change. First 
was that they could refuse to implement any new practices, or circumvent 
rules for instance under the flag of ‗academic freedom‘. Therefore any 
leader would need the support of his or her organization to get anything 
done.  
 
A leader may be nominated from above, but if he or she 
wants that the troops will follow, the leader must also earn 
their trust. 
 
The second possibility for especially the best academics – as well as the best 
students – was to simply go somewhere else if they disliked the 
environment provided by the management. Many informants saw in 
particular this second option, the best talents voting with their legs, a 
serious threat. 
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In practice the ultimate power in a university lies in the 
hands of faculty and students … Losing talent is the worst 
thing that can happen to a good university. 
 
If for instance the President wouldn‟t have the support of the 
professors, she would be in trouble even though she‟s not 
nominated by the professors. If you can‟t attract and keep the 
faculty, they can always go somewhere else. 
 
Obviously these requirements meant that any change had to result from a 
process of negotiation between the management and the academic 
community. However, a key issue here is how this negotiation could 
actually be done in a university employing thousands of people, hundreds 
of them professors. Apparently the top management had a simple method 
for choosing whom to listen: they simply chose the professors who had the 
most authority within the scientific community, which typically meant the 
professors who were academically most distinguished. This approach 
enabled the management to gain access to the informal power network of 
the academic community, but also made the key academics working as 
nodes in this system potentially powerful. 
 
The power lies at the hands of opinion leaders and the best 
researchers. If someone gets a Nobel prize or has extensive 
co-operation with Nokia, he has also a lot of power. 
 
The authorities are the top professors, and you always have 
to listen to them. … When someone has a good competence, 
you have to listen to and respect it. If someone doesn‟t have a 
good competence, it should have its consequences as well. 
 
The fact that distinguished academics had a lot of power in a university was 
nothing new, of course. They had had power in the old system as well. 
However, as the top managers of Aalto University had more power than 
their predecessors, this meant that also the people who the managers 
listened to became more powerful. On the other hand, some informants 
also thought that the more straightforward leadership structure in Aalto 
University would somewhat diminish the significance of behind-the-scenes 
operations. Furthermore, the influential academics in the Aalto weren‘t 
necessarily the same people who had had influence in the old universities, 
which demanded a change in the informal power structure as well. It 
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is even possible that some of the feeling of powerlessness or chaos 
experienced by some of the faculty during the transformation could have 
resulted from the redefinition of the informal structure of the organization, 
where the established ways of ―getting things done‖ were no longer valid. 
 
I got the feeling in the old university that strong professors 
talked with the president directly past the department 
manager. And the department manager was informed if 
someone remembered to. 
 
We clearly went through a state where the informal decision-
making structures were reformed. … The most agile players 
established their own informal organization for instance by 
rebuilding their old relationship with some Board member, 
or a member of the A8.  
   
Finally, there was also a number of power games played between 
different organizational units and also amongst the faculty. These 
were most prominent between the old university administrations in 
influencing the processes of the new university, and between the schools in 
influencing the principles of resource allocation and how centralized the 
management system should be. Also the trade unions and students were 
accustomed to being involved in tripartite decision-making and had to be 
kept calm. In many cases all sides felt that they had been somehow 
maltreated while the others were favored. As a result the management 
needed also political skills to keep the situation under control. 
 
We‟re losing tremendous amounts of time in every single 
matter, because everybody feels that some other school is 
somehow favored or treated better than the others. (Aalto 
manager) 
 
Why is it so that we have to always change the system and 
not the others? (HSE)    
 
We feel that we have been the side that has had to give in all 
the time. (TKK) 
All-in-all the change meant configuring the organization again and 
redistributing some of the resources, which meant more possibilities for 
some and more limitations for others forcing a new balance of power. 
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We have had here some age-old conflicts gnawing between 
people and between units, and now they all rise back to 
surface because of this transformation. 
 
External Legitimacy Constraints 
As stated before, Aalto University would never have been created without 
significant efforts of external stakeholders and consequently there were 
tremendous expectations to fulfill. On the other hand, because the very 
purpose of Aalto was to create something new and extraordinary, the 
informants saw it to be somewhat free from following the established ways 
of doing things in Finnish universities. These two conditions effectively 
meant that to justify its existence and privileges Aalto had to invent 
something new and couldn‘t keep doing the same thing as everyone else, 
but the solutions Aalto came up with had to satisfy the expectations of the 
various stakeholders. It could be almost said that Aalto was constructed to 
change the rules of the game, but the paying audience expected the new 
game to be better than the old. The setting is especially interesting from the 
legitimacy perspective. 
The most important dynamism was the legitimacy on the higher 
education sector, where the key players were the universities and the 
Ministry of Education. In relation to the other universities Aalto had two 
contradictory roles. On one hand Aalto was spearheading a reform that 
would enable all universities to gain more liberties from the government, 
but on the other hand Aalto was the ‗spoiled brat‘ hoarding the resources 
and talent from the others.  
 
All universities are now seeking the limits how much 
independence they can get and how they can run themselves 
when they don‟t have to follow the government bureaucracy 
any more. … Especially some smaller universities are 
interested in how we do things here and are asking us to 
share some of the new ideas. 
 
We get feedback from the other universities that not only 
have we taken all the money, but we have also screwed up all 
their fancy systems, like “we have been building this new 
salary model for 14 years and now you come and spoil it 
with your local agreements”.    
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The Ministry of Education, as well as for instance the Ministry of Finance, 
had similar dilemma in that the reason for creating Aalto had been to give 
universities more freedom, but they still wanted to maintain control. So the 
question was where the limits were, as Aalto tried to gain as much 
autonomy as possible. 
 
The Ministry of Education in principle gave us autonomy at 
the university reform, but at the same time, for instance this 
year, I think we have seen that they gave us leach but now 
they have tightened it again. … They want to control us the 
same way they control the municipalities. 
 
As long as we are dependent on government funding, the 
government decision-makers are an authority. We just have 
to get along with them, and we are dependent on their 
decisions.  
 
Other important external stakeholders were the donators and the 
institutions providing external research funding. All informants 
agreed that the donators didn‘t have any direct effect on how things were 
done in Aalto. In fact the informants didn‘t recall that the significant 
donators would even have tried to persuade the university management. 
Actually the donators did have influence, but this realized at a more 
abstract level: the informants told that the donators simply wanted Aalto to 
be internationally competitive quality university, and they wanted to ensure 
that the ambition level of the management remained high. 
 
The CEO level stakeholders just think that they need talented 
workforce, but say that they don‟t have the competence to tell 
us how this goal can be accomplished.  
 
On the contrary, the traditional providers of external research funding, 
TEKES, Academy of Finland and European Union, were seen to have a 
great influence on the internal processes and focus areas of the university. 
The university had to adapt to the whims of these institutions and follow 
the trends in choosing the research focus areas. The funding system was 
also regarded extremely bureaucratic and forced the university to allocate 
significant resources to manage the application process. 
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[The providers of research funding] have incredibly 
bureaucratic criteria. This money is by no means free but 
you have to do a lot of work for it. Actually the cost of this 
money is so high that only about half of it … ever ends to 
funding the research and the other half is needed for running 
this administration. … I would rather get rid of the whole 
business. 
 
When considering which operating models were deemed legitimate and 
which were not, one has to also take into account the broader 
international perspective. If Aalto was to answer to international 
competition, it had to also benchmark this competition and try to adapt 
internationally acknowledged best practices in addition to getting along 
with its local stakeholders. The benchmarking was extensive during the 
planning phase of Aalto project, and actually many European universities 
were currently doing exactly the same thing as Aalto. Also elsewhere the 
European universities were trying to reach the global markets, and were 
looking for models in the apparently more successful American universities. 
Going yet one step further, the Aalto University project has to be placed 
in the context of broader national competitiveness, described by one 
informant as follows: 
 
Aalto is strongly involved in the national development of 
Finland. For many reasons we have understood that the 
production-based thinking won‟t keep this nation on its feet. 
Then what is the option? Option is the information-intensive, 
service-based thinking. Well, how is such thinking powered? 
It is powered by basic research. Well, where is it done? It is 
done in the universities. Well, what about our universities? 
They haven‟t been shining too much lately. Well, what should 
be done? How about if we put there more resources to make 
them shine?   
Limitations of Collective Rationality 
During the planning phase of the Aalto project, coordinated by the Aalto 
Transformation Team, the organization remained small and informal. 
Often the processes were not very established and many members of the A8 
also felt that the ownership of the project was more or less vague with no 
clear leadership until the President could be nominated. 
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After the President had been nominated the construction of the actual 
university central administration began with the President gathering a 
management team around her. The construction work took its time with 
much of the ambiguity of the earlier phases of the project still present, but 
eventually the new leaders could be recruited and new management 
practices established. The administration started to grow with explicitly 
defined roles and processes.  
This new system didn‘t share the ambiguous features of the A8, but 
instead two new themes emerged from the accounts of the informants: 1) 
concentration of power – a theme not present anywhere before, and 2) 
slowness in decision-making – a theme the informants had earlier 
described as characteristic for the old universities. 
Ensuring that the Board of the university and the key academic leaders – 
especially the President – would have sufficient freedom to act had been a 
key goal for the Aalto Transformation Team. This power, enabling the top 
management to really lead the university, was seen as an important asset 
for Aalto in the competition against other universities. This goal was largely 
reached and the new Universities Act made the concentration of power 
possible. 
 
As you know, we have a very clear governance model that is 
based on excellent Board that has chosen an excellent 
President, who then yields very extensive power. The 
President then has all kinds of resources at her disposal. 
 
However, after the system was in place, some Aalto top managers started to 
also get some second thoughts if the model had gone a little too far. 
 
It took me a long time to understand that the management 
team actually doesn‟t decide anything. Actually we have two 
levels where some decisions are made: the President and the 
deans, with some department manager occasionally deciding 
something. 
 
I‟m thinking that this new model may have caused that a 
way too many decisions are piled on the President‟s desk. … 
All the significant decisions go to the President and only some 
trivial matters are resolved elsewhere. 
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We were so relieved to get rid of the collegial decision 
making, but it may be that now we are going at the other 
extreme of the scale. 
 
The President herself commented the system as follows: 
 
There are an awful lot of decisions coming to this level. My 
decision making is based on good preparation and facts. I 
rarely make decisions based on instinct. … Of course I have a 
vision about how to construct a good university, and it‟s 
naturally a pretty personal vision, but I discuss it with my 
management team because they are able to give me good 
advice. It‟s possible to influence me with good arguments. 
 
The extensive concentration of decision-making may have made the system 
susceptible to for instance information constraints as described earlier in 
this Chapter, but also caused delays as the President wanted to ensure that 
she had the necessary information and understanding available before 
making a decision. The situation obviously presented challenges for a single 
individual to solve a vast number of issues through resolution (to use the 
terminology of Cohen, March and Olsen as discussed in Chapter 3.2.7) and 
made the system susceptible for decision-making through oversight. 
However, the centralized model clearly reduced decision-making through 
flight, which seemed to be a dominant model in the traditional collegial 
system.  
 
The concentration of power and decision-making may have caused some 
delays in the management‘s capability to resolve issues in a dynamic 
situation. The other important cause for the perceived lag in the system was 
that as the organization grew and became more established, it gained more 
of the traditional properties of the very system that the management tried 
to reform, such as tendency to prefer talk over action and a need to get 
everyone involved in decision-making. This was not surprising, of course, as 
the organization had grown to its full size and most practical issues were 
handled between the same administrators and academics as before the 
transformation with very little time for any significant cultural change. That 
was also the level where the top management had to implement their plans. 
It was discussed earlier that the centralization of power in the top 
management decreased the amount of decisions that were made through 
flight, i.e. bouncing them back and forth between different decision-makers. 
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However, in the lower levels of organization this behavior did still happen, 
although possibly not so extensively than in the old system. 
 
We‟re discussing and discussing and taking something into 
account or not taking something into account until finally 
possibly reaching a conclusion or, more often, not having the 
courage to decide. 
 
There are things that have been waiting to be resolved since I 
started here [almost a year ago]. And they are still waiting. 
… It‟s one of the principal sins of such a professional 
organization that we are afraid to make a decision until we 
are certain that we are 100% right. 
 
It should be remembered that the Aalto project was very complex and 
actually it did progress very fast on many fronts. From the perspective of 
the individual members of the university community, however, the change 
process seemed often stagnated causing concern for the managers.  
 
People say that it‟s better to do it well than fast. But the speed 
would have some value as well. … We haven‟t yet fulfilled any 
of our promises. There‟s quite a bit of frustration among the 
professors. 
 
Most of the talk has been about improving the research 
support services and such practical things, but they have 
been left as the last issues to be resolved. And these would 
have been the issues through which it might have been easiest 
to improve the spirits of the professors. … The big picture has 
not been entirely under control. 
Sunk Costs 
In addition to the primary themes discussed above, also two secondary 
themes with less yet still clearly observable support emerged from the 
interviews. These were the sunk costs and limitations of learning. 
Sunk costs represent quite an obvious source of organizational inertia. 
Large investments made in infrastructure and personnel necessarily limit 
the diversity of feasible alternatives in decision-making and make certain 
strategic developments such as moving facilities or shutting down 
operations with a large staff difficult. Therefore I did not deem the sunk 
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costs as especially interesting topic to discuss with the informants, but 
because of its clear significance it was brought up by many informants and 
it must be covered here as well. 
In a university the cost structure has typically two dominant elements: 
salaries and real estate costs. This is also the case in Aalto University with 
almost two thirds of costs being salaries and almost one third being real 
estate costs. Necessarily this means that significant changes in personnel 
and real estate incur significant costs. During the Aalto transformation this 
obvious fact converged into two main debates: 1) what would happen to the 
administrative staff when the three old central administrations would 
merge into one, and 2) what kind of campus structure Aalto University 
should develop, with the three original main campuses scattered around the 
Helsinki area. 
Considering the personnel costs, naturally one of the reasons why the 
change had to be pulled through by the old personnel was sunk costs. Of 
course there was also irreplaceable competence within the organization and 
several atmosphere-related reasons, but if the management wanted to affect 
a major cultural change, in theory it might have been much easier if a 
significant part of the personnel could have been replaced from outside by 
new people with no previous burden of history. However, sunk costs made 
such large scale changes impossible. 
 
Building an organization has been also a painful process. 
We have had three universities, the administrations of which 
have had to be partially merged. It means that we have 
people and we have jobs and these two would need to meet 
one another. I don‟t know, and I don‟t know if anyone else 
knows either, if all the people in administration and the tasks 
we have to offer will meet one another.  
 
Also here the model of a change curve adapted by the management 
emerged. The management expected the personnel to go through a mental 
change adaptation process with early descent into ―an abyss‖ of 
demotivation and fear before overcoming the change and adapting to the 
new status quo. However, they also expected that some minority of the 
personnel might not be capable or willing to adapt to the new system, 
arising the question what could be done about it. 
 
You have to think what you will do with the people that will 
stay in the abyss. Either you have to do everything you can to 
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help them up, or then you eliminate them, as often happens 
in the corporate world. What causes the most damage is to 
leave part of your organization there in the abyss, which will 
ensure that you‟ll never get where you are going.  
 
The other issue with the sunk costs was the costs associated with 
infrastructure and specifically with the real estate needed by the 
university. This discussion saw several twists and turns during the 
transformation process, but some prominent elements were the issue about 
creating a single Aalto campus in one place instead of three, the 
construction of a new landmark main building for the university and using 
the extra funding for creating more modern space for teaching and 
research. The simplified main argument of the proponents of creating a 
single Aalto campus by moving HSE and TaiK to TKK campus was that TKK 
was so much larger that moving TKK would have been economically 
impossible – essentially a sunk costs argument. 
The discussion about constructing new buildings or refurbishing old 
ones was part of a debate how Aalto should use its extra funding, and many 
warned about spending the money that was meant to improve teaching and 
research to non-essential construction projects. 
 
[One of our Board members] always says that, god dammit, 
don‟t spend your money to walls, spend it to people … to get 
the best people to do the research. 
 
The structure is always a product of history and we have 
been investing very broadly into this research environment, 
the maintenance of which incurs significant costs. It‟s very 
hard to think how we could release resources from this 
environment, because it is so difficult to see what we could 
give up.  
 
Limitations of Learning 
In short, the limitations of learning experienced by the Aalto management 
were largely the same as those experienced earlier by the Aalto 
Transformation Team. Almost all senior executives were manning a post 
that they had no previous experience of in any organization. Aalto was also 
a new and unique organization in its early development with no one to ask 
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for previous experience of a similar project. Therefore there were 
necessarily limitations in how much the executives could learn.  
 
No one has been before a president, a vice-president, 
everyone is doing what they are doing for the first time. 
Many here hold for the first time such executive positions. 
 
On the other hand the executives were very experienced, either in academic 
world or as private sector professionals. Therefore their previous experience 
dictated much of the models they followed and limited their capability to 
come up with something entirely new, with a focus in applying existing best 
practice models to Aalto context. 
 
I don‟t have much ambition to try to come up with a unique 
way of arranging this particular support service. Let‟s look 
how the good universities have done it and just copy it. Just 
like Stravinsky has said that minor artists borrow but the 
great ones steal. 
 
Change Context: Feedback from the Staff 
The discussion about how the staff perceived the change would logically 
belong here as the next Chapter. However, from the perspective of a change 
effort coordinated by the management the staff had more the role of an 
object rather than a subject, making it difficult to make a distinction 
between the context of the change itself and the efforts of the management. 
That is, effectively the efforts of the management were an essential part of 
the change context as perceived by the staff. Therefore the leaders‘ response 
and actions are discussed first in the next Chapter, before discussing the 
perceptions of the staff in Chapter 5.4. 
 
5.3 Leaders’ Responses 
The theme of Chapter 5.1 was to provide insight into how first the Aalto 
Transformation Team and later Aalto University management as well as 
ordinary people working for the university experienced the status quo 
before Aalto transformation. The structure of the chapter emerged from the 
data with the perspective of organizational inertia in mind, but the essential 
question answered in that Chapter was ―Why did Aalto come to be?‖ and 
how can organizational inertia actually be seen as a driving force increasing 
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the need for a new university. In Chapter 5.2 the key question was ―What 
happened during the transformation process?‖ and how inertial 
phenomena affected the change effort. 
So the leaders of the Aalto project had an understanding about what they 
were trying to accomplish, and they also observed a number of emerging 
difficulties that made it more challenging for them to reach these goals. The 
natural third question to answer is ―What did the management try to do 
about it?‖ Answering this question is the purpose of this Chapter. A 
question of equal importance is ―What the management did not do?‖ 
5.3.1 Leaders’ Responses: Planning 2007-09 
The Aalto Transformation Team (A8) had a fairly unified understanding 
about what they tried to accomplish as well as about issues that were 
causing trouble during the transformation. Above all information 
constraints, internal political constraints, internal institutional constraints 
and external legitimacy constraints emerged clearly from the data as 
serious causes of concern for the team. Naturally the A8 had to handle all 
these issues at least on some basic level, such as taking care of necessary 
communications, or taking into account costs sunk into infrastructure or 
limitations in their own capability to learn. Therefore some of the response 
was likely self-evident and thus not present in the data as an interesting 
interview topic (it should be reminded that the interviews of A8 had been 
conducted earlier by another researcher with another perspective). On the 
other hand the data also suggests that some themes may be absent because 
they were deemed ‗force majeure‘ by the informants and out of their control 
(even if it wasn‘t necessarily so), such as external legitimacy constraints and 
partially even information constraints. 
However, two clear themes obviously highly relevant for the informants 
emerged from the data: Internal political constraints and internal 
institutional constraints. Information constraints and limitations of 
learning emerged as secondary themes. 
Internal Political Constraints 
The project management tried to overcome internal political obstacles to 
the change by various means, of which the most important were converting 
respected individuals to support the cause, and encouraging commitment 
through various means. 
As almost all members of the A8 were already VP-level university 
executives when they joined the team, they understood well the internal 
dynamics of the academic community and knew that they had to gain the 
113 Data and Analysis 
 
support of the professors to get anything done. They also knew that on 
the academic playground not all animals were equal, but some were more 
equal than others, so to say. Therefore it was important to identify certain 
key professors and try to get their support, or at least try to ensure that they 
would not openly oppose the project. 
 
It's imperative to find the change agents inside the 
community. Even though the press has been saying that all 
opinions are equally valuable, in reality they are not. Those 
based on deep experience and good argumentation are much 
more valuable than some first impression delivered by a text 
message. 
 
Converting opponents to our side, it's not power games, 
politics or anything, but handling and manipulating people. 
 
The project management had a clear understanding that even though it was 
―their‖ project and they had to keep it moving, the real change would 
materialize only if the university community as a whole would take the 
change as their own. The management had to also take into account the 
conversational tradition of the universities demanding a certain level of 
involvement in everything that took place. 
 
If we try to make all the decisions somewhere in the top, and 
don‟t allow the people to influence anything, it‟s the biggest 
possible damage we can do for the motivation of these smart 
people, who think that they are even smarter. 
 
The most important practical solution the A8 came up with for encouraging 
the commitment was creating dozens of so called “theme groups” 
contributing to the planning of practically all fields of the project. These 
groups had hundreds of members and for some part their work was also 
used as a starting point for future planning. However, the primary reason 
for the groups was to facilitate commitment and communication. 
 
It‟s a great challenge to find a position for everyone willing 
to participate in the teams, because it‟s so important to get 
people in. To create change agents inside the schools. 
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There were also different discussion forums set up, where the project 
management tried to gather and address concerns of the community.  
Trying to get the wider community involved with the transformation was 
not an easy task. Problem was that the message often depended on who was 
asked, and the academic community and its sub-groups often had difficulty 
in articulating what they wanted, which caused frustration in the project 
management. 
 
I‟ve given up trying to get inside the administration. Now I 
just make my own decisions. 
 
Internal Institutional Constraints 
Another clear theme emerging from the interviews was that the project 
management really wanted to combat the established institutionalized ways 
of doing things. Essentially they advanced on four fronts: imposing a 
cultural change, introducing new operating models, showing a positive 
example, and trying to prevent a too early re-freezing of the organization 
into a new form before the change had progressed far enough. 
The most fundamental level of change was the cultural 
transformation. This took many forms as the project advanced, but some 
of the key themes were trying to replace ―controlling‖ by ―servicing‖, 
encouraging risk-taking and multiculturalism, emphasizing separation 
from the ―government bureaucracy‖, and underlining the value of teaching 
and basic research. 
 
We‟re going through a major change in mind set. This 
university is about to rise the research and teaching to an 
entirely new level, and all this other nonsense will be subject 
to these main functions. 
 
The cultural aspect of change was important also for the motivation of the 
project management itself. Many commented that they were participating 
because it was a chance to make history, and some even saw themselves 
fulfilling a national mission. A story of Aalto was born from the language of 
the cultural change, multiplied by especially the mass media. The A8 made 
a conscious effort to keep the story intact by showing an external unified 
image regardless of sometimes heated debates within the team. 
In practice a new story wasn‘t enough, but A8 had to also come up with 
practical new procedures. The themes that later became to characterize 
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the whole transformation story were already there: reducing bureaucracy, 
strengthening leadership and emphasizing Aalto as an independent actor. It 
was important to come up with even radical ideas to challenge people into 
rethinking the institutionalized ways of doing things. In part the system of 
the voluntary ‗theme groups‘ served also this goal, as it enabled the people 
from the different schools to share their best practices. Effectively this 
meant creating new institutions to replace the old ones. 
 
Designing an administration is no different from designing a 
“löylykauha”. The experience has to be positive, it has to be 
understandable, it has to be clear. 
 
As the project management was demanding something ―radical‖ and rather 
ambiguous, it was necessary to show by their own example what they 
meant with their transformation story. Eventually the informal work-
culture of the ambitious and interdisciplinary A8 had great symbolic value 
for visualizing the change, and could even be seen as the original source of 
many elements now considered to be parts of the Aalto image. A8 was also 
necessary for creating momentum for the change with a ―yes, we can‖ –
attitude.    
 
[The first offices of A8] didn‟t create a sense of doing 
something top-notch. But the upside of the place was that it 
forced these guys to really give up their cozy old offices in 
their old universities. It was a strong symbolic signal of the 
upcoming change. 
 
How do you get things done? Saying that you‟re going to do 
it anyway and asking the others to join you. 
 
As the A8 observed that at least some parts of the organization slowly 
started moving and the change effort gathered pace, they became worried 
that the organization could ―refreeze‖ again before any significant changes 
could really have been implemented. Therefore it was critical to get the new 
key managers in place and to not allow for instance the old three 
administrations to negotiate any new processes between themselves. The 
project management also tried to prevent new procedures from emerging as 
combinations of the old ones as long as there was a possibility of coming up 
with completely new procedures. 
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When the year changes, we have to contend with simply 
combining old models on many areas. But it is a dangerous 
thought philosophically, as it may prevent creating anything 
new. 
 
The project management actually went to great lengths to prevent the old 
institutions from re-establishing themselves within the new university. One 
of the principal reasons for disintegrating TKK into four separate schools 
later during the transformation, for example, was to break down the old 
institutionalized central administration, which otherwise would have 
remained largely intact after the transformation.   
 
Information Constraints 
All informants were painfully aware of shortcomings in external 
communication. Some thought, however, that not much more could be 
done because they were working at their limits already and simply did not 
have the time. Others thought that getting more communications 
professionals to help would do the job. In any case the primary remedy for 
trying to ease the communication pressures was encouraging the 
commitment of the academic community, especially its key members, to the 
project. This could mostly be accomplished only through personally 
contacting the people, and on the other hand through the people‘s 
involvement with the change effort such as the theme group organization. 
 
The greatest challenge is how to get your message through 
on a broad front and manage your time so that you can meet 
the right people. Because sending letters and putting up web 
pages aren't enough in this job, you really have to meet 
people personally. 
 
Considering the internal communication of the project management, it 
seems that even within the small Aalto Transformation Team some 
members were better informed and kept closer contact with one another 
than the others. These members in general perceived no significant 
problems in the internal communication of the project management, while 
the other less informed members reported significant confusion in what 
they were doing. In any case, the internal communication of the project 
management was largely based on informal contact, and was made possible 
by establishing a separate project office, where the A8 could do its work 
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together without being spread out across the campuses. In practice, 
however, this did not solve all internal communication challenges as 
eventually the participants did most of their work meeting people elsewhere 
in the organization and had little time to be in contact with one another. 
 
Limitations of Learning 
There were three basic learning-based challenges that emerged from the 
data: 1) the project management did not have all the necessary skills for 
actually running or planning a university, 2) many solutions the project 
management was capable of producing were based on their own earlier 
experience, and 3) the project management had insufficient experience in 
actual management of large projects and process design. 
The informants recognized the first challenge, but were confident that 
even though the A8 members were not specialists on every field, they still 
had extensive experience, and as a whole the team was widely regarded as 
the ―dream team‖ for the job: if they could not do it, no one could do it. The 
same largely applied to the second challenge. The A8 tried to foster an 
entrepreneurial spirit and atmosphere that would encourage fresh, even 
radical, thinking and this seemed to succeed at least to a certain extent. 
However, the strategic planning of the change effort was deemed an 
overwhelming task and therefore the project management decided to use a 
major international consulting firm to support in orchestrating the 
transformation, to provide international benchmarking and to contribute to 
the design of new processes and create presentations and other material. 
Many of the informants were very impressed by the contribution of the 
consultants in conceptualizing the change and facilitating the early stages of 
the change effort.  
 
Perhaps we should have been more reckless in spending 
money to consultants who could have facilitated certain 
processes more effectively. University people are lousy at it. 
Some consultant could be here breathing on our neck every 
week. 
 
This contribution progressively decreased as the project started to take 
shape. Different consultancies were used to support the project on selected 
fields also during the later stages.   
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5.3.2  Leaders’ Responses: Implementation 
2009- 
Based on the accounts of the informants, Aalto University Management had 
identified several issues in the ―old system‖ that they wanted to resolve, and 
the most significant were classified as internal political constraints, internal 
institutional constraints and limitations of collective rationality in Chapter 
5.1.2. Furthermore, the informants recognized several challenges to the 
transformation process itself, with the most significant categorized as 
internal institutional constraints, internal political constraints, information 
constraints,  external legitimacy constraints and limitations of collective 
rationality in Chapter 5.2.2. 
The data suggests that in tackling these challenges, the main response of 
the management was focused on internal political constraints, internal 
institutional constraints and information constraints. Sunk costs and 
limitations of learning emerged as secondary themes in the leaders‘ 
response. 
Internal Political Constraints 
The new leaders realized that they would face internal political opposition 
against many of the reforms that they struggled to implement. The 
management responded by strengthening the leadership across the 
organization, using their own power and resources to support initiatives 
that were seen as beneficial for the transformation while denying support 
from initiatives perceived to stall the reform, using change agents, and 
trying to inspire commitment to the change in as much of the community as 
possible. 
During the earlier phases of the Aalto project most of the planners‘ 
attention was focused on developing the project management and the 
support organization management. As the project advanced and Aalto 
started its operations as a functional university, however, the focus 
eventually turned on developing strategic and academic leadership.  
 
We have been talking a lot about if it is possible to lead a 
university. … And when you want to go where Aalto is going, 
you‟ll have to lead. It‟s a different thinking and culture. 
These universities are so large that you actually have to lead 
them. You can‟t just administrate them anymore.  
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What is the point in having a common organization if you 
don‟t have any common goals? 
 
Here the key players were the President, the deans and the department 
managers, who no longer received their mandate and therefore also its 
limits from below through the tripartite democracy. Instead in the new 
system the mandate came from above, from their own superiors, ensuring a 
more direct chain of command and responsibility. 
 
I think my mandate [as the President] to make decisions is 
greater, because the mandate kind of comes from the owners 
of this university, the responsible Board of the university. 
 
The new deans have not been chosen by the traditional 
selection method. Instead we have tried to find as good as 
possible academic-, above all, leaders. 
 
Department manager is a leader. He or she has the power to 
say no, and it‟s not like before when you had to think about 
the other guy in your team taking the manager‟s role over 
after a couple of years, so better not upset him. 
 
Both information and resources were supposed to move along this 
straightforward chain of command, suppressing any informal coalitions or 
other invisible power structures bypassing the formal organizational 
structure. To compensate the extended power of the leaders, the idea was to 
also make the leaders more accountable for their performance and make 
replacing them easier to make the construction of personal kingdoms or 
dynasties more difficult (see Mintzberg‘s power games in Chapter 3.2.3). 
 
We have the strong President who uses her budgeting power 
to distribute the money between the deans. She has also 
announced that she won‟t control how the deans shall 
distribute the money forward, but the deans distribute the 
resources between the departments. And the department 
manager then has the undivided responsibility for the 
financial situation of the department. 
 
In the previous system it was not very easy to dismiss for 
instance the president as he was chosen through election. On 
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the contrary, it‟s very easy to kick me out if I make some 
serious mistakes. I have to have the support of the Board to 
fulfill my task. 
 
Even though the new leadership model was meant to give the key academic 
leaders better tools for controlling the organization, the informants did also 
realize that the particular characteristics and traditions of the university 
environment had to be taken into account. 
 
What we are trying to do is to develop a new leadership 
model that fits into a university. It‟s completely clear that it 
will be a combination of these old and new ideas, because 
obviously we can‟t just copy and import our leadership 
model from some big company.    
 
In addition to strengthening the leadership across the organization, another 
major approach for overcoming the political resistance was supporting 
beneficial activities within the university, while denying support for 
initiatives that were deemed to take the university into wrong direction. In 
some cases it was enough to simply give permission and symbolic support 
for ―Aalto-minded‖ activities, but the more powerful control tool was 
resource control. The management also had the power to enforce rules 
and policies. 
 
The university is like a garden. We cannot grow the plants, 
they grow all by themselves. But we have to put in the soil 
and the fertilizer, and then we have to root out weeds to 
make space for the nice plants, and use the pruning scissors 
and such. 
 
There were two kinds of important resource decisions that could be made: 
budgeting decisions and recruitment decisions. In theory the budgeting 
power made it possible for management to create focus areas within the 
university or support certain broader trends, such as basic science against 
applied science. In practice, however, the management understood that 
such management through resources fitted very poorly in a university 
environment. 
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One important driver is the message coming from the 
university management, where the university is putting its 
money. 
 
If you ask our top researchers what they find rewarding, 
they answer that resources to do their job. 
 
Of course it won‟t work that way that the President would 
define that these are the focus areas. Instead the focus areas 
emerge bottom-up. 
 
Therefore the most significant way of exercising resource control was 
through recruitment decisions, making the new career system, the ‗tenure 
track‘, perhaps the most important resource control initiative of the project. 
By introducing a new career system the management created a new set of 
rules how the internal competition of the university community would take 
part, and which characteristics were the most valuable, renewing the scene 
for the power games within the community. 
 
The tenure track system is the most strategic initiative of this 
entire reform, and the fate of the whole university depends 
on how well the system works. … 2020 when all the systems 
are finally ready and all the money has been spent and all 
the people have been hired, everything is up to what kind of 
people we have been able to hire.     
 
Lastly, the management also recognized the importance of finding change 
agents inside the community and encouraging commitment by trying 
to get as many people as possible involved with the transformation effort. 
 
It‟s of great importance that there are people who have 
credibility within the community, and who want to believe 
with their words and actions that this change is possible, or 
at the very least that the change is a possibility. 
 
The theme groups were valuable because they facilitated 
internal cohesion of the community and encouraged people 
to get to know each other. The results themselves weren‟t so 
special. 
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Internal Institutional Constraints 
The management‘s effort to break and reform some of the institutionalized 
behavior in the organization started with defining a new desired end state 
that crystallized around a story of ―freeing‖ the academic community to 
focus on teaching and research. Reaching the goal and gaining sufficient 
momentum required the implementation of new processes and ways of 
doing things, which were in practice accomplished by hiring new key 
leaders from outside and reorganizing the responsibilities of existing staff. 
The informants shared an ambitious vision of helping the Aalto 
University to grow into something much more dynamic, competitive and 
international than it had been. Many saw themselves as missionaries that 
would just need to make the academic community to wake up, open its eyes 
and unleash its full potential. Most informants saw that there was a lot of 
talent in the organization but it was wasted because ―the way how things 
had been always done‖ was often old-fashioned, bureaucratic and 
ineffective.  
 
We created a vision and an idea about building something 
far enough from the present day, so that the mere setting of 
the goal created movement and dynamics.  
 
We have taken the people outside of their comfort zone, to 
question the environment where they have been used to 
work. 
 
We don‟t use the argument “it has always been like this, so 
we shall do it like this for all eternity.” 
 
The uncertainty you see now in the organization tells that we 
have been able to detach ourselves from the old world. 
 
The story of ―freeing‖ the academic community to focus on teaching and 
research was aimed at both the administration and the academics. An 
important point here is that the informants saw these two groups largely 
separate organizations, with the same mission but very different roles. The 
main problem with the administration was seen to be the control culture it 
exercised over the teachers and researchers making their life often more 
difficult instead of helping them out. On the contrary, the issue with the 
academics was the inability to focus efforts and lack of ambition. The 
challenges of the groups were naturally interrelated. 
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Administration cannot be the primary function of this 
organization, instead it has to be research, teaching and art. 
 
We‟re not some police in here, we‟re here servicing the 
teaching and research. 
 
Administration or service organization is not the same thing 
as the academic community. … The academic organization 
does all the results and the purpose of the service 
organization is to support it. 
 
What this dualistic model meant, as some informants brought up, was that 
the two organizations also had to be managed differently. Managing the 
service organization was seen as straightforward top-down management, 
while the key principle of managing the academic organization was the 
academic freedom. As these two organizations had become largely 
interrelated in the old system through the administrative control that 
influenced many academic affairs, some change efforts of the new 
management caused confusion. The management for instance talked about 
increasing the academic freedom, but when they reshaped the 
administration into more effective and straightforward direction, the 
changes were interpreted by some academics to involve them as well and 
saw the reform as an attack against the academic freedom. 
 
The administration has to be managed top-down. You have 
to be able to systematically implement changes, to define 
processes and to build it to fulfill an exact mission. On the 
other hand the primary way of managing the academic 
organization is the tenure track, with a very different time 
span.  
 
The informants also brought up examples how the implementation of 
new ways of doing things had advanced. On a more abstract level many 
informants thought that the management had been largely successful in 
revitalizing the environment and rehabilitating basic values and activities 
like teaching and research. The more practical examples of successful 
implementation involved issues like the successful establishment of certain 
services, the ability of key executives to gather their own teams, the tenure 
track system that had gained acceptance nationally, and certain test 
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platforms with symbolic significance such as the new teaching and research 
environment Design Factory. 
All informants regardless of their background – academic or corporate – 
saw the appointment of external professionals to key management 
positions a crucial measure in the effort of changing the institutionalized 
behavior. The same applied to the fact that the President and the first vice-
president had not held senior executive positions in any of the old three 
universities. The new professional managers were seen to serve the goals of 
the transformation by bringing in expertise rarely present in universities 
and challenging the established methods and processes. Also the process 
how the key managers were hand-picked for their tasks was expected to set 
the standards for the renewed recruitment policy in Aalto. 
 
If we would have just hired for instance our communications 
director or finance director from some other university, I 
think there would have been a strong temptation to continue 
business as usual. 
 
We have a new President and five out of six deans are new, 
it‟s a major change. 
 
An interesting detail was that the professional managers with a corporate 
background saw their move from the private sector to a university as 
something very unorthodox, underlining the special nature of the Aalto 
project. They also shared the same ideology as the other builders of Aalto, 
seeing themselves as taking part into a historic endeavor. 
 
When I told people in my old organization that I was going 
to move to Aalto, they asked me if I had turned mad. Who on 
earth would leave the private sector to join a university?  
 
As a member of the management team I want to influence 
where Aalto is going … The structure of the organization, the 
people who work here, and the strategies we use. 
 
Some key managers could be recruited from the outside to facilitate the 
change, but it was evident that for any transformation to actually 
materialize, the people already working in the organization would need to 
change their behavior. The management understood that it was an 
impossible request to expect that people doing the same job with the same 
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people would all of a sudden simply start behaving differently, because the 
management asked them to do so and changed the name of the 
organizational unit. Therefore it was necessary to also reorganize the 
responsibilities and tasks of the existing staff. 
 
It‟s very difficult to behave differently if you have the same 
people and the same structure. “I‟m the same person as 
yesterday when we did business, but today I have a 
completely new agenda.” We obviously have to get the 
organization out of balance. 
 
We have opened up new positions and people have applied 
for them, and so we have enabled a large amount of 
transfers between the schools and organizations. 
 
Information Constraints 
The informants recognized several limitations in both external and internal 
communication, but the efforts to improve the situation concentrated on 
external issues. A common attitude seemed to be that ―the communication 
is imperfect, but we are doing our best, and not much else can be done‖. 
Some of the practical themes that emerged as remedies were facilitating a 
dialogue rather than one-way communication and telling the story by 
promoting successful examples. Improving the communication was also 
given as one of the motivators for building a matrix-form service 
organization. 
A constant dialogue between management and the faculty was seen as 
the only beneficial way of communicating, with any top-down 
announcements likely to face fierce opposition. Some informants perceived 
that this was also an important contrast when compared to the old system 
and had therefore symbolic significance, while others dismissed this notion 
and simply saw the dialogue the only way of communicating in a university. 
However, a lot of top-down announcements actually did take place, and 
some informants also expressed their doubts that some ―Aalto liturgy‖ had 
taken hold in the message of the management, decreasing rather than 
increasing the management‘s credibility. 
 
I wouldn‟t call it communication, which somehow reminds 
me of some kind of propaganda or a dogma that you share to 
the people. I would rather call it a dialogue. 
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In promoting the successful examples and achievements of the Aalto 
community the management tried to tell their favored story of Aalto 
through tangible examples, and to simultaneously create a virtuous cycle to 
power up the transformation. The management had also realized the 
significance of external communications in internal communications, as 
Aalto was closely followed by the national mass media. As the media had 
after initial skepticism established a relatively positive attitude towards 
Aalto, many of the published stories supported the management‘s goals of 
inspiring and empowering the community and created an air of rapid 
development, even if on many fields the actual progress was much slower 
than could be understood from the media reports. 
 
Thank God we have the Design Factory. We have something 
concrete, new, different. Without it we would be a little 
helpless when people come to see what we are doing 
differently in Aalto. We would have nothing else to show than 
some powerpoint slides in old lecture halls about what we 
are intending to do. But there you can see and experience and 
sense the new culture. 
 
Interestingly, some informants brought up the new matrix organization 
as a tool for improving communications. The point was that as the service 
organization had been constructed in matrix form with service personnel 
responsible both to their superior in the service organization and to their 
superior in the academic organization, it made it impossible for the service 
professionals to make decisions and plan reforms without consulting the 
academics. The organization was also intended to reveal any conflicts 
within the organization, without burying them behind the scenes of a 
faceless administration, promoting transparency. 
 
In a matrix you cannot live like in a strict line organization, 
where you say that “my responsibility ends here, I take care 
of only these bullet points”.  
Sunk Costs 
The new management was well aware that the large overheads associated 
with infrastructure and personnel costs of a university – typical sunk costs 
– limited the feasible options for reshaping the organization. Nonetheless, 
they made a serious effort to renew some visible elements where the culture 
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and power structure of the old system had become embedded in the 
everyday work environment. These elements with symbolic significance 
included issues like the office layout illustrating the authority of executives, 
decoration of offices symbolizing power and long history, and a general 
formalism encouraging for instance the use of people‘s last names instead 
of first names when referring to someone. The new management could have 
for instance taken over the TKK central administration and turned it into 
Aalto administration, but instead chose to use a significant amount of time 
and money to construct a new environment visualizing the new 
culture elsewhere. 
 
I‟m trying to show that the size of your office doesn‟t tell 
anything about your influence. 
 
There‟s been a lot of management by fear. 
 
The formal authority is empty, it‟s incredibly old-fashioned, 
you can‟t get very far with it. 
 
As some of the old symbols of authority were brought down, the 
management had to try to redefine the desirable new end state through 
their own actions, realizing that the structures and actors of the early 
days of the new organization would have a significant and long-
lasting legacy. This further amplified the need to find a like-minded team, 
―a coalition of the willing‖, with the energy and ambition to see that the 
transformation would meet its goals. Both the Aalto Transformation Team 
and Aalto University top management satisfied these requirements, with 
the shared dream ensuring homogeneity of the key players, who also largely 
defined their own goals. The homogeneity attracted like-minded and 
repelled critical voices, who either avoided the change effort altogether, 
were kept away from key positions, or left the project when they noticed 
that the critical thoughts were not welcomed.  
 
I expect us to create an outstanding work culture here in 
[Aalto central administration]. Such work culture that we 
can proudly spread to the schools and from there to the 
departments. 
 
Sharing a dream binds the people working with this project 
together. It binds the people who sacrifice themselves even on 
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the level of feelings for this goal. This brings the risk that you 
can also get insulted on the level of feelings. 
 
X became a little side-lined when he started to question if 
there was any sense in what we were doing. 
 
Especially in the earlier phases of the project, it was also evident that people 
participating in the effort were the key, not how these people were 
organized. This contributed to the birth of certain idiosynchronic jobs, 
where some of the participants effectively shaped their own job descriptions 
according to their own ambitions and abilities. 
       
Limitations of Learning 
Finally, the Aalto management knew, as did the Aalto Transformation 
Team, that they did not have all the necessary experience to take them 
where they wanted to go, and on the other hand the experience they had 
limited the set of solutions they were likely to come up with. An obvious 
solution for tackling both these challenges was the hiring of the external 
professional managers to take the lead on certain key areas and to bring 
their input to the discussions of the top management. 
Another source of skills and knowledge was the academic expertise 
within the own university, especially on such relevant fields as strategy, 
management, leadership and work psychology. As most of the Aalto 
management had not been deeply involved in major organizational 
transformations before, some professors could contribute by giving a 
broader perspective to the change effort and explaining typical 
organizational phenomena. 
 
If I have written a pile of articles around the world about 
strategic alliances, and nobody asks me anything when we 
are creating a strategic alliance, it‟s pretty stupid because I 
could probably tell you something about it. Similarly if 
someone is making something out of cellulose, perhaps it 
might be a good idea to ask the cellulose professor about it. 
 
Also the external professional managers brought some theoretical 
models with them, defining the language for the management‘s discussion 
about the change. Creating an entirely new and unique organizational 
model from a scratch was considered unrealistic, because it was difficult to 
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learn fast enough to be able to build a system that would be better than the 
old one. Instead it was more feasible to create a model based on existing 
theory, and try to adapt this model to the actual environment of the Aalto 
University. 
 
We look for theoretical models that could work in this kind of 
environment. Then we can start moving forward from some 
basic general model that we have taken from the literature or 
somewhere, and begin to build elements that have worked 
here in some earlier situation, or that some of our professors 
have been doing in the corporate world. 
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5.4 Change Context: Feedback from 
the Staff – Fears and Resistance 
The previous Chapters have introduced already several aspects of the 
available research data. The emerging framework of organizational inertia 
and the aggregate dimensions of Triggers of Change, Change Context and 
Leaders‘ Responses have followed through the chapters, while the 
perspective has changed according to the primary data source from Aalto 
Transformation Team to Aalto University management and to feedback 
from the staff. These chapters have been an attempt to describe what the 
management has tried to accomplish, what challenges they have faced and 
what they have done to overcome the challenges. However, as one manager 
put it: 
 
The transformation has to have a clear positive effect on the 
departments, the infrastructure, and the personnel. That is 
the reality check – if we can‟t show any progress there, 
there‟s no point of doing this. Then we should not have done 
this. If we only build the façade, a fancy graphical outlook 
and cool events, then we are on a very thin ice and will face 
the fate of the Irish national economy. 
 
Therefore it was important to look into how the staff was experiencing the 
change. Chapter 5.1.3 also looked into the hopes and positive expectations 
of the staff in order to figure out if the management was responding to an 
actual demand. Putting together all the previous Chapters 5.1-5.3 a picture 
of the transformation effort emerges. The purpose of this final Chapter is to 
look into what kind of inertial elements seemed to emerge from this very 
effort, namely the actions of the management. Therefore ―the management‖ 
in this chapter means both the Aalto Transformation Team and the Aalto 
University management, although earlier it referred only to the latter. 
Again it should be remembered that the feedback material was originally 
collected for the purpose of giving the personnel a chance to express their 
concerns regarding the change. The structure of the chapter follows from 
the structure of the earlier chapters, as the perspective is how the staff 
experienced the management‘s actions. However, the feedback from the 
staff was gathered in late autumn 2009, a year before the interviews of the 
Aalto University management, and before the management had been fully 
assembled. Therefore the relationship between the actions reported by the 
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management and the staff feedback is not causal, but rather two different 
perspectives on the same themes.  
As the management concentrated most of its efforts into overcoming the 
information constraints, internal political constraints, internal institutional 
constraints, and external legitimacy constraints, it should be expected that 
these themes are strongly represented in the staff‘s comments as well. This 
is indeed the case, excluding the external legitimacy constraints, as these 
actions were aimed outside the organization and did not therefore directly 
affect the personnel.  
 
Information Constraints 
Communication challenges were the shortcomings that the management 
was most willing to admit at all phases of the transformation. A lot of effort 
was put to improve the communication, but still the main focus was in 
doing rather than in telling what was done, and the time was the scarcest of 
resources. There were a few units that reported that they were happy with 
the information they got and knew what was happening, but the 
overwhelming majority of the units across the entire organization from 
administration to academic units reported some degree of discontent with 
how the change process was communicated. The most general type of 
critical feedback was that the people simply did not understand what was 
going on, and how the change would affect them personally. 
The management had made creating a strong and compelling change 
story a priority. According to the feedback, the story was actually very well 
received in general, with the goals seen as good and ambitious. However, 
the story seemed to also slightly backfire, because many units pointed out 
that most communication was very high level and abstract, with 
information about acute practical issues nowhere to be found. This applied 
to some degree also to the new strategy that a few units commented to be 
complex and difficult to understand, leaving the goals of the project unclear 
and vague for some. There were also comments that even though the story 
was nice, it would have been better to see some successful examples 
explaining what the change meant in practice – a concern shared also by 
the management. 
 
Our people feel that they are complete bystanders in the 
Aalto project, if they are informed about decisions only after 
the decisions have been made, and no chance for discussion, 
Change Context: Feedback from the Staff – Fears and 
Resistance 
132 
 
comments and orientation is given during the preparation of 
the decision. 
 
The goals are vague. Strategy should not be just a list of good 
things but there should be courage to choose what not to do. 
 
The perceived communication problems were amplified for several reasons. 
First, the management tried to share information by meeting people on the 
field, but there were only a few managers and thousands of people in the 
organization. Furthermore, the internal situational awareness of the 
management was often less than perfect, meaning that the message carried 
by different managers might vary. Second, there was great variation in how 
much of help the established academic and administrative leaders through 
the organization were. Some tried to cooperate the best way they could, but 
didn‘t get sufficient information from the Aalto management to share it 
forward, while others were unwilling or incapable of helping the change 
effort. Naturally there were also successful examples. Third, the staff often 
reacted to the information shortages by trying to contact the Aalto 
management directly, but these efforts were rarely successful as the 
management was overstretched with their duties. As a result there was 
increasing frustration and discontent in the staff, with many units 
commenting that Aalto did little to respect its own values that included 
openness. Some of the sharpest critique was aimed at the Aalto University 
Board that disclosed little to none of its decisions or discussions to the 
public.  
 
Transformation process is secretive and closed, staff is left 
out. 
 
Management is invisible and impossible to contact, contact 
attempts are not responded.    
 
The communication shortcomings also sparked some comments about the 
lack of professionalism of the management. However, likely the most 
serious problem was that there seemed to be an extended period during the 
critical phases of the transformation, when rumors and gossip dominated 
as a primary source of information instead of facts. 
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Internal Political Constraints 
From the very beginning, the management was well aware of the 
significance of internal politics involved in the change effort and stated that 
for the transformation to be successful it would need the support of the 
academic community. The management tried to facilitate the commitment 
of the staff by arranging discussion events and creating the theme groups to 
support their own planning, and recruited change agents and tried to 
strengthen the leadership across the organization. 
The feedback from the units suggests that the management‘s fears of the 
scale of the internal politics and power games were well founded. There was 
huge heterogeneity across different units and organizational functions, with 
the most units mainly concerned how they would succeed in rivalry against 
others within the same university. The smaller schools were concerned if 
they would get enough power to manage their own affairs, and complained 
that all the decisions were made in Otaniemi campus where TKK and Aalto 
central administration was located, and the other two campuses had no 
other role than following the orders. There was also suspicion that the 
resources would not be distributed ―fairly‖ between the schools, with some 
even claiming that the recent Research Assessment Exercise had been 
―politically motivated‖ and now Aalto was using the results to make 
―wrong‖ resource allocation decisions. The administrative units were 
complaining that they had to adapt to the processes of other schools, and 
there were even some academic subunits of the departments that wanted to 
send their own feedback because they felt that they were so different from 
their department that they could not get their feedback through that way. 
 
Will HSE be forced to decrease its quality so that all the 
schools can start from the same level? 
 
We feel that we are sidelined and marginalized in our 
department both in the planning of teaching and in the 
distribution of resources. 
 
Moreover, the only division did not go along the unit boundaries but also 
along the different personnel groups, such as professors, other academic 
staff and support staff. The management had promoted the tenure track 
career system as perhaps the most important improvement brought by 
Aalto, but in the first phase the system was opened only for researchers. 
This sparked bitter comments from the excluded personnel groups that the 
system encouraged inequality and most of the staff had been abandoned by 
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the management. There were also concerns how the representation of 
different personnel groups would be taken care of in the university 
administration, because, unlike earlier, all the representative councils of 
Aalto no longer had mandate seats for all the groups as in the old tripartite 
system. 
 
There are no seats for all the subgroups of personnel in the 
council, will this cause tensions between the groups? 
 
Some of the lectors are worried about the distribution of the 
seats in the council, because the professors are getting 5 seats 
out of 11 while the lectors have room only among the 3 seats 
reserved for other personnel. 
 
The professors think that the aforementioned distribution of 
seats is satisfying, with them carrying the heaviest burden of 
responsibility. 
 
There was also feedback commenting the change effort itself. The 
management had emphasized encouraging involvement and commitment 
of the academic community to the change effort. It seems, however, that the 
efforts did not satisfy everybody, as the process faced a lot of criticism 
especially from the TKK and HSE administration, as well as from certain 
academic units. Many administrative units complained that their expertise 
had been completely ignored, while others called encouraging staff‘s 
involvement just a façade. 
  
Our opinion has not been listened to, or at least it has not 
been heard. 
 
Internal Institutional Constraints 
The management had set a cultural renewal one of their key targets, 
questioning the established ways of doing things and enabling the 
implementation of new processes and procedures. The new system was 
supposed to mean more academic freedom, less bureaucracy and 
professionally arranged support services for the teaching and research. This 
goal was widely accepted and supported in the academic units. In many 
units the efforts of the management to empower people seemed to bear 
135 Data and Analysis 
 
fruit, with comments lauding the transformation process as inspiring and 
the new administration as more professional. Even some administrative 
units that were in general very negative admitted that the new co-operation 
within administration was a positive trend, and that Aalto was a good 
―excuse‖ for improving internal processes. In some units the spirits were 
high enough to repeat the message that the management was most eager to 
hear: ―We will create Aalto.‖ Despite the fact that most of the staff was 
actually still excluded from the tenure track career system, it was perceived 
to facilitate more professional and better quality research in general. 
Not all were expecting for the things to change for the better, however. 
Some academic as well as administrative units pointed out that the culture 
of efficiency and strong leadership fitted poorly in a university. Concrete 
plans and more practical decisions were expected, and some were worried 
about the current good practices and if they would be ―sacrificed to the altar 
of harmonization‖. It was also pointed out that the management wanted 
change, but failed to explain what exactly was wrong with the present 
situation. Some of the new procedures had also not been completely 
planned through or were vaguely communicated, which gave rise to 
concerns if the new processes would do more damage than good. 
 
How can we prevent mistakes in decision making if there are 
no more officials with the responsibility for the legality of 
their actions. 
 
The new career system should be an opportunity, not a 
threat to people who don't fit the model. 
 
The management had wanted to recruit external professionals for certain 
top management positions exactly because they wanted new input with an 
external perspective to challenge the internal institutions. This move 
backfired especially in certain administrative units, where the closed 
recruitment process with no possibility for the internal applicants to apply 
for the positions was used as an illustrative example of the lack of 
transparency and non-conversational leadership style of the top 
management. 
 
The method of silent recruitment has been experienced as 
regrettable and demotivating, as we don‟t even know which 
posts are open to be filled.   
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Another source of great doubts was the management‘s promise of 
decreasing bureaucracy. Few units had yet witnessed any change to the 
better, and the fact that TKK still remained as a huge school with its own 
complex internal structure under the Aalto umbrella meant that from the 
perspective of TKK units, the university was actually even more 
bureaucratic and distant than it had been before. The feeling was shared in 
previously independent HSE and TaiK, but in TKK units the whole TKK 
level of the organization was widely regarded as obsolete and unnecessary. 
As of 2009 there were also few signs of the promised extra resources, and as 
most of the news was about the building of the central administration, 
many units believed that actually the new central administration spent 
most of the extra money. 
 
All kinds of measurement and assessment seem to be 
increasing instead of decreasing. 
 
The suggested administrative structure feels heavy, binds a 
lot of resources and widens the gap between management 
and teaching- and research units.   
 
TKK was broken down to four schools based on the four TKK faculties in 
the end of year 2010. 
 
Sunk Costs and Limitations of Learning 
In addition to the primary themes mentioned above, there was also some 
evidence of staff‘s response to the management‘s efforts to curb the inertia 
caused by sunk costs and limitations of learning. 
The close-knit management team had generated a strong transformation 
story and wanted to catalyze the change with their energizing example. 
Despite the generally positive response, there were still many that saw the 
management‘s efforts as ―lots of talk, little action‖. Especially within the 
administrative staff the management‘s ambition, drive and small attention 
to the past created also a feeling of inadequacy as well as insecurity over 
personal employment. As a result of a number of major earlier 
transformations just recently e.g. in TKK, there was also growing weariness 
towards yet another transformation both in academic and administrative 
staff. The transformation also created a lot of extra work for the 
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administrative staff, causing many to complain that they were 
―overwhelmed‖ by the change. 
 
Couldn‟t you just leave us alone and give us a chance to 
concentrate on our real jobs? 
 
Concerning the limitations of learning, especially many academic units 
expressed their support for the professional managers with corporate 
background, but underlined that the new managers would have to learn 
how things were done in a university. However, some units expressed that 
they were also ready to learn from the external experience. Another 
learning-related issue was that some units commented that they were eager 
to develop their practices, but that ―it was difficult to be creative in the 
middle of a terrible hurry‖. The management was frustrated that it was 
difficult to get much of the staff involved with the change effort, but 
possibly the extra administrative work caused by the uncertainty of the 
transformation was a factor limiting the possibilities of the staff to 
contribute even if they would have wanted to. 
 
The professional managers from outside don't have a deep 
understanding of the academic world, cooperation requires a 
process of mutual learning. 
 
5.5 The Relative Significance of the 
Emergent Themes 
Based on the analysis in the previous Chapters, it should be clear that the 
Aalto transformation was a very dynamic and occasionally even ambiguous 
project, with the goals, perceptions and responses constantly on the move. 
The dataset makes it possible to discuss the differences in what were the 
challenges of the old system that Aalto tried to solve, what were the 
challenges emerging from the transformation effort itself, and where did 
the management concentrate its efforts.   
The relative significance of the different themes in the data is portrayed 
in Table 6. Themes with strong support in the data are classified as 
‗primary‘, themes with moderate support in the data as ‗secondary‘, and 
themes which barely emerge from the data as ‗tertiary‘. If there has been no 
clear evidence for a particular theme, the theme has been marked as ‗-‗. 
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Table 6: The relative significance of emerging themes 
1. Planning phase 2007-09 Aggregate Dimensions 
Second Order Themes 
A) Triggers of 
Change: Inertia in 
the old system 
B) Change Context: 
Inertia in the 
Transformation C) Leaders' Responses 
i) Sunk costs 1.A.i) Tertiary 1.B.i) - 1.C.i) - 
ii) Information constraints 1.A.ii) - 1.B.ii) Primary 1.C.ii) Primary 
iii) Internal political 
constraints 1.A.iii) Primary 1.B.iii) Primary 1.C.iii) Primary 
iv) Internal institutional 
constraints 1.A.iv) Primary 1.B.iv) Primary 1.C.iv) Primary 
v) Barriers of entry/exit 1.A.v) Secondary 1.B.v) Tertiary 1.C.v) - 
vi) External legitimacy 
constraints 1.A.vi) Primary 1.B.vi) Primary 1.C.vi) - 
vii) Limitations of 
collective rationality 1.A.vii) - 1.B.vii) Secondary 1.C.vii) - 
viii) Limitations of learning 1.A.viii) - 1.B.viii) Secondary 1.C.viii) Secondary 
        
2. Implementation phase 
2009- Aggregate Dimensions 
Second Order Themes 
A) Triggers of 
Change: Inertia in 
the old system 
B) Change Context: 
Inertia in the 
Transformation C) Leaders' Responses 
i) Sunk costs 2.A.i) - 2.B.i) Secondary 2.C.i) Secondary 
ii) Information constraints 2.A.ii) - 2.B.ii) Primary 2.C.ii) Primary 
iii) Internal political 
constraints 2.A.iii) Primary 2.B.iii) Primary 2.C.iii) Primary 
iv) Internal institutional 
constraints 2.A.iv) Primary 2.B.iv) Primary 2.C.iv) Primary 
v) Barriers of entry/exit 2.A.v) - 2.B.v) Tertiary 2.C.v) - 
vi) External legitimacy 
constraints 2.A.vi) Secondary 2.B.vi) Primary 2.C.vi) - 
vii) Limitations of 
collective rationality 2.A.vii) Primary 2.B.vii) Primary 2.C.vii) - 
viii) Limitations of learning 2.A.viii) - 2.B.viii) Tertiary 2.C.viii) Secondary 
        
3. Feedback from the Staff 
2009 Aggregate Dimensions 
Second Order Themes 
A) Triggers of 
Change: Inertia in 
the old system - 
Staff's hope for a 
better future 
B) Change Context: 
Inertia in the 
Transformation - Staff's 
fears and resistance 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
i) Sunk costs 3.A.i) Primary 3.B.i) Secondary 
ii) Information constraints 3.A.ii) Tertiary 3.B.ii) Primary 
iii) Internal political 
constraints 3.A.iii) - 3.B.iii) Primary 
iv) Internal institutional 
constraints 3.A.iv) Primary 3.B.iv) Primary 
v) Barriers of entry/exit 3.A.v) - 3.B.v) Tertiary 
vi) External legitimacy 
constraints 3.A.vi) - 3.B.vi) Tertiary 
vii) Limitations of 
collective rationality 3.A.vii) - 3.B.vii) - 
viii) Limitations of learning 3.A.viii) - 3.B.viii) Secondary 
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As a disclaimer it must be remembered that the absence of a certain theme 
from the research data does not necessarily imply that the theme would 
have been absent in reality as well. The informants have had the chance to 
withhold information at their discretion, and some themes may have been 
left underemphasized simply because they have not been considered 
relevant or interesting by informants and interviewers. However, the 
themes identified as important by the informants should be appropriately 
presented. 
Significance of internal political and institutional constraints. 
Internal political and institutional constraints were easily the most 
prominent themes emerging from all sets of data and during all phases of 
the transformation. They emerged as primary goals and issues that were 
tried to be solved by the Aalto transformation as well as strong forces 
making the life of the change leaders occasionally very difficult. Accordingly 
the management also aimed the blunt of their efforts to resolving these 
issues. From the staff‘s point of view these managements‘ efforts were the 
source of much of the stress and opposition of the change effort as the 
traditional institutions and informal political structures were challenged. 
However, at the same time the staff recognized many of the shortcomings of 
the institutions of the old system and many were actually looking forward to 
the change, almost any change. 
Information constraints caused by the transformation. 
Information constraints were a major issue causing challenges for the 
management, and much of the change efforts were focused in trying to 
improve communication and gather better information to support decision-
making. However, the information constraints did not emerge from any 
dataset as a significant issue in the old system, so it seems that 
communication was a very change management related issue. Nevertheless, 
this could easily be interpreted by the academic community so that 
communication in Aalto University is worse than in the old universities, 
which could have negative long-term consequences. The more centralized 
decision-making system with less members of the academic community 
directly involved in the decision-making and access to first-hand 
information may have contributed to the shortcomings perceived by the 
staff. 
External legitimacy constraints perceived as a force majeure 
or a tabu? The external legitimacy constraints emerged as a strong theme 
characterizing both the goals of Aalto as well as the change process itself. 
The management identified the strong pressure and influence of external 
actors towards Aalto. Interestingly, based on interview data, the 
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management did nothing to the situation, implying that the externally 
imposed constraints were recognized as a force majeure that the Aalto 
simply had to take for granted. However, based on secondary information 
sources outside the interviews, it is likely that Aalto management actually 
contributed significant efforts to trying to change the external institutions, 
all the way down to trying to customize the reformed legislation to the 
needs of Aalto. Based on favorable changes that actually took place in the 
environment, this is the more likely case. It would suggest that the 
managers were relaxed to disclose their opinions on the internal state of 
their own organization, but the external issues were a tabu or a ‗trade 
secret‘ that was not wanted to be documented in any study. 
Limitations of collective rationality escaping the attention of 
the managers. Issues related to the limitations of collective rationality 
emerged as a significant theme explaining phenomena both during 
planning and implementation phases of the project. However, there was no 
evident management response to these themes. This should not be 
especially surprising, if the issue really is the shortcomings of the 
management‘s own rationality making the phenomena by definition 
difficult to identify. The other explanation is that the informants feared that 
suggestions for correcting measures would be interpreted as a critique 
towards their own team. 
Sunk costs and barriers of entry/exit are not interesting. 
Regardless of their economic significance, sunk costs and barriers of 
entry/exit emerged only as secondary themes at their best from the data. 
The lame appearance would suggest that either the managers feel that these 
issues are so obvious that there‘s not much to discuss about them, or then 
the academic managers simply are not very interested in economic issues. 
Especially the last notion might have significant implications to decision-
making in a university if it is true, but any such conclusions would require 
further studies.   
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6. Discussion 
This final Part of the study begins with a discussion of the findings in 
Chapter 6.1. I present a critique and suggestions for further research in 
Chapter 6.2, and the final conclusions follow in Chapter 6.3. 
Due to the broad scope of the observed phenomena and the resulting 
wide array of necessary interpretations, this discussion is not meant to be 
exhaustive. Rather my purpose is to highlight some representative 
observations as a starting point for interpreting the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 3 and the empirical data presented in Chapter 5. 
6.1 Organizational Inertia in Aalto 
University 
The starting point of this study was the expectation that organizational 
inertia would play some kind of role in the examined merger of TKK, HSE 
and TaiK to become Aalto University. Returning to the old debate between 
adaptation and selection (inertial) camps discussed in Chapter 1.4.5, it was 
never claimed that adaptation would not have happened in the studied 
transformation, or even that the inertial forces would have been more 
significant than adaptive capabilities. My claim has been simply to examine 
the inertial side of the story and leave the adaptive perspective for others to 
explore. 
Be that as it may, but I claim that based on my empirical evidence there 
is ample proof of diverse and significant inertial phenomena in this 
particular merger. The inertial forces played a part not only in complicating 
the top-down controlled change effort, but they significantly contributed to 
the perceived shortcomings of the pre-merger status quo as well, therefore 
creating a rationale for the change effort itself. 
6.1.1 Sunk Costs 
Although one of the less prominent themes in the study, some interesting 
conclusions can still be drawn from the more elaborate sides of the sunk 
costs.  
On a basic level, it can be said that sunk costs represented an obvious 
source of inertia during the change. Compared to the more elusive themes 
of inertia, basic resource-based sunk costs can also be easily understood by 
common sense. This brought sunk costs –related issues to the spotlight of 
public debate during Aalto transformation, which was evident for example 
in the heated discussion about what kind of campus structure Aalto should 
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have. Sunk costs –arguments dominated also the numerous ‗synergy‘ –
debates about finding savings through merging the support functions, 
which caused concern and major insecurity especially in the administrative 
staff. 
More interestingly, it seems that the sunk costs contributed to the 
change resistance of administrative staff also on personal level. In line with 
the findings of Inchniowski and Shaw (1995), it seems that the personal 
investment of individuals to organization –specific and task-specific skills 
that were previously highly valued and that had taken a long time to 
accumulate might have made it rational to oppose Aalto transformation. 
This would not have been as important in any transformation, but because 
Aalto was labeled as the vanguard of a national reform, there was a risk of 
nation-wide degradation of prestige and career possibilities for the old-
school professionals if Aalto would be successful in redefining which skills 
were valued and which were not. To a certain extent it may be that the same 
argumentation would apply also to certain academics representing the 
more applied fields of science that turned hostile against the change when 
the new management started to emphasize the value of basic research over 
applied research. 
Another interesting notion is the valuation of mental and symbolic sunk 
costs over physical costs. Even though there were significant resources 
bound to the old infrastructure, the new management deemed that there 
were so many invisible controls embedded in it (Scott, 2003: 317), that it 
was more reasonable to create completely new ―Aalto space‖ than try to 
convert and refurbish something old.  
6.1.2 Information Constraints 
Not surprisingly for a major change effort, information constraints emerged 
as one of the dominant inertial themes characterizing the whole 
transformation. This was further underlined by the fact that information 
constraints was the only primary theme emerging from the study with no 
evidence suggesting that communications would have been a particular 
problem before the transformation effort began. 
The management was successful in creating a compelling vision of the 
desired future state of Aalto University that was widely accepted by the 
faculty, amplified by the national media distinguishing Aalto from the other 
universities, and ensuring Aalto privileges in funding and regulation. An 
ambitious vision worked also as a driver for the managers themselves, and 
attracted talented people to join the effort. However, the transformation 
story had one major flaw. One of the most significant early goals of the new 
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management was to transform the university administration, and because 
this had to be accomplished mostly with the existing people, it was 
necessary to win the support of the administrative staff. But the 
management was unable to create a story that would have empowered the 
administration, instead the story stigmatized the old administration as a 
failure that had to be repaired, and the message received by the academic 
units was that they would be ‗freed from the old administration‘s 
oppression‘. Unavoidably this failure in creating a more balanced story was 
a source of deep insecurity and open opposition to the change in the old 
administrative units. This negative effect may have been even more 
significant because the data suggests that the administrative staff may in 
general identify itself more closely with the organization than the academic 
staff that often sees the organization as a simple utility. 
Another major set of information constraints evident through the 
transformation was the selective perception and exposure to information 
caused by the goal displacement of sub-groups within the organization 
(March and Simon, 1958: 150-158). In the case of Aalto transformation the 
issue was not so much the creation of new such sub-groups, because most 
of them were inherited by Aalto from its predecessors (notably the three 
original schools themselves), but the very diverse goals and perceptions of 
the existing groups. The only significant new sub-group of the organization 
was the Aalto management itself. There was no major change in the goals 
and perceptions when the sub-groups were formally integrated into a new 
organization, meaning that the content of in-group communication 
remained very selective. Therefore a homogenous message sent by the 
management was interpreted very differently in different parts of the 
organization. 
Neither can the significance of information as power be downplayed. 
There is no evidence that the management would have used withholding of 
information as a source of power on purpose (Aldrich 1999: 153). However, 
it is evident that the de facto decision to exclude the boards and presidents 
of TKK, HSE and TaiK from the strategic discussions in Aalto 
Transformation Team and Aalto University foundation Board meant the 
takeover of the old universities under a new jurisdiction, regardless that the 
old institutions were required to formally approve certain decisions. A 
similar ‗information coup‘ took place when the new Aalto management 
announced that they would inform the administrative units how the 
administrative processes would be structured. The other option would have 
been allowing the old administrations to negotiate a new structure that 
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would then have been assigned under a new manager, but this solution 
would have left the power of information lower in the organization. 
Many writers (e.g. Cohen, March and Simon 1972, Hannan and Freeman 
1977, Aldrich 1999 and Scott 2003) suggest that the partially irrational 
internal information processes in expert organizations such as universities 
make them especially prone to defective decision-making processes. 
Without doubt the collegial decision-making system in the old system had 
serious flaws. However, the centralization of power, lack of established 
processes and fatigue made information processing capabilities a critical 
issue for the Aalto management. The empirical evidence suggests that 
optimism, overconfidence and selective use of information degraded the 
management‘s situational awareness during the early phases of the project. 
It should be also be recognized that the social reality created by the early 
Aalto actors, especially the Aalto Transformation Team, set strong 
limitations for the later actors, such as Aalto University management, to 
interpret their environment. Furthermore, the collegial decision-making 
bodies had been important instruments for communicating important 
developments between the management and the academic community. 
Disbanding these forums made it much more difficult for the management 
to get their message through and gather real-time feedback. 
As the project progressed and the new university management was 
appointed, it seems that attention patterns became more important, with 
variation in results by where the key leaders turned their attention to, and 
by who attended to what. As much of the strategic decision-making 
revolved around the President, the process how the President‘s attention 
was focused, who had access to the President, and where came the 
information that the President‘s decision-making was based on, became 
critical issues of the Aalto university decision-making. 
6.1.3 Internal Political Constraints 
Internal political constraints emerged from the data as an extremely 
prominent theme second only to internal institutional constraints. There 
was significant evidence supporting internal politics as a source of inertia 
across different phases of the project and all informant groups. This is not 
particularly surprising in light of existing literature, much of which suggests 
that for instance major change, large size, maturity and high 
decentralization in expert organizations generally make organizations more 
susceptible to political games (Mintzberg 2009). 
Probably the most characteristic political feature evident in the data was 
the central position of the academic staff, especially the professors, in the 
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perceived dominant coalition (Scott 2003) whose preferences could not be 
neglected in the change effort. Even after strengthening the leadership 
across the organization, centralization of power and seeking to define 
academic freedom more narrowly than before, the new management 
recognized that the strategic leadership of the university‘s research and 
teaching was in the collective control of the academic faculty, and that the 
support of at least key academics was needed for other reforms as well. 
Therefore the core of the dominant coalition remained largely the same 
through the transformation. What did happen, however, was that the 
tripartite system was dissolved, meaning that the academics, other staff and 
students no longer had formal power in the decision-making system. 
Therefore it could be asked, did the other members of the academic 
community than the prominent professors lose their power, if the other 
staff and students were no longer part of the dominant coalition. The 
answer is yes and no.  
On one hand all the tripartite groups of university democracy lost their 
formal power, and the representative democracy was replaced with a 
system where the formal power and responsibility was concentrated on 
certain leaders. Although the new leaders were more accountable for their 
decisions, the debate that previously could take place openly in formal 
tripartite decision-making bodies, had to move behind the scenes, where 
invisible lobbyists tried to influence the decision-makers. The power of the 
internal groups could remain high, but it became dependent on the 
goodwill and attention of the decision-makers, and unwanted voices could 
be simply ignored. 
On the other hand, however, it can be questioned if the non-professor 
staff and students were members of an actual dominant coalition in the old 
system at all, and how open and transparent the decision-making in the 
tripartite bodies really was. If the old system is considered more like a 
decoupled façade of a democracy with the important decisions de facto 
arranged behind the scenes by key leaders, then the dominant coalition 
effectively remained the same in the transformation, constituting of all 
internal groups whose support was needed for a certain initiative, with the 
coalition constantly taking a new shape. In this interpretation the system 
simply became more effective with clearer responsibilities. In neither case, 
however, the actual decision-making system can be called especially open 
or transparent although forums for debate existed. 
Another interesting topic emerging from the data is the issue of resource 
control. Scott (2003) argues that the resource distribution is a significant 
indicator of the ―true‖ goals of the management, as opposed to the 
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ceremonial goals emphasized in political rhetoric. During the Aalto 
transformation the resource distribution gained a variation of this 
interpretation. As the academic community was expecting significant extra 
resources based on political rhetoric and public discussion in the media, but 
not much of the resources had actualized by 2009, much of the academic 
staff interpreted the lack of resources as an indicator that Aalto was just talk 
and that the rest of the promised positive reforms wouldn‘t actualize either. 
Furthermore, much support could be found for the claim of Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) that any alteration of organizational structure would cause 
political resistance because even if the reorganization is considered 
beneficial as a whole, most benefits will be shared and are realized only in 
the long run, while most disadvantages of the reorganization normally 
affect only a part of the organization, and are realized immediately. Even 
though practically all Aalto‘s internal subgroups officially supported the 
merger as a whole, in practice many of the subgroups fought back fiercely to 
halt the entire transformation when they felt that their group was at a 
relative disadvantage. Interestingly the source of this most intense internal 
opposition seemed to circulate around the organization as the 
transformation process advanced: starting from TKK top management and 
TaiK students, moving to HSE top management and certain parts of TaiK, 
then to TKK and HSE administration, and finally to certain more applied 
science –oriented academic units of TKK and HSE.  
Finally, the distinction between user and supporter –orientations 
available for organizational participants (see Chapter 3.2.3) is interesting in 
the context of Aalto transformation. An expected development is the change 
from the Aalto Transformation Team and early Aalto University 
management (that were heavily dominated by dedicated supporters) to the 
later much extended Aalto University management where participants with 
a more pragmatic user orientation were becoming more abundant. The 
shifting balance caused some tension between the different orientations. 
However, it seems that supporters were abundant not only in the Aalto 
proponents, the new management and early adopters, but also in the old 
universities with the dedication aimed at the existing structures instead of 
Aalto. In general, there seemed to be relatively more supporters of the old 
system in administration than in academic units, and more in HSE and 
TaiK than in the larger TKK. From this perspective, ‗supporting a noble 
cause‘ was not the privilege of Aalto management as the new managers 
often liked to think, but rather a clash of supporters of different ideologies 
took place. If this has been the case, a transformation story based on past 
strengths might have been more effective than one based on future 
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opportunities in such units. However, such recognition of the past proved 
difficult to be integrated to the official story of a historical change. 
6.1.4 Internal Institutional Constraints 
Internal institutional constraints emerged as the dominant theme 
characterizing organizational inertia in universities. Much of the change 
effort culminated to the new management‘s attempt to change the ―control 
culture‖ of the past to the ―service culture‖ of the future, but more broadly 
the change was about trying to change how things were done in a university, 
which required challenging the institutionalized behavior. Simultaneously it 
was necessary to create a new pluralistic Aalto culture that would have 
something to offer for each of the old universities with strong, long and 
quite homogenous cultural roots. 
The strong cultures of the old universities and their certain subunits 
were a decisive factor in shaping the debate around Aalto transformation. 
As Hannan and Freeman (1977) suggested, the normatively agreed 
processes seemed to significantly limit the serious consideration of different 
available options to only a few alternatives, which was evident for instance 
in the work of the ‗theme groups‘ set up in 2008. Most of the suggestions 
made by the groups were incremental developments or compromises 
between existing solutions. The normative approval also granted 
justification and organizing principle to forces that chose to oppose the 
change by providing a common cause above mere self-interest. The 
ambiguous concepts of academic freedom and classical humboldtian 
university provided this ammunition for the opponents of national 
university reform. The power of such concepts was so great that they were 
actually used by the proponents of the change as well to support their own 
cause. The management claimed that they were paving the way for 
academic freedom, and even nurtured visions where the new Aalto 
University would restore the original humboldtian virtues (instead of the 
―misinterpreted‖ humboldtian virtues championed by their opponents) to 
value, such as bringing the students back to the core of learning in the 
university. This part of the management‘s rhetoric stemming from the 
recognized institutions bears echoes from the work of Clemens and Cook 
(1999), who claim that the most ambitious innovators may well cloak their 
efforts for change in appeals to restore tradition to keep their calls for 
change within accepted models.  
In general, however, it seems that the Aalto management has had the 
courage to challenge the old institutions directly. Therefore the 
management must have seen the culture not only as something static and 
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institutionalized, but also as a malleable tool that can have been used in 
transforming the organization, as suggested by Gioia and Thomas (1997). 
A further interesting reflection of some of the dynamics of Aalto project 
is the concept of enforcement of unpopular norms introduced by Willer, 
Kuwabara and Macy (2009). The writers suggest that people enforce 
unpopular norms to show that they comply out of genuine conviction and 
not because of social pressure. The first thought is naturally that this might 
be part of the explanation why undesirable behavior such as a control 
culture can develop among motivated professionals. However, it is worth 
thinking that neither all the reforms actually implemented by Aalto have 
been terribly popular. Might it be that some members of the university 
community help to enforce any reforms proposed by Aalto management 
mainly to identify themselves as genuine supporters of the new culture? 
Guiding the organization through a major change necessarily demanded 
charismatic leadership. Supporting the notions of for instance Barley and 
Kunda (1992), Aldrich (1999) and Scott (2003), this leadership may have 
interesting implications for the future of Aalto. Firstly, any routines and 
processes dating back to the period of founding are resilient to change 
because they are associated with the strong emotions of organization‘s early 
development, increasing the vitality of cultural elements established by the 
early management. Secondly, the very processes how important decisions 
are made and how the structure of the organization is altered shape the 
character of the organization. Therefore the informal social structure of the 
Aalto University has likely adapted to maximize its influence on the early 
strategic decisions and key decision-makers, and will try to retain this 
influence if the decision-making structure is later tried to be changed. This 
will further encourage the encoding of charismatic leadership into the 
structures of the organization, meaning that even charisma can be 
institutionalized. 
These examples underline that the establishment of new institutions is 
already rapidly progressing in the new organization, decreasing the 
flexibility of the management and making any major future change 
initiatives more challenging. Scott (2003: 181) has proposed that 
organization develops from one stage to another during its life cycle, with 
each stage requiring different type of leadership and the solutions for each 
stage becoming the problems of the next. Each stage ends in a crisis that the 
organization has to survive to enter the next stage, but normally the 
solutions the management has to offer for solving the crisis are the 
solutions of the past. It seems that Aalto has already moved to the second 
such stage as it progressed from the informal planning of Aalto 
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Transformation Team to the more serious phase run by the first Aalto 
University management with established leadership structure and the 
actual responsibilities of running a university. The university encountered a 
crisis as it was no longer possible to run it with the same informal principles 
which worked well while doing the planning, but simultaneously Aalto 
started to acquire certain unwanted bureaucratic features of the old system 
that it had tried to replace. Probably the most interesting question to be 
asked here is that if Scott‘s model still applies, what will be the next stage of 
development for Aalto University, and which will be the old solutions of the 
first Aalto University management that no longer apply for the future state 
of the organization. In such case the challenge for the present Aalto 
management is if and how it can maintain a degree of flexibility that will 
allow it to make future development of the organization possible. 
6.1.5 Barriers of Entry/Exit 
Entry and exit barriers represent a rather obvious inertial element for any 
organization. Perhaps for this reason there was enough evidence in the data 
to point out that the barriers were there, but they provided little reason for 
extended debate and emerged only as a minor theme from the data. 
However, there was some evidence that Aalto was trying some limits of 
the barriers. Previously the barriers had simply been taken for granted 
because a university was expected to fulfill a role assigned by the 
government, but now there was, for instance, debate about how extensively 
Aalto should continue bachelor-level education and if Aalto could divest 
some disciplines to better focus on its strengths. 
A further interesting speculation is the significance of the ―red queen 
model‖ suggested by Barnett and Sorenson (2002). According to their 
model, competition triggers organizational learning, which in turn 
intensifies competition and causes some organizations to grow and evolve 
quickly and establish strong barriers of entry while limiting the choice 
available for the organizations involved. In principle the Finnish higher 
education system was in a state of low competition before the university 
reform, but the reform encouraged national and international competition 
for resources and talent to boost the quality of the system. Now if the red 
queen model would apply, it would imply that if even some of the 
universities would increase their efforts to compete internationally, it would 
start a cycle of learning and competition requiring the other universities to 
join the game before the barriers of entry would grow too high. Through 
this mechanism Aalto University would work to fulfill its national mission 
of spearheading a wider reform. 
Organizational Inertia in Aalto University 150 
 
6.1.6 External Legitimacy Constraints 
External legitimacy constraints emerged as a significant theme 
characterizing both the old university system and Aalto transformation. 
There were a number of authorities and pressure groups whose 
expectations had to be satisfied, and that could influence Aalto through 
laws, policies, resources and public debate. In general this was something 
that the Aalto management thought that they could do little about, and in 
fact many of these stakeholders had proven invaluable assets for Aalto to 
reach its goals. 
In light of the existing literature much of the observed behavior of Aalto 
University in relation to external established institutions is quite 
unorthodox. For instance Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984) suggest that 
the key success factor for private sector organizations is efficiency, but on 
the public sector the success is largely based on isomorphism to 
institutionally accepted behavior. Meyer and Rowan (1977) continue that 
the best way for a complex organization of experts such as a university to 
manage the conflicting needs of external legitimacy and internal efficiency 
is to maintain a loosely coupled state with a legitimate façade and unofficial 
but efficient processes behind the scenes (see Chapter 3.2.6). These 
characterizations seem to describe rather well the old universities, 
particularly TKK and HSE, and are supported by the accounts of the 
informants. Nevertheless, it seems that Aalto University has been able not 
only to challenge and break many of the institutionalized models, but to 
actually make the system follow its own example. This sounds like a 
decisive breakthrough for the proponents of Aalto as the spearhead of 
national higher education reform. However, the actual interactions between 
different actors are likely more dynamic. 
As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued, many organizations actively seek 
charters from authorities and manage to institutionalize their goals and 
structures in the rules enforced by the authorities.  Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) wrote that powerful institutions attempt to build their goals directly 
into society as institutionalized rules. But in the case of Aalto University it 
must be remembered that the university itself and the reform it is based on 
are products of the wishes and efforts of key stakeholders such as the 
government, the funders and even other rivaling universities. Therefore it is 
actually a false observation that Aalto would have changed the system, but 
rather that the collective need of the system to change has produced Aalto 
as a test platform with a limited free will. Such a collective change of 
institutionalized rules is an even more significant phenomenon than the 
breakthrough of a single organization. 
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If this is indeed the case, then the next question is where the new set of 
rules or new institutions came from. The answer is readily available: in the 
face of globalization pressures and increasing international competition, 
the universities with their most important stakeholders realized that the 
system had to be changed. If the universities wanted to compete in the 
international series, they could no longer use the national best practices as 
the basis of evaluating their institutionalized behavior, but had to search for 
new models internationally. This granted legitimacy to such models that 
could not have been fitted to the framework of old institutions, such as 
universities based on private foundations and run by external boards. 
This unique situation allowed Aalto University to neglect established 
institutionalized myths and abandon its loosely coupled structure. 
However, it is less clear if the loose coupling still exists in some parts of the 
organization internally, as some functions and units have not necessarily 
been able to match the speed of the rapid change, and may seek to present 
themselves to the new management as effective without actually complying 
with the new procedures.  Furthermore, it is possible that Aalto will later 
resume the partially loosely coupled structure as time goes by, regulatory 
environment tightens and the privileges of the university are scaled down. 
6.1.7 Limitations of Collective Rationality 
Limitations of Collective Rationality emerged as a primary theme especially 
in the accounts of the Aalto University management. Inconsistencies and 
shortcomings in decision-making were identified to be more the rule than 
an exception in the behavior of the old system, but they were present in all 
phases of Aalto project as well. However, these limitations of decision-
making in old and new system were different in nature. 
It seems that Cohen, March and Olsen managed to describe many 
features of the traditional universities with their ‗Garbage can model‘ of 
organized anarchies (1972), see Chapter 3.2.7. In these organizations 
preferences were often discovered through action instead of acting on the 
basis of preferences, the universities‘ own processes were not necessarily 
understood by their members, and the participation of the members to 
different domains was often fluid. The decision-making had two dominant 
elements: the inefficient collective tripartite system where the groups had a 
tendency to vote against each other, and a strong tendency to avoid conflict, 
risk taking and mistakes. As a result the decision-making bodies were 
mostly capable to solve only trivial matters through resolution, and 
especially the most important decisions such as strategies were not likely to 
resolve significant issues. Instead the system had a tendency to resolve 
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issues through flight and assign them somewhere else to be made (for 
instance the President or deans), or through oversight if the true 
consequences of the decisions were not known. This caused many structural 
issues to emerge again and again in slightly different form with the system 
unable to resolve them once and for all. 
Before the President was appointed there was similar ambiguity in the 
decision-making of emerging Aalto, as the project had no clear ownership 
or the decision-makers resorted to flight to avoid binding the hands of the 
upcoming President. 
The new more centralized decision-making system in Aalto, on the other 
hand, was at least in theory much more capable in producing and 
implementing decisions, especially such decisions that did not enjoy the 
support of all internal groups. The strategic decision-making was almost 
entirely in the hands of the external Board and the President, who also had 
to address a diverse range of internal and external matters. The potential 
problems of the system were associated with the capacity and information 
biases of these critical decision-makers.  
The external Board was free from the internal politics of the university, 
but on the other hand their time was limited and their decisions were 
heavily dependent on the preparations of the introducers. Thus there was a 
high risk that the Board would make decisions by oversight if the number of 
issues under discussion would not be very limited.  
The President faced the same challenge, as the number of issues she had 
to resolve was immense, and the mechanisms how she focused her 
attention had significant effect on what happened in the organization. Many 
universities have tried to tackle the issue of President‘s limited resources by 
appointing a separate provost to take responsibility for the internal 
management. However, the centralized decision-making system obviously 
served to avoid decision-making by flight, and the system had the capability 
to resolve even strategic issues. 
6.1.8 Limitations of Learning 
Limitations of learning emerged as a moderately significant secondary 
theme across the data. The management faced a tremendous challenge in 
learning new skills while moving through uncharted territory in building a 
new organization. The managers were also aware of their own limitations in 
learning, and they resorted to hiring external management professionals, 
using consultants, and utilizing the academic change management skills of 
their professors. 
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Even though several writers such as Salaman (2001), Johnson (1987), 
Contu, Grey and Ortenbla (2003), and even Mintzberg (2009) remind of 
the limitations of the learning organization, it seems that the studied 
change process has been so rapid and dynamic that the human limitations 
of the management have been more significant in limiting learning than 
organizational phenomena. Neither is there significant evidence 
demonstrating where the learning would have failed, so learning-based 
issues have not likely been especially significant sources of inertia in the 
change process. On the contrary, the learning capabilities of the 
management seem to have been very good. 
Nevertheless, one issue worth discussing is the notion of Johnson (1987) 
and Mintzberg (2009) that uncontrolled learning can lead to strategic drift, 
meaning that an organization can learn away from what works. If this is 
combined to Staw‘s (1976) notion of escalating commitment, it is possible 
to imagine a scenario where the new management is so focused on 
developing new processes and skills that the change that should be only a 
tool turns into a goal in itself, and the organization actually loses important 
knowledge by learning away from previous good practices. As Aalto works 
as a test platform for new ideas, there is also the risk that proponents of 
these ideas are ready to go to great lengths in trying to prove themselves 
right. Such behavior could lead to escalating commitment, where after 
initial failure the decision-makers keep investing more resources in hoping 
to recoup the initial losses and not recognizing that the situation may be 
hopeless. 
Finally, it should be remembered that Aalto is not the first private 
university in Finland. There have been several, the last of which were taken 
over by the government in the 1970s. Furthermore, a large number of 
university mergers have taken place internationally, only a small minority 
of which have been considered successful. These facts remind of the 
warnings of Levinthal and March (1993), who identified the ―learning 
myopia‖ – a tendency to overlook distant times, distant places, and failures. 
6.2 Limitations and suggestions for 
further research 
No empirical study is free of limitations, and this work is no exception. 
Hopefully the limitations identified here serve not only as qualifiers of this 
work, but also as pointers for future research. 
The first obvious limitation is the perspective. As stated before, I believe 
that the perspective of organizational inertia has been fruitful in describing 
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the dynamics of a complex change effort and identifying issues that the 
management should be conscious of. However, it would have been equally 
possible to choose for instance the perspective of organizational adaptation, 
and focus on the dynamic characteristics of the organization making it more 
malleable. 
The second limitation is the fact that this is a case study of a single case. 
Considering the uniqueness of the case I believe that it has been a well-
founded decision to focus on only one case, but this can limit the 
transferability of the findings. On the other hand extensive studies of major 
public sector transformations have been almost nonexistent when 
compared to private sector studies, and hopefully this rather detailed 
analysis contributes to help this shortage. 
Thirdly, part of the data used in this study, namely the interviews of 
Aalto Transformation Team in 2008-09 and the staff feedback of 2009 
have not been originally gathered for the purposes of this study. Of course 
this may have also positive implications like reducing the researcher-
generated bias, but this data can also have some gaps that could have been 
filled in a dedicated data set. A crucial benefit of this data, however, is that 
it has been collected in real time when the described events were still 
unfolding. Therefore it has been possible to make a longitudinal study with 
no problems of retrospective questionnaires. 
Finally, I identify myself not only a researcher but also a previous active 
participant in the Aalto project, and a supporter of the new university, even 
though without any present role in the project. However, I have done my 
best to take any subjective biases into account and have focused this 
research on areas with little personal contribution. I also believe that the 
available tacit knowledge of the intricacies of the project has helped to 
guide the research into relevant areas.  
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6.3 Conclusions 
In the beginning of this research project, I set out to serve two audiences: 
The Aalto University management and the scientific community. For the 
management I promised to find out what was going on in their university, 
and how had organizational inertia contributed to their change effort. For 
science I promised to do my best to put together the various fragments of 
theory about organizational inertia and see if they could actually explain the 
phenomena observed in a major university merger. I claim to have fulfilled 
both my promises, but leave it to my audiences to decide if the results were 
what they wanted to hear. In any case, I believe that the most important 
contribution of this work is not any single punchline extracted from the 
conclusions, but rather that the beauty is in the details, leaving room for 
knowledgeable people to draw their own conclusions. It must be also 
remembered that this study covers only the very first years of an ongoing 
transformation. Therefore the results provide no answer to the question, 
was Aalto University successful or not. This remains to be seen. 
 
Scientifically the study clearly illustrates the importance of organizational 
inertia as a concept, and its power to explain and classify complex 
organizational phenomena as a framework. The model of eight sources of 
inertia emerging from this study resembles an expanded version of the 
model presented by Hannan and Freeman (1977) which was later 
supplemented by Hannan, Pólós and Carroll (2003). However, where this 
earlier work has been very general in defining and describing the concepts 
– only by a few sentences -, I have strived to create a framework that would 
have more depth and some real explaining power. Furthermore, even 
though I found the labels used by Hannan and Freeman illustrative, 
practically all concepts have been completely redefined, mostly 
independently from their work.  
The grounded framework is also very flexible in nature. It manages to 
explain most of the relevant phenomena encountered during the study, with 
an apparent focus in institutional, political, legitimacy and information 
issues in the public sector case. However, there is reason to believe that if 
the same framework would be used to analyze for instance a private sector 
merger, the economically more significant themes such as sunk costs and 
entry/exit barriers would become more prominent. 
The study also illustrates the significance of cultural, institutional and 
decision-making issues. Prominent writers like Richard Scott (2003), 
Howard Aldrich (1999), Henry Mintzberg (2009), and John Meyer and 
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Brian Rowan (1977) seem to have been right in most of their grim 
conclusions. A typical university organization is a mess of politics, rivalry, 
problematic leadership and complex social networks. However, it may be 
that there is more hope than these writers acknowledge, because the study 
also suggests that the university organization can be more malleable than 
expected. It has been asked if it is possible to lead a university. This study 
suggests that it may be very hard to lead the people in a university, but the 
management can certainly make an effort to lead the image of a university 
by creating a compelling transformation story, and such a story may be a 
powerful driver of change indeed. Gioia and Thomas (1996) gained similar 
results in their study of an American university, but as their focus was 
mostly in the sensemaking of top management they missed most of the 
significant inertial elements emerging from other parts of the organization. 
Another significant observation is the fact that organizational inertia 
emerged not only as a force making the change more difficult, or change 
context in the terms of this study. Instead the inertial themes observed in 
the pre-merger organization formed the rationale for the entire change 
effort, in other words were key triggers of change. Therefore this study 
provides strong support for the subtle work of Zajac and Kraatz (1993), 
suggesting that certain forces can act simultaneously to initiate and inhibit 
strategic change by increasing the need while decreasing the ability to 
change. 
 
For the Aalto University management my message is that the Aalto project 
has thus far gone surprisingly well considering that it has never actually 
been completely under control. The positive trend is even more significant 
as much of the organizational literature and international examples of past 
university mergers and turnarounds paint a rather grim picture of the odds 
for affecting a major change. The management has been able to identify and 
satisfy the needs of key stakeholders in the surrounding society and ensure 
broad external support, which has been decisive in gathering necessary 
resources (including talent) and maintaining public discussion that has 
supported the construction of a desired image for the new university. In 
general, the management‘s principal goals (even if not necessarily all of the 
means) are acknowledged also by their own academic community, and the 
management has been able to come up with a compelling story that has 
inspired some desired changes in the organization. The overall rate of 
reforms that have been actually implemented during a relatively short 
transformation period challenges the picture of universities as extremely 
static organizations. 
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However, the study also reveals much of the limitations for planning and 
pulling through such a complex transformation. Many of the frameworks 
used by the management were very basic tools incapable of explaining the 
complex social, political and cultural phenomena that actually dominated 
the organization. Management also had the tendency to emphasize 
principles of rational decision-making and planning, although their 
decision-making was only partially rational with serious limitations for 
instance in information, and many of the best results seemed to be a result 
of dynamic adaptation to a rapidly changing situation rather than complex 
plans that would turn out to be outdated when they were finally finished. 
The management had also been successful in creating a powerful future 
vision, but had trouble in communicating and implementing the vision 
effectively. Furthermore, the Aalto identity and culture remain shallow and 
recognized mostly by the relatively small elite when compared to the old 
still vital identities of TKK, HSE and TaiK. Moreover, it remains to be seen 
if Aalto will actually be successful in its goal of reducing bureaucracy, or if 
the control culture will simply evolve to take a different form. 
 
Let us now conclude this investigation of organizational inertia with a 
quotation from Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1976). They suggest that 
in a turbulent environment, the correct solution might not be a complex 
and bureaucratic traditional organization - an organizational palace. 
Instead, they suggest building an organizational tent. 
 
In constant surroundings, one could confidently assemble an 
intricate, rigid structure combining elegant and refined 
components – an organizational palace. …  
 
However, systematic procedures offer weak protection 
against unpredictability, just as increased rigidity does not 
effectively prepare a building for earthquakes. … Residents of 
changing environments need a tent.  
 
An organizational tent places greater emphasis on flexibility, 
creativity, immediacy, and initiative than on authority, 
clarity, decisiveness, or responsiveness; and an 
organizational tent neither asks for harmony between the 
activities of different organizational components, nor asks 
that today‟s behavior resemble yesterday‟s or tomorrow‟s.  
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Why behave more consistently than one‟s world does? 
 
-Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1976: 44-45, adapted from 
Scott 2003: 306-307) 
 
Perhaps Aalto University should choose a tent instead of a palace?  
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Aalto University formally started its 
operations 1.1.2010, forcing a number of 
fundamental changes to the old 
organizations it is based on. These include, 
but are not limited to, a new top 
management, new management system and 
complete reorganization of central 
administration, new organizational form, 
moving the whole personnel from public 
civil service positions to private contracts, 
major organizational restructuring, and a 
stated goal of the new top management to 
change the culture of the university. Such a 
transformation would be challenging for any 
organization, but many writers have pointed 
out that many features of universities make 
them especially difﬁcult to change. This 
study uses an extensive data set of staff 
feedback, top management interviews and 
Aalto project planning material to construct 
a model of eight principal sources of 
organizational inertia to explain and 
interpret the complex organizational 
phenomena encountered during the ﬁrst 
years of the construction (2007-2010) of a 
new university. 
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